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ABSTRACT 
Using the 2004 Rural Development Initiative data, 99 communities are compared. Three 
varieties of social capital and ten other constructs serve as dependent variables. The social 
capital forms are within group, between group, and out-bridging. The dependent qualities are 
homogeneity, us-versus-them, embeddedness, selectorate, trusting attitude, cohesiveness, 
contentment, relational rationality, satisfaction with public services and satisfaction with 
government services. The four forms of cardinality are level cardinality, bijective cardinality, 
injective cardinality and composite cardinality. An analytic paradigm employing lattices and 
network analysis is developed to analyze hypotheses. I also address a confusion that grows 
from sociology investigating groups and group interaction with an ontologically individualist 
focus. In this dissertation I prove, using the logic of sets pursuant with set theory, that the 
application of methodological individualism is a mistake. I prove instead that decision-
making is embedded in the social order and that a relational perspective employing 
methodological holism can be achieved. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background of the Problem 
This dissertation analyzes the social capital of small towns in Iowa using theoretical and 
analytical advances to understand how these small communities improve with social capital. 
Social capital is one of the most exciting, powerful, and resilient concepts in recent sociology 
(Waldstrom and Svendsen 2008). After much debate, sociologists have reached tentative 
agreement that the definition of social capital is social networks characterized by trust, as 
propagated by Robert Putnam, particularly at the macro level (Godoy et. al 2007; Chiesi 2007).  
There is debate about how social capital is operationalized. Survey based research and 
network perspectives have been dominant approaches (Chiesi 2007). Profound awareness of the 
value of social networks has been accompanied by useful analytical techniques and 
methodologies. Network analysis focuses on the ego-individual at the center of the network. It is 
best applied in social psychology and is problematic for sampling. Survey research, however, has 
difficulty capturing the relational nature of social reality (Emirbayer 1997). Mapping entire 
networks is cost prohibitive, difficult, and does not work well with sampling (Freeman 2000). 
There is no distinct empirical methodological approach for the sociological study of social 
capital that takes this into account (Borgatti, Jones and Everett 1998). 
 This dissertation addresses that problem by breaking it into two parts. First, the 
operational concepts involved in social capital lack theoretical clarity. Second, they lack 
methodological clarity. Previous researchers have not sufficiently considered procedures that 
capture the relational nature of interaction. Social capital research requires a distinctly 
sociological way of understanding social networks that are characterized by trust. 
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 Robert (2007) at the Harvard Kennedy School is conducting state of the art of empirical 
social capital research. He summarized much of his recent endeavor with the essential notion that 
diversity weakens community. It reduces trust both within and between groups. In typical 
Putnam fashion, the simplicity of this statement disguises a great deal of complexity and 
extensive empirical work. The essential notion may be restated as; low homogeneity in those 
qualities community members use to construct their identities reduces indicators of social 
capital. The best solution is to change what factors are used to construct identity. This idea that 
homogenous communities where people see themselves as similar to their neighbors on 
important questions are more likely sites for rich networks typified by trust is not a particularly 
controversial idea, but much of what Putnam does is clarify terms. The idea that diversity is good 
is a bulwark of academics, but examining what diversity is reveals negative short term 
consequences for social capital. 
 If Putnam is correct and diversity reduces social capital, sociologists exploring social 
capital need an exact understanding of what is meant by diversity. At its core that is an 
ontological question. How a community defines its identity defines difference (Mead 1913; 
1934).  
 The reason this question is ontological is that communities are either real entities or they 
are simple aggregates of people. How researchers view communities decides how they define 
diversity. If communities are aggregates then diversity is the individual differences among 
people who are forced to interact because of economic or geographical constraints. If 
communities are ontological realities, then diversity is a quality of the group that must be 
addressed at a group level.  
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 In this dissertation I adopt the perspective that communities can acquire ontological 
reality, but not all do. They range from simple aggregates of individuals to collective constructs. 
How a community sees itself dramatically affects the presence of social capital. 
 To place the communities along this ontological range I employ nine dependent 
variables. I contrast the concepts of rationality and embeddedness as keys for understanding how 
communities see their selves. I also measure the presence of an us-versus-them mindset in each 
community, community cohesiveness and community trust, community homogeneity, 
contentment, and community satisfaction with government and satisfaction with public services. 
These factors all contribute to a more robust understanding of the diversity of a community, and 
promote a sociological understanding of how a community may perceive its character. These are 
used for testing hypothesis among the sample communities. 
I employ three empirically measured constructs of social capital. Out-community 
bridging, within group bonding, and between group bridging forms of social capital are central 
for this examination and also serve as measures for sampling the communities. 
 I clearly state how and why I measure the various forms of social capital and the other 
dependent concepts, using a data set designed for measuring social capital. It is a largely settled 
question that social capital is networks and trust, yet there are many unanswered theoretical 
questions about the nature of social capital. Most of the questions are ultimately concerned with 
the ontological nature of groups. I explore the relevant social capital theoretical questions in light 
of this inquiry. In the end, I present a strong and clear suggestion for future research using the 
concepts relevant to a community's sense of identity. I also suggest several measurement 
refinements. In examining this data I introduce some analytical techniques based on 
mathematical concepts best suited for the prescient ideas. I use lattices that capture network 
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concepts and fully explain the philosophical, mathematical and sociological theories behind these 
methodological decisions. 
Throughout this dissertation I explore the recognition of new political and social realities 
as a contemporary theme. Putnam treats community as an agentic entity, thus endorsing 
embeddedness over rational purposive action. He suggests a direction for the whole of sociology 
into the new century. Rational purposive action is the idea that society is a series of decisions 
where actors try to maximizing their personal benefit. Embeddedness is the idea that social 
actors exist in a social universe of contexts where their decisions are understood in terms of the 
social reality where they are embedded (Putnam 1995; 2000). There is risk of viewing embedded 
actors as over-socialized (Granovetter 1985). 
 
The Problem 
This dissertation addresses the problem that sociology lacks the conceptual clarity and 
analytical tools to understand social capital in a networked society. 
 Measuring social capital consistently with its theoretical description, networks and trust, 
is difficult. Sociology as a discipline has not arrived at an understanding of the concept for 
empirical use that is consistent with the sociological tradition or with the understanding of 
networks characterized by trust. This is in part because network theory typically employs an ego-
network. An ego-network shows an individual and all of the individuals to whom they are 
connected for some specific quality. Sampling the network destroys its validity, and makes 
useless most common network measures. Also, ego-networks are intrinsically psychological. 
However, as a direction for sociological research (Emirbayer 1997; Freeman 1996) relational 
sociology indicates that network theory holds great promise. It reveals truths about social 
 5  
 
 
structures. I propose the use of concept lattices for transforming data in a way that captures the 
value of a network perspective, but allows for sampling and maintains a fundamentally 
sociological perspective. 
 I also address a confusion that grows from sociology investigating groups and group 
interaction with an ontologically individualist focus. This confusion makes the discipline seem 
both archaic and befuddled by comparison with pointed disciplines like economics. But at the 
same time people see sociology as a common sense discipline, because they recognize its 
insistence that groups and group interaction are real and that people live their lives embedded in 
society. In this dissertation I prove, using the logic of sets pursuant with set theory, that the 
application of methodological individualism is a mistake. I prove instead that decision-making is 
embedded in the social order and that a relational perspective employing methodological holism 
can be achieved. 
 
Theoretical Context 
 Social capital theory may be understood as a debate between the proponents of rational 
choice theory, who see social capital as an instrumental tool akin to fiscal capital or human 
capital, and proponents of embeddedness theory who view it as a summary description of the 
presence of useful networks and trust in a group. The difference between these perspectives is 
one of ontology. Rational choice proponents suggest social capital resides in individuals who use 
it for their own purposes in a way that generally serves their affiliated groups as simple 
aggregates. All actions that are instrumentally useful to the members of the group are useful to 
the group. The embeddedness perspective views capital as a property of the group and requires 
that individuals adjust their actions in order to mobilize capital in useful ways for the group. 
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 On the group-as-aggregate side of the debate are well respected social capital theorists 
like James Coleman, Nan Lin, and Alejandro Portes. On the group-as-distinct side of the debate 
are Robert Putnam, Pierre Bourdieu and Mark Granovetter. These writers express nuances that 
acknowledge the other perspective. Both sides of the debate have long records of successful 
empirical enquiry supporting their assertions, and so in all likelihood both are correct. I propose 
viewing a community's social capital on a measurable continuum ranging from individuated to 
embedded. This recognizes both perspectives but privileging measuring the actual practices of 
the subjects of investigation instead of abstracts. 
 Concept lattices can help here because set mathematics is superior for describing 
naturally occurring continuum like group qualities. There are theoretical reasons for using set 
mathematics in the social sciences, particularly when describing the ontological construction of 
communities. The lattice arrays the qualities of the communities on a graduated continuum of 
concepts naturally derived from the data. Concept lattices have implications for methodological 
individualism and methodological collectivism, and the close examination of the implications of 
the two perspectives on social capital is necessary. 
 I draw on Tonnies and Simmel for support arraying group qualities on a continuum. I 
draw analogies between arraying social capital in group contexts on continuum and similar 
historical practice like mechanic and organic solidarity (Durkheim 1947), gesellschaft and 
gemeinschaft (Tonnies 1887), I and Thou (Buber 1970) and I and We (Etzioni 1987). All of 
these distinctions are parallax views of the same fundamental social distinction between a focus 
on group level qualities and a focus on individual level qualities, though they all capture 
important nuances on that distinction. Bourdieu, Granovetter, Coleman, Lin, and many other 
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social capital theorists have identified this problem and attempted to address it through the lenses 
of their own theoretical projects. 
 The works of Mustafa Emirbayer and Pierre Bourdieu offer methodological and 
epistemological solutions to this ontological dilemma. They begin to develop a collective 
methodology that runs contrary to the dominant methodological individualism. I review their 
writing in light of theoretical backgrounds including Putnam’s as I move into my own empirical 
evaluation and look to future research. First, it is necessary to understand the status quo 
represented by methodological individualism. 
 
Methodological Individualism 
 It is simple yet telling that the foundation of rational choice theory, the Nash equilibrium, 
though worthy of a Nobel Prize was the product of a paranoid schizophrenic. John Nash Jr was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1994 along with John C. Harsanyi and 
Reinhard Selten for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative 
games. But, as described in the 1998 book and 2001 movie “A Beautiful Mind” Nash suffered 
from paranoid schizophrenia. He was diagnosed in 1959. The way Nash described people’s 
thought processes in game theory is consistent with the perceptions of a paranoid schizophrenic. 
Nash’s game theory makes the rational actor the foundation of the social universe and 
makes the social universe mass sociopathy. Granovetter (1985) describes this incredibly 
influential worldview as the undersocialized model.  
Rational choice theory makes a commitment to methodological individualism (Friedman 
and Hechter 1988). Methodological individualism assumes that all social action is explained as 
the sum decisions of individual social actors. In the context of rational choice theory self interest 
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alone drives those decisions. Social norms and imperfect information prevent people from 
always acting on their self interest. Lastly, rational choice assumes an aggregation mechanism 
like a social marketplace where individuals are combined for analytical purposes (Friedman and 
Hechter 1988). 
 This perspective models disinterested social players acting in a civil context only when 
pursuing personal goals. It assumes families, friends, or shared interest groups have no reality 
beyond how the members of a group use the group to further their personal ends. It allows for 
members to sacrifice for those groups only if normative restraints demand it and if sacrificing 
will likely pay personal dividends. Even if the mechanism described by rational choice theorists 
is masked behind internal justifications, the assumption that the actor is a calculating machine 
figuring cost-profit ratios and acting upon them rationally makes the mistake of attributing 
reality to convenient systems of categorization. It assumes that math forms the observed reality 
instead of describing it (Latour 2005). 
In certain situations individual do not make decisions as rational actors. This complicates 
things. If the range of relationships and group compositions fall on Tonnies’ (1887) 
gemeinschaft-gesellschaft continuum then relationships characterized as gesellschaft should be 
observed in a rational choice paradigm. Yet, even in those situations most actors interject 
gemeinschaft aspects in their relationships. 
 Sociologists historically sought to explain the nature of social relations in society. Merton 
(1949) provides a structural foundation to these same two sorts of groups, goal oriented and 
ritualized process oriented, corresponding to gesellschaft and gemeinschaft respectively. As an 
example, shared meals are a tool to get business done and can be a chance to build symbolic 
cohesion. It is an old dichotomy that has been described many different ways, reflected in part in 
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Durkheim’s organic-mechanic paradigm, present in Etzioni’s “I and We” (1987) in turn drawn 
on Buber’s “I and Thou” (1970), like many different perspectives seeing the same social truth. I 
contend social truth is most fully revealed through a relational perspective (Emirbayer 1997). 
 The relational perspective requires a foundational perspective to the nature of 
relationships themselves. To qualify what is a relevant relationship for evaluation, social capital 
is the quintessential theoretical tool. 
 
Social Capital 
 There are two primary approaches to social capital. They are the embeddedness 
perspective of Robert Putnam, employed here, and the rational actor perspective of James 
Coleman. The rational actor perspective has value and empirical support, but is subject to the 
ontological confusion emanating from its reliance on methodological individualism. 
 For Coleman (1990) social actors are perfectly rational; the essential human is entirely 
self interested and calculating. Their every decision is based solely on what best serves them 
personally. This vision of the human is economic and founded in the rational actor theory of 
social capital. Coleman, and other social economists (examples include Yamaguchi 2000; Braun 
1994; Turner 1992), spend a lot of effort identifying factors that alter this perfect rational 
individual to make social models fit empirical reality.  
Coleman’s modified social actors have an infinite variety of add-ons. Most of those add-
ons are costs, benefits, norms, sanctions, and externalities. Capitals, including fiscal, human, 
cultural, social and myriad other lesser capitals, describe the flow of resources for acquiring the 
actor’s desire, called the target, in an essential and rational way. In this social model there are no 
intrinsic things called groups. Through add-ons, especially norms, an approximation of a group 
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may emerge but no group could be anything greater than the sum of its parts. Coleman focuses 
on what role one capital resource plays in the acquisition of another.  
Bourdieu (1986) provides a powerful toolbox for addressing this misuse of social capital 
to make social structures seem economic (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Potter 2000). A 
number of his books openly and directly lambaste and ridicule rational choice theory. 
 
“Sartre’s ultra-subjectivist imagination has been outdone by the voluntarism of the 
anthropological fictions to which the ‘rational actor’ theorists have to resort (when they 
actually raise the question, which they usually avoid) in order to make rational decision 
making the sole basis of the rational conduct of the ‘rational actor’, and more especially 
of the constancy and coherence of his preference over time… by refusing to recognize 
any other way of founding it in reason than by giving reason as foundation, they simply 
introduce a being of reason, an ought-to-be, as a vis dormativa, in the form of an agent all 
of whose practices have reason as their principle” (Bourdieu 1990a:46-47). 
 
 I make extensive use of Bourdieu, but as a foundational influence opposing rational 
choice. Bourdieu elicits response from Emirbayer (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Emirbayer 
and Williams 2005) and arrives at an understanding of social ontology quite in keeping with 
embeddedness theory. 
 I find great inspiration in the Durkheimian tradition as expressed in Emirbayer’s 
(Emirbayer 1997) relational sociology. Emirbayer argues Durkheim was dismissed by many 
sociologists of the mid 20th century as useless (Tilly 1981) or unsuited to the primary concerns of 
sociology (Collins 1990; Skocpol 1985). Emirbayer (2003) shows, instead, that Durkheim is 
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extremely applicable to modern sociology. In relational sociology, Emirbayer describes society 
as both constructed by, and constructing, individuals and groups.  
 Emirbayer and Bourdieu (1990a) supply theoretical support to the use of Putnam’s (1995) 
construction of social capital. Statistical tests are applied to the dependent variables to advocate 
an embeddedness perspective of social capital, sympathetic to relational sociology using set 
theory (Badiou 2005) and concept lattices (Freeman and White 1993). 
 Robert Putnam incorporated some of Coleman’s thought by developing a two-level game 
theory, and champions the idea that voluntary organization involvement is beneficial to a society 
using an embeddedness model of social capital. People, in practice, often act against their own 
best interest, not from a rational calculation but from a gemeinschaft sense of community. 
Sociology will benefit from a thorough theoretical proof of the practical inapplicability of game 
theory to the human condition in community. 
The application of game theory in social analysis is well demonstrated by the selectorate. 
It has a robust empirical body and much success but clearly demonstrated the almost myopic 
limits of its applicability. 
 
The Selectorate 
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s concept of the selectorate applies many of Coleman’s ideas 
to prove rational choice theory. The selectorate is the part of a population that is capable of 
bestowing power. In a liberal democracy like America the selectorate is the voting public. In a 
dictatorship the selectorate may be generals or warlords. In 1984 he predicted that Hojatolislam 
Khamenei and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani would succeed Khomeini’s reign, five years before it 
happened. It made him famous among political scientists. 
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De Mesquita’s defines rational as whatever cost is paid to the selectorate to maintain 
power. In democracy it may be effective policy. In the dictatorship it may be munitions and large 
bribes. This application describes the agent as homo economicus, the self interested and 
calculating agent. De Mesquita (1984) predicts events in international politics using rational 
choice. His scope is limited because his purposive description of personhood is not applicable in 
social situations described as gemeinschaft, like family. It is highly applicable in gesellschaft, 
like international politics. Situations that mix the two, like private business, are nominally 
applicable. When applied as the theory dictates, this dissertation shows that rational choice does 
not fit general situations in American social life. By extension, the other forms of rational choice, 
such as those developed by Coleman, Elster, and Boudon, are at their core built on the same 
ontological model, but incorporate various modifications to fit empirical observation. They are 
also less useful than the embeddedness model of social ontology. 
 
Research Objective 
 This dissertation tests the theoretical qualities of social capital. The social capital 
literature addresses the argument for understanding social capital and broader aspects of 
sociology as a contention between rational choice and embeddedness, ontological individualism 
and ontological collectivism. Refining this theoretical point is an important goal of this study. 
A 2004 study offers theoretical clarification. The study was a follow up to a 1994 study 
that surveyed 10,798 Iowans in communities of 500 to 10, 000 people, that were not contiguous 
with population centers of 50,000 or more people. The respondents were heads or co-heads of 
households probability-sampled from households randomly selected from communities randomly 
selected from each of Iowa’s 99 counties. So the respondents represent the 408 Iowa 
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communities with populations of 500-10,000. Survey questionnaires were administered with an 
overall response rate of 72.7%. This research was funded through the Iowa Agriculture and 
Home Economics Experiment Station, College of Agriculture, Iowa State University. The 
authors of the study were Vernon Ryan, Andy L. Terry and Danyal Woebke. See RDI-0101 for 
further information on the study. 
 The people in these communities may be fairly characterized as sharing interests and 
concerns with one another and I characterize the relationships as primarily gemeinschafitan, 
particularly by comparison to the relationships present in national and international politics. 
 The 2004 study, used in this dissertation, is a ten-year follow up to the first. Its authors 
were Kerry Agnitsch, Terry Besser, Jean Friestad, and Monica Whitham. The Iowa Agriculture 
and Home Economics Experiment Station, College of Agriculture, Iowa State University again 
funded the research this time in conjunction with the National Research Initiative, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture under Agreement Number 2003-35401-13828. 9962 respondents 
answered the survey instrument the second time around with an average response rate if 67%. 
The same communities were addressed, and within each community the same sampling 
techniques were used. Reading the original documents is well worth the time, if simply for the 
insight it provides into the changing face of rural Iowa and America. For the second study see 
RDI-225 for further information. 
The second objective of this dissertation, in pursuit of theoretical clarification, is to test 
hypotheses describing rational choice and embeddedness. The decision to not test the 
longitudinal change in the communities between the 2004 and 1994 data was a difficult one, but 
it falls outside the scope of this dissertation. The studies both asked questions intended to 
identify trends in social capital where community involvement, motivations and habits of 
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consumption were addressed. Those are the questions I employ to construct models representing 
theoretically interesting concepts given a rational choice model of the individual versus 
outcomes expected for a model of individuals as embedded in the social structure.  
The third objective of this dissertation is to provide analytical methodologies that 
accounts for the theoretical advances made in this dissertation. I use network methods and 
employ lattice structures to transform the data to represent the intrinsically hierarchic nature of 
social capital and related concepts to construct and test my hypotheses. As such, this dissertation, 
while focused on theoretical implications, is also interesting from a methodological perspective 
in respect to the analysis of the data, by mixing network models as concept lattices with 
conventional statistical techniques.  
 
Propositions for Testing, Research and Design Questions 
Lattices represent a single theoretic quality. They show the distribution of individuals 
into concepts expressing various levels of the quality in question. Lattices characterize the 
communities as a whole with various levels of different forms of theoretically relevant social 
capital. I analyze and compare lattices to support or refute hypotheses. 
 I analyze the independent variables contributing to the dependent variables that are 
expressed as concept lattices, paying particular attention to reliability and validity. The 
hypotheses address the correlations of three forms of social capital and ten other dependent 
qualities measured using lattices employing four constructions of cardinality. The social capital 
forms are within group, between group, and out-bridging. The dependent qualities are 
homogeneity, us-versus-them, embeddedness, selectorate, trusting attitude, cohesiveness, 
contentment, relational rationality, satisfaction with public services and satisfaction with 
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government services. The four forms of cardinality are level cardinality, bijective cardinality, 
injective cardinality and composite cardinality. The specific hypothesis statements are found in 
chapter three. 
 From the 99 communities, a sample of communities was purposively selected as 
representing high, low, and average levels of three forms of social capital. Community-bridging, 
within-group and between-group social capital scores are formed and a sample of six 
communities were selected and ascribed the aliases Titon Within, Averagely, Titon Between, 
Laston, Firston, and Long Bridges, being slightly descriptive names of their positions. Details of 
the selection process are given in the methodology chapter. 
 This series of hypotheses captures the core notion that various forms of social capital 
represent the relationships within a community. The hypotheses pertain to Putnam’s (1995; 
2007) contention that, first, relationships of trust are social capital and, second, diverse identities 
are not conducive to community well being. Also, this set of hypotheses examines the idea that 
group level interactions structure ontological reality. Using lattices I analyze each hypothesis for 
support or refutation of the hypotheses. 
 
Need for This Research 
 This dissertation clarifies theoretical social capital consistent with the sociological 
tradition. It provides an empirical methodology and statistical approach consistent with that 
theoretical understanding. It does so using concept lattices to model the theoretical specificity of 
set logic. As a further goal this dissertation consolidates and contrasts two lines of sociological 
inquiry, the embedded ontological-collectivism line and the ontological-individualism line. 
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 I suggest avenues of research design that clarify this ontological confusion and 
substantially strengthen validity. Sociologists often mix ontological individualism with 
epistemological collectivism (Vandenberghe 2007). This dissertation provides a service to the 
social sciences by addressing this underlying contradiction. 
Researchers frequently employ a network perspective and creative epistemologies to 
capture complex group dynamics, but fail to embrace a collective ontological construction of the 
actor. A recent study (Pickering 2006) used social capital as a tool for understanding efforts to 
build bridges between religious segments of post-war Balkans society, segments that had tried to 
exterminate one another. The methods included interviews and participant observation. 
Conclusions drawn from those experiences focused on rebuilding civil society by building 
authentic relationships. But, supporting her position, Pickering invokes Lin (2001) and Burt 
(1997), strong advocates of an individualistic ontology, in the same breath as Putnam (1995, 
2000) who uses Alexis de Tocqueville to lend ontological reality to civic organizations. Her 
conclusions are subsequently disjointed as she glosses past fundamental incongruities. 
 I have committed the same ontological fallacy. Lin and Burt offer appealing insights into 
social reality. They observed truth in social structures that others overlooked, and their focus on 
individuals allowed that insight. The explanations they provide for what they observe deny 
ontological reality to groups and so fail to capture the contextual significance of the observed 
phenomena. Observing a social bridge without context makes it meaningless. Giving it context 
requires observing the realities of the groups it connects. 
  In contrast, Putnam’s perspective grants sovereignty to groups, but doesn’t deny people 
exist, and sees both in relation to the other. The researcher must grapple with the complexity of 
the observed phenomena. Pickering observed the Muslim majority and various minority 
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populations. When people interact they do not stand alone with a cascade of attributes. They 
interact as embedded group members. Understanding the relationships between the groups, 
transcending individuals, gives context to the bridges and shows how hard they are to build. 
 Unfortunately the rational choice and embeddedness perspectives share conceptual 
vocabulary that leads to confused theorizing for practical sociologists like Pickering. She drew 
on norms of reciprocity, as Coleman suggests, as an explanatory tool. This means her 
explanation of how ethnic groups, in the short span of a decade, moved from trying to 
genocidally exterminate one another to tentatively embracing each other as fellow Balkaners 
rests on the power of norms. Norms, exercised at an individual level as rational choice demands, 
are fundamentally insufficient to explain people embracing the executioners of their families. A 
more fundamental shift in the way these groups identify them-selves and the others has occurred, 
and it happened at the group level.  
Pickering uses an ego-network perspective effectively but she fails to provide robust truth 
when she tries to say that building reciprocity led groups to coexist with people who had killed 
their family and friends. That sort of change only makes sense if the two groups are embedded in 
a common social body and both groups reconstructed their identities relative to that common 
body. Complex mechanisms of reflection, interaction, and understanding of the sort Emirbayer 
(1997) and Tilly (2004; 2005) describe are employed. It is apparent that norms of reciprocity are 
the result of social capital, but are not themselves causal of social capital.  
Pickering made powerful observations of this incredible shift, but her theoretical toolbox 
was fundamentally polluted with ontological confusion. Pickering, a keen observer of social 
reality, is symptomatic of a larger problem in sociology. The purpose of this dissertation, then, is 
to aid all of sociology by sorting out the tools sociologists use, so in the future they won’t be 
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trying to drive screws with rubber mallets. These complex problems and confusions are 
addressed through theoretical clarity and methodological specificity resulting from the 
employment of formal structural concept lattices. 
 
Significance of This Research 
 While the concept of social capital is significantly valuable, research scholars have had 
great difficulty operationalizing the concept in a way that satisfies the theoretical demands. At its 
heart, the importance of this dissertation addresses a confusion underpinning much of sociology 
and complicating clarity of thought and the unity of the discipline. If research scholars intend to 
advance the discipline of sociology, they need to remember what makes it a distinct scientific 
discipline. The sociological perspective recognizes groups. I often think it answers why people 
behave differently in groups than in isolation. It is what makes the group more than the sum of 
its parts. The relational reality of the social universe is consistent with the sociological 
perspective, and offers solutions that are useful to policy and social change advocates. The 
sociological perspective, as inspired by the sociological imagination, fundamentally views 
society as made of groups with ontological reality. 
 Within social capital theory I advocate the embeddedness perspective as the only 
effective approach for understanding society. As a discipline, ontological perspectives that 
assume homo economicus , the rational actor, have been delusional (Bourdieu 1977; 1990a). This 
creature, if it exists, is not the body of sociology. If this monstrous creation is real it lives in the 
realm of international politics. I advocate a uniquely sociological relational perspective on 
society. I advocate seeing society as populated by actors engaging in relating in more or less 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft relationships. Sociologists employing relational perspectives 
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arrive at conclusions that are useful for governmental policy and much healthier for society than 
those reached in the past by adherence of the concepts of individualism and an aggregating 
mechanism like the free market. 
 Supporting the holism of ontological embeddedness is the epistemological approach and 
methodological technique involving the use of lattices coupled with statistical tests. The value of 
the lattice for representing sociological data is incredible. This dissertation makes a conceptual 
introduction of lattice representations of sociological data. Strong theoretical links are made here 
for the first time ever. From those theoretical advances, empirical procedures are refined further 
than they have been before. 
 
Rationale for This Research 
This study employs key conceptual ideas in the social capital literature. Robert Putnam 
asserts that diversity is harmful to social capital. It is important to define social capital and 
diversity. Any effort to do so, addressing the importance and nature of relationships, requires a 
revolutionary approach for explaining sociological observations. A visual objective 
representation capturing all the observations and understanding of the qualitative observer in 
quantitative terms is incredibly important and advances the interests of sociology. 
 This study ranks a set of 99 communities from low to high in-group, out-group and 
bridging social capital. Then six communities are selected to represent the middle and the 
extremes of those scales. Then those six communities are measured and described according to 
the concepts of homogeneity, having an us-versus-them mindset, containing a selectorate, 
embeddedness as a group orientation, exhibiting a trusting attitude, cohesiveness, general 
contentment, rationality, satisfaction with public services, and satisfaction with government. 
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 Lattices facilitate understanding the social structure of communities and reveal the 
hierarchical structure of concepts. They allow for comparisons among concepts and 
communities. I show correlations between the communities with high measures of three forms of 
social capital and these concepts. Directional and significant correlations reveal an understanding 
of diversity in community that gives nuance to Putnam’s (2006) assertion that diversity is bad for 
community. They show diversity as a disaggregate quality, an un-aggregatable quality full of 
nuance. I am not making statements of causality, but at its present level of development, using 
lattices as an analytical tool reveals correlations that are directional and significant between the 
dependent variables and the three forms of social capital. I use Putnam’s question as a loose 
thread to hold these concepts together. 
 
Scope and Limitations 
 This dissertation is placed in the literature of the sociology of social capital. I address 
aspects of political science and economics where their influence has impacted social capital 
theory by universalizing a construction of the social actor as homo economicus. This sort of ideal 
type is undoubtedly useful in the gesellschaftian settings like international relations and business, 
but is a misleading distraction in sociology. Homo economicus is ultimately a fiction and even as 
an ideal type, is not representative of an average person (Bourdieu 2005). 
 This dissertation finds its scope reaching out from sociology to include methodological 
and procedural questions concerning the best way to gather, analyze and represent data. The goal 
is consistency with sociological tradition and inclusion of the advances made in set math and 
social networks. Social networks offer exciting new avenues for research but can challenge the 
fidelity of the sociological perspective. 
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 This dissertation addresses two sets of questions. First, what is the ontological nature of 
social actors relative to social capital, and second what is the best way to study their relational 
construction of society. Several approaches have been used to address these questions. This 
dissertation summarizes some of the descriptive information, as well as information from the 
historical record, in an attempt to describe the evolution of ontological individualism and 
ontological embeddedness. This dissertation is applicable to this sociological question but is also 
related to other areas. The broader purpose of this argument is its application outside of the 
academy. The world of policy and practice (Bourdieu 1977) has been dominated by ontological-
individualism for 35 years, through objectivist (Rand 1964) philosophy and the actions of neo-
liberalism which are strongly associated with free market economics, and neo-conservatives 
strongly associated with American imperialism. Champions of this perspective in the highest 
offices have fundamentally altered the way people think about the reality of community, and 
their place in it. It divorces people from their social context. Milton Friedman, Margaret 
Thatcher, Ronal Ragan, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, to name just some, are strongly associated 
with neo-liberal economics. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan wrote for Ayn Rand’s 
journal, and advocated strongly for ontological individualism and a universal end to social 
programs (Gourevitch 2007; Mudrack 2007). A broader intention of this dissertation is to suggest 
ways of framing the sociological perspective in the public sphere such that it will seem more 
intuitive to a general audience. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In this dissertation, I apply set theory as a valid and reliable analytic tool for constructing 
concept lattices that represent network concepts. I do so in order to understand the social capital 
patterns found in the examined communities. Lattices facilitate understanding the social structure 
of communities. Lattices reveal the hierarchical structure of key concepts used in the hypothesis, 
and allow for comparisons among concepts and communities. I show correlations between the 
communities with high measures of three forms of social capital and various other concepts. 
Those correlations, which are directional and significant, reveal an understanding of diversity in 
community that gives nuance to Putnam’s (2006) assertion that diversity is bad for community. 
They show diversity as a disaggregate quality, an un-aggregatable quality full of nuance. I am 
not making statements of causality, but at its present level of development, using lattices as an 
analytical tool reveals correlations that are directional and significant between the dependent 
variables and the three forms of social capital. I use Putnam’s question as a loose thread to hold 
these concepts together. 
 
Social Capital 
 It is necessary to lay out exactly what social capital is in order to examine it, and so there 
is need to discuss the basic concept of capital, as social capital is a derivation of that concept. 
Modern economics relies heavily on rational choice, that people and groups make the decision 
that is optimally in their best economic interest given the available information. Social 
economists assume a universe of rational social actors making exchanges of resources within a 
network environment, this is certainly the foundation of Coleman’s (1990) Social Theory, and 
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though Bourdieu rejects this notion of the social universe (Bourdieu 1979), I arrive at an 
acceptable conception of capital by examining its epistemology. 
 Karl Marx (1867) expanded Adam Smith (1776) conception of Capital; though they 
disagreed as to the effect of self interested capitalists on the society as a whole, Marx and Smith 
agreed that self interest motivated capitalists and that capital was investment in production to 
generate greater returns. Marxist capital is a very corporeal thing, rooted in commodities being 
differently valued by users and producers. The use value exceeds the cost of production allowing 
the excess of value to be reaped by investors in the form of currency, a symbolic abstraction of 
capital that is reinvested in production thus transforming currency back into capital. Capital is an 
abstract entity, much like gratitude, represented symbolically in a cycle of commodities and 
currencies. 
 In simple capital, incorporating the concept of human capital, the worker creates capital 
by their labor while the investor takes excess value as profit, compensating the worker more or 
less well depending on the productivity of their labor. This creates miniature economies of 
interaction among workers and investors, lending some stability to the system as a whole 
(Becker 1964). 
 This simple model fails when attempts are made to explain divergences in outcomes 
among actors with similar stocks of human capital. Becker insists that there is a trend in 
outcomes of human capital regardless of any cultural preference for one similar stock over 
another (Becker 1976). He uses other methods to account for those variations within a system 
reliant on human capital. He strictly excludes theories from outside of the economic literature so 
the accounts are reducible, eventually, back to human and economic capitals (Becker 1996). 
Both Coleman and Bourdieu cite Becker’s (1976) human capital theories heavily, but from there 
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they diverged to look at ideas of social and cultural capital to account for the variations in 
reception, for example, of an Ivy League MBA versus an MBA acquired form an on-line 
University. 
 From this divergence, what has essentially been an economic theory is brought into the 
realm of modern social theory. Coleman attempts to stay largely within the realm of economics, 
drawing in social concepts where needed for his theory of purely rational actors in a logical 
system. In contrast Bourdieu attempts to draw the economic concept of capital, as it has evolved 
from human capital, into the milieu of a post-structurally framed social theory, to quantify 
competencies with particular cultural performance skills. 
 What this implies about the nature of capital is that it exists in a system where social 
relationships can serve the purpose of commodity exchange, and social value is exchanged as a 
commodity. The exchange-relationship is far more socially relevant than the commodity 
exchange; it is more durable and can be reused. It is, once created, an observable phenomena in 
itself; it is real and when described, the description is descriptive of the social capital itself (Lin 
2001). 
 There are further differences between how Bourdieu and Coleman see the potential of 
social relationships and the systems where they exist. In Coleman’s systems, most of an actor’s 
adherence to the system is explainable by the pressure of social norms, and there is a rational 
advantage to be derived from most closely resembling those norms. In Bourdieu’s more 
multifaceted system, habitus explains the actor’s relationship to the fields and sub-fields where 
they exist. A field is an area of social space as defined by its member’s interactive reflection and 
conversation with themselves and members of other fields. It houses the shared habitus and doxa 
of its members (Bourdieu 1977). Habitus is the collective group’s expectation of life possibilities 
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for its members as expressed by that group’s members approach in practice of everyday life 
(Bourdieu 1998). Like norms, habitus is learned, but unlike norms habitus is shared internally by 
the actors in a field. Doxa are the physical manifestations, the artifacts, of habitus. Norms, in 
contrast, exert external pressure upon the actors, constantly correcting their behavior back to the 
norm. Habitus exerts its pressure internally on the actor, not requiring constant checks, but 
actually serving as a semiological foundation for the actor’s very thoughts (Bourdieu 1993; 
1998), far more substantially even than an internalized norm (Coleman 1990) 
 Bourdieu’s cultural capital rests largely in the actor’s ability to learn the habitum of the 
dominant fields in a society. Social capital is specific to a field or subfield, and follows much the 
same logic as Cultural Capital, but is more specifically embedded in the existence of a durable 
network of actors, like Putnam’s (2000) concept of social capital. Doxa is how a group 
collectively views their relationship to the material world as self evident and appropriate to the 
group’s members (Bourdieu 1977). Where cultural capital relies on doxa, the use of symbols and 
signs, semiological artifacts, that are widely recognizable in the culture as a whole but do not 
require specific knowledge of the individuals to whom common habitus is being related, social 
capital does rest on common social recognition of the actors or their affiliations as represented in 
doxatic objects, that is the capital itself; the relationship of trust or some symbolic abstraction of 
it. 
 Bourdieu (1977; 1998) argues that social struggles take place within fields during the 
pursuit of desirable resources. The commodities of Marxist literature are extended to include 
ethereal equivalents, social and cultural goods in addition to the possibility of acquiring fiscal 
resources by way of social and cultural maneuvering and vice-versa. Currency, as a synthesis of 
a symbolic representation of a real capital, has no inherent ability or right to be recognized 
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outside of the immediacy of those people who observed the legitimacy of the initial inequality 
that gave rise to the capital. Further recognition comes with the formation of social relationships 
of power, often institutional, and the imposition or adoption of culture. Hegemony insures 
capital’s legitimacy and extends and deepens that initial inequality. In simple terms, if an actor 
doesn’t know another deserves credit, and neither does anyone they trust, then no credit is 
extended.  
 Social capital is similar to fiscal capital in that at the core of its nature is an inequality 
among those who are immediately aware of one another. Small intimate groups have loyalties in 
the form of social credits and debts, essential and basic relationship measured as social capital. 
The relationship is the capital, equivalent in the social world to the essential core of fiscal capital. 
Trust is the debt. But, fiscal capital has money and human capital has credentialing institutions 
serving as simulated-symbolic forms. Even cultural capital has recognizable symbolic 
representations in society, the proper fetishes and rituals that can symbolically carry some of the 
value of cultural capital. Social capital, as it is field specific, has less transferability and exists 
without a salient symbolic form. Social capital exists distinctly within each separate field where 
fiscal capital resides in the field of the economy, cultural capital exists within the broad culture, 
and human capital exists within each broad professional field. Social capital has the limiting 
scope of the field created by an actor’s network of social acquaintances. 
 There have been limited efforts throughout history at making symbolic-simulation of 
social capital. The most typical form of social capital exchange is introduction, the extension of 
one actor’s social network is valuable for the actor being introduced and for the actor doing the 
introduction. The actor being introduced may gather access to new social assets, but the actor 
making the introduction is inherently increasing their own centrality and clique 
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interconnectedness, or density. A symbolically-simulated social capital exchange would be a 
letter of introduction, but it is a risky proposition for the introducer; aside from risking their 
reputation on the actions of another actor they are forfeiting the exclusivity of their position at 
the nexus of two separate networks, and the need of an introduction itself implies a value in that 
position that offers a onetime capitalization from the actor being introduced. Their need of an 
introduction implies they are not in a position of relatively greater power and so have little to 
offer. 
 Putnam’s model of capital differs from others. It is not predicated on capitalism. 
Inequalities will exist, but they are not leveraged as Marx would have it, for advantage. There is 
no industrialization that could give way to ownership of the mode of production of social capital 
and so there is no possibility of market exchange where excess value can be taken from the labor 
of others. For Putnam, relationships are a resource like any other. Relationships typified by the 
value of trust are social capital. And so, it is possible to put them to capitalistic ends, by 
exploiting trust to gain further relationships of trust, mobilizing trusted friends to expand a 
network. But those relationships must ultimately be crafted. The market of social capital has not 
undergone anything comparable to the industrial revolution. But, unlike fiscal capital, social 
capital can be spent again and again. It will require reciprocity, but so long as reciprocity is 
forthcoming, or at least implied, the same stock of capital can be used indefinitely. Also, an 
understanding of the network, comparable in some ways but not in others, to the market, allows 
some actors to acquire superior quantities of social capital using complex concepts like 
reputation and accreditation. 
 The great contribution Putnam makes to Bourdieu is to simplify all of this in the forms of 
trust. Trust is symbolic recognition of adequate performance of cultural habiti and doxa 
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sufficient to a given subjective field, also called a social set, such that the actor in question 
carries value on those relationships. 
 
Historical Background of Social Capital 
 Since Marx (1867) wrote extensively on capital, sociology has struggled to make 
practical use of describing social orders as forms of capital. Sociology today recognizes fiscal 
capital, constructed however economists construct it. There is some debate on the exact nature of 
money. Human capital is generally recognized as the skills and abilities a person has, both 
material-bodied and cognitive-metal. Forms of conceptual capital, including social capital, 
cultural, political, and other varieties, are tied to the exercise of social networks for various 
purposes. Social capital focuses on trust. Cultural capital is the effective performance of cultural 
expectations to mobilize power within a network. Political capital is the effective use of 
networks of social acquaintance to acquire authority. In keeping, social capital is the effective 
use of networks of social acquaintance to acquire trust.  
Once acquired, that capital can be put to any number of ends. Political capital derived 
authority can be used to solicit bribes, or to enact legislation beneficial to the populous. Cultural 
capital derived power can be used to demonstrate the superiority of its holder, or it can be used to 
solicit charitable action from the elite. Social capital derived trust may be used to gain access to a 
superior job market (Granovetter 1974; Lin 1999) or it may be used to exploit vulnerable 
segments of the population (Schulman and Anderson 1999). These all have the common 
connection to networks, but otherwise capital is very much a tool to be wielded as the worker 
desires. 
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 The history of sociological study of these ideas, especially the conceptual forms, is 
characterized by debate over the exact definitions of these terms and how to operationalize them 
and then how to analyze the data effectively. The theoretical and liturgical portion of this thesis 
will focus on varieties of social capital established in the literature and how they must be framed 
or reframed in terms of the governing logic of set theory and lattice structures. Initially, lattices 
and set theory may seem foreign, but it is really quite a common sense way of seeing the world. 
It is naturally given to rigorous scientific procedure. Lattices have been around for quite some 
time and have had a place in the literature of sociology since the 1970s. Set theory has been 
important in mathematics since the end of the 19th century, and served as the structure of game 
theory, embraced by rational choice advocates. There is not much new to discover about them 
procedurally, but there is fertile ground for their use in sociology. Especially with the recent 
publication of Badiou’s Being and Event (2005), a radical philosophical perspective of the 
multiple that is in keeping with a basic sociological understanding of the world. 
 
Debates Surrounding Social Capital 
 The earliest relevant works on social capital are Pierre Bourdieu’s predominantly post-
structuralist “Outline of a Theory of Practice” (1977) and James Coleman’s treatise on rational 
systems, “Foundations of Social Theory” (1990). Though Coleman was writing on game theory 
as rational action much earlier (Coleman 1966; 1986), he didn’t employ the term Social Capital 
until Foundations of Social Theory. They largely agree that a form of capital exists in the process 
of social exchange where relationships carry the potential of exchange value.  
Coleman describes the social world as a network of actors making exchanges of salient 
resources, including social resources, through an overarching social structure. He attempts to 
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provide a template social actor who is fully rational, then calls for the measurement of any 
factors that create variations from that template and their expected interactions with the social 
system. 
 Bourdieu describes the world as a relational series of actors and their positions relative to 
one another within a series of social phenomena called fields. Fields are social areas where actors 
consistently relate to, and define, social objects. Definitions of social objects vary from field to 
field. In Bourdieu’s theory, the field is as real and relevant as the actors themselves, who are 
deeply embedded in the fields they inhabit. This necessitates the measurement of actors, 
relationships, fields, the relationships of actors to fields and the relationships of actors in fields to 
social objects (Bourdieu 1990a; 1984; 1998). Bourdieu’s theory allows for a more subtle and 
problematized social world where actors are defined holistically in their social world, composed 
of many fields and the actor’s relations to the fields, that Bourdieu calls habitus. 
 Coleman’s (1966; 1990) theory was foundational in American social capital research. 
Bourdieu’s concepts of the field, habitus, and doxa appealed broadly to social anthropologists, 
education and sociology scholars (Bourdieu 1977; 1990a; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). The 
concept of homophily, a tendency for associated social objects to increasingly become similar, 
was used by Nan Lin (1999; 2001). Coleman, Bourdieu and Lin, along with Ronald Burt’s 
(1992) structural holes, Mark Granovetter’s (1973) strength of weak ties, Alejandro Portes’ 
(Portes 1998; Portes and Landolt 2000) explorations of the negative aspects of social capital, and 
Robert Putnam’s (1995; 2000) popularly read works on the declines of social capital, provided 
the canonical foundations for social capital theory. They typically emphasized network concepts, 
but debated whether to measure social actors, structural positions, relationships, or some 
combination. 
 31  
 
 
 Putnam (1995; 2000) and Lin (2001) integrated Bourdieu’s work into the American 
debate. His schema for subdividing capital into its economic, cultural, social and other forms was 
useful to differentiate social capital from other forms of capital and begin to approach the 
difficulty of translating one form of capital into another (Bourdieu 1986). Bourdieu complained 
that people in various academic fields cited only what served their ends, ignoring the scope and 
complexity of his approach. His various writings had been codified in different academic fields. 
Sociologists read Distinction (1984), cultural anthropologists read Outline of a Theory of 
Practice (1977), education theorists read Homo Academicus (1990b) and typically they did not 
communicate with one another. Consequently, each field got a partial picture of Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice, fundamental to his ideas of social capital. Most avoided a full understanding 
of his complex method of interpreting the social world (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Bourdieu 
advocates observing myriad social fields, actor’s habits of interacting with others through them, 
forms of symbolic exchange within and among the actors in the fields, and the fields themselves. 
All of these are to be observed in the daily practice of cultural life where people engage 
habitually and dogmatically using methods learned while carrying out those daily practices since 
birth (Bourdieu 1993). 
 The most common and pervasive of these misunderstandings is the idea that Bourdieu 
advocates that all forms of capital are reducible to economic capital. A surface reading of The 
forms of capital (1986), a chapter in a collected work, could lead to that understanding. 
 
“The different types of capital can be derived from economic capital, but only at the cost 
of a more or less great effort of transformation, which is needed to produce the type of 
power effective in the field in question.” (Bourdieu 1986:252) 
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 But in context of the full article, as well as in contect of the body of Bourdeau’s writings, 
there is no way that a reader could believe Bourdieu lent a supremency to economic capital. All 
forms of capital can be changed to a baser form, reducing eventually to a “nonspecific 
indebtedness which is called gratitude” (p252) but because social exchange presupposes 
misrecognition and time between the initiation of an exchange and its reciprication, leaving a 
non-corporeal commodity, gratitude, there is a tendancy to use economic capital because 
gratitude is abstract.  
In full explanation Bourdieu offers “So it has to be posited simultaneously that economic 
capital is at the root of all the other types of capital and that these transformed, disguised forms 
of economic capital, never entirely reducible to that definition, produce their most specific 
effects only to the extent that they conceal (not least from their possessors) the fact that 
economic capital is at their root, in other words -- but only in the last analysis -- at the root of 
their effects” (Bourdieu 1986:252). Not only is this a posit, but it contains in itself the 
recognition of two competing theoretical stances, economism and post-structuralism, that 
Bourdieu explores as process of fungibility among capital forms. He claims that economism’s 
love of financial systems makes it blind to the independence and potency of non-economic 
capital. He also claims that post-structuralism, in its love of semiotics, ignores the truth of 
economics’ supremacy in society as a constructed system that rivals semiotics in its position at 
the base of human thought. The two have different logics. Economics sees social exchange as an 
aspect of the aggregating function of the market, and generally makes no allowance for it. Post-
structuralism denies that economics is the source of actor’s decision to expend time, an act it 
elevates in the acquisition of cultural and social capitals. 
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 These subtleties of capital and the parallel values of economism and structuralism are 
often overlooked in the process of object construction, measure design as carried out by 
empirical investigators. Bourdieu’s emphasized the importance of theoretical clarity in defining 
the object of study (Bourdieu 1990b). Frequently scholars develop models of social capital on 
shaky footing for use in their research then they attempt to make theoretical statements about 
their objects of research, based on de-contextualized quotes from social theorists. 
 
Three Conceptual Frameworks of Capital 
 The dilemma sociologists face when constructing an object of study pertaining to social 
capital is identifying the observable feature that reveals the existence of social capital. In 
response to that dilemma, three approaches have been commonly employed. 
 The first approach qualifies the study of social capital by explaining that the object of 
study is not capital in the traditional sense. The second approach limits the scope of the object to 
the acquaintance networks of an identifiable group of actors. The third approach constructs the 
object as correlated variables aggregated for convenience sake; a multivariate object. My 
approach is a combination of the second and third approaches, but because set theory illuminates 
social network structures while aggregating the variables of trust, my approach is superior to any 
used before and more faithfully captures the ideas presented by Robert Putnam in his seminal 
works Making Democracy Work (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993) and Bowling Alone 
(1995). 
 The first approach, qualifying the object, is quite common. Every month new studies 
prefix something onto social capital. Educational social capital has over a hundred listings in 
sociological abstracts. Educational social capital is actually human capital. This is acceptable if 
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qualifying a particular field as the location of a habitus based social capital, as in the second 
approach. But, this is a problem if qualifying social capital removes the idea of exchange. 
The second approach is the one endorsed by Bourdieu’s (1977; 1984; 1993) field theory 
and practical sociology. It is the study of people practicing their social systems. This is what is 
most commonly done when qualifying a particular field as the location of a habitus based social 
capital. The key difficulty arises when attempting to generalize any results. If a researcher selects 
a field, for instance the field of social capital research, then identifies qualities of interactive 
practice that allow for greater success within that field, like renaming human capital educational 
social capital, the researcher could claim to have identified and defined the object of social 
capital in the field of social capital research. Substitute a nearly infinite variety of possibilities 
for social capital research and there arise a nearly infinite variety of definitions of social capital. I 
term this ontological inflation. That is fine when defining practice contextually, but it 
necessitates making assumptions about similarities among fields if findings are to be generalized. 
This being the case, approach two is the most robust approach to social analysis. Findings have 
enhanced validity that may ease reliability concerns. Using robust multifaceted descriptions may 
mean only some aspects of the object may be generalized. But, it is more reliable than 
generalizing from over simplified objects to objects they resemble, having too been flattened 
(Newman, Barabási and Watts 2006). 
 The third approach is the creative use of misnomers. A safe set of variables tied to fixed 
properties is aggregated to represent theoretical defensible concepts. Composite variables are 
ascribed a descriptive name, or a concept is matched to variables that collectively realize its 
theoretical definition. 
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 The later technique is defensible as the creation of a measure to describe a theoretical 
construct. This relates to approach two in the case of social capital. In this approach the 
sociologist considers the existing theoretical literature before deciding to use a term, and then 
uses the definitions the term already carries. It is often necessary to create variables that fit with a 
theory being advanced, but the use of a convenient composite variable constructed from values 
already present in the researcher’s data must be avoided if they require modifying a theory to 
make the data fit a definition. Such practices rob the researcher of their credence in the eyes of 
readers familiar with the theoretical literature, and it can further harm the whole of the field by 
diluting solid theory through the presence of literature contradictory to the valid uses of the 
concept. 
 
Examples of the Three Operational Approaches 
 Savage and Kanazawa (2004) typify the first approach in a case study. The authors 
directly and overtly state as the goal of the article to “propose a revised definition of social 
capital, premised on the principles of evolutionary psychology.” (Savage and Kanazawa 
2004:504) Valid definitions of social capital define the concept capital as modified by the 
concept social, and any other concepts that need to be incorporated for the particular object in 
question. 
 The authors set forth the argument that “Social capital from the evolutionary 
psychological perspective is any feature of a social relationship that, directly or indirectly, 
confers reproductive benefits to a participant in that relationship.” (Savage and Kanazawa 
2004:508) The authors dismiss from social capital all aspects of economy and exchange that 
typify capital, and claim a biological supremacy over the social universe. 
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 In footnote the authors extend their definition of social capital to include the reproductive 
benefits of close kin (Savage and Kanazawa 2004:508). Nan Lin (2001) also extended social 
capital to include close kin, but he did so using an explanation involving the concept of 
reciprocity in network exchange models, an extension by logic with a foundation in classic 
Marxist models of capital, as opposed to the model of capital proposed by Savage and Kanazawa 
(2004:504) where “[c]apital is any commodity that helps individuals achieve some goal.” The 
concept of commodity is made so broad that it can be anything. That makes empirical distinction 
difficult. 
 They answer that question of empirical distinction by suggesting that the key value of 
human society is biological reproduction. They contend society is driven by an instinctual need 
to propagate that confers social advantage for use in exchange, to actors with biological 
advantage. Genetics may have their place in the social sciences but using social capital as a 
placeholder for biology muddies the lexicon. Kanazawa has a series of articles defending 
sociobiology, including the article ”Social Sciences Are Branches of Biology” (Kanazawa 2004) 
arguing that all social behavior can be explained through the study of biology and that sociology 
should be understood as a sub-discipline of biology. Savage is primarily a criminologist 
defending an ecological perspective promoting the use of health care and education to lower 
crime rates, including the idea that criminality can be affected with alterations to prenatal care, 
thus promoting the notion that criminality can be determined inutero (Savage and Villa 2002). 
 The crux of those perspectives on social capital rests in theories of how humanity evolved 
and the reduction of social interaction to chemical stimulus-response; that social differentiation 
emerges from pre-historical evolution. In this theory social facts have no place. This radically 
diverges from both the econometric model and the structuralist model of social capital. Bourdieu 
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and Coleman are cited dismissively in passing as a reference to the existence of a body of 
literature to be ignored in favor of biology literature. This is necessary, as they so directly oppose 
the Bourdieu article they cite. Bourdieu states that “the social world is accumulated history, and 
if it is not to be reduced to a discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibrium 
between agents who are treated as interchangeable particles, one must reintroduce into it the 
notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its effects.” (Bourdieu 1986:241) Savage and 
Kanazawa reduce society to a discontinuous series of biological relationships among agents. 
Further, evolution (the foundation of the understanding of society used by Savage and 
Kanazawa) is not exhibiting dynamic change in recorded history, closing off the possibility of a 
dialectical progression of social elements, even if those elements are simply understood as access 
to reproductive success. The dialectic that would take place between social groups and 
evolutionary forces would be slow and belabored as the passage of time between evolutionary 
leaps is so great. 
 This article clearly exemplifies an extreme version of the first approach to social capital, 
to re-label something that is not social capital as social capital. All of society, including social 
economics, is the causal effect of biology and evolution. There are many examples of less 
extreme non-asset/non-commodity variable features of actors being advanced as being social 
capital. For example, Hunter (2002) proposes that beauty is capital and so light skin color is 
social capital for women, as light skin color is widely seen as more beautiful. Though this may 
be true in limited cases it cannot be generalized, as it is socially relative. This combination of 
approaches, mislabeling one object as another, skin color as social capital in this case, by 
omission of a proper definition of the social field it is applicable to, is more typical of the 
occurrences in the literature. 
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 The second approach is to reduce the object to a smaller network of actors, ideally a 
specific social field, where the lack of economic-style symbolic currency can be contended with, 
though this is done at the cost of generalizability. This is the approach that typifies actor-network 
analysis, though network analysis does not presuppose that its application is sufficiently 
relational to satisfy the needs of social capital theory. Silverman (2002) offers an example of this 
approach. In this example the object is faith based social capital as it exists within the field of 
charitable organizations in a city in the deep-south. The argument is made that within the 
charitable organization’s social field in a specific city in the deep-south, it can be demonstrated 
that faith based organizational membership, especially in black churches, is social capital and 
those relationships can be mobilized within the field to modify outcomes in interactions within 
the field as well as between fields. The argument is made quite convincing by limiting the scope 
of the argument. 
 There is also a considerable body of literature focused on network analysis where certain 
sorts of relationships are considered to be social capital, as typified by this second approach to 
social capital. In network analysis, social capital is assumed to be present in relationships. 
Further theory subdivides social capital into various forms. Notably, Putnam (1995; 2000) 
describes the existence of bridging and bonding capital, where bonding capital is within a group 
and bridging capital connects groups. Structural holes (Burt 1992) exist within a network and 
prohibit the flow of resources and assets. The holes can be bridged, and normative relationships 
that foster trust (Coleman 1990) can be reinforced by bonding capital. 
 There is also a theoretical body of literature growing out of network analysis surrounding 
the idea of capital as it exists in hierarchies, allowing for horizontal and vertical capital. 
Horizontal capital is typified by relationships that connect actors with similar access to resources 
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described in the hierarchy. Vertical capital exists in relationships where the actors being 
connected have different access to resources or access to different sorts of resources, providing 
access to a wider range of resources for the actors involved in the relationship (Lin 1999; 
Granovetter 1973; Putnam 2000). 
 Analysis of capital in network analysis expands the question of exchange by pointing out 
the value of latent relationships, not actualized but serviced with occasional contact, that provide 
options for some actors that are not available for others. A child who attends an exclusive school 
has a myriad of options available when it comes time to look for a job, options that are not 
available to children from impoverished backgrounds. Networks are invested in, as social capital 
commodities, and then used as a means to convert social capital into other forms of capital, 
mobilizing the network to acquire anything from a babysitter, to employment, to informal credit. 
The list is endless. It also allows an escape from traditional statistical models, allowing for the 
analysis of actors, as nodes, at the same time it considers relationships, as connection among 
those nodes (Lin 1999; Granovetter 1973; Freeman 2000; 1997; 1977). 
 Methodologically drawing on many of the concepts developed using the second 
approach, the third approach commonly uses a technique of applying such concepts to 
traditional, or flat, data. Such data is typified by a list of actors and a list of variables anchored to 
those actors. Some prominent sociologists have advocated for more robust methodologies 
considering relationships among actors as independent entities (Emirbayer 1997; Bourdieu 1977; 
1990a). 
 But, the ease of manipulating data using traditional techniques while borrowing from 
concepts developed in network analysis is tempting, and many composite measures have been 
developed for social capital that seem quite reasonable. This has typified many studies, both 
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large and small. The largest to date, the Social Capital Benchmark Study, was released in 2001 
by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The data has been 
disseminated and a number of publications have come from it (DeLeon and Naff 2004; Son and 
Lin 2008). Each has its own particular strengths and weaknesses, generally they suffer from the 
same basic flaw. They reduce relationships to variables housed in the actors that fail to capture 
the interrelatedness of social capital, but by doing so they are able to capture large sample 
populations and reach levels of generalizability that may not be possible with other techniques. It 
is important to note that sampling from a network inherently destroys the integrity of the data, 
inserting random holes and making impossible to determine the strength or structure of 
relationships. 
 By way of example, Messner, Baumer and Rosenfeld (2004) published a study of 
homicide rates exploring the relationships between social capital and criminal homicide using the 
Social Capital Benchmark Study. They employ complex statistical models to accomplish a 
“systematic empirical evaluation of the links between the multiple dimensions of social capital 
and violence…” (Messner, Baumer and Rosenfeld 2004:882) But, they rely on a supposed 
theoretical validity claimed by the study using questions pertaining to the presence of conditions 
theorized by Putnam and others to exist in places with high social capital. 
Edwards and McCarthy (2004) offer an example of a smaller study to employ the third 
approach. They begin with the premise that “[s]ocial capital plays a central role in facilitating the 
mobilization of social movement organizations.” (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:621) They 
explore whether those benefits persist as social movements evolve. They employ empirical 
analysis of factors influencing the persistence of local chapters of Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving (MADD). Social capital is one of their key factors. 
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 The authors conceptualize social capital as “networked access to resources present in 
specific sociopolitical contexts.” (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:624) They expand this definition 
by arguing that recent literature has emphasized the importance of unequal access to resources 
through the possession of more or less durable relationships, drawing on Bourdieu and Wacquant 
(1992) and Granovetter’s (1973) concept of the strength of weak ties. Persistent and durable 
fields where people share habitus and doxa exhibit homophily (Bourdieu 1993). Granovetter 
however sees a value in weak relationships from a social network analysis perspective, where 
shared qualities are subservient to the potential to gain exclusive, among the densely connected 
core group, access to rare resources through weak connections to other groups. 
 The authors favor the social network perspective when they review the literature to 
formulate their object of study. They observe that social movement and social network research 
have established that “social capital in the form of access to human and material resources 
mediated through preexisting social networks facilitates movement mobilization.” They then 
show a lacking in the literature of any mention of how those factors hold up after early stages of 
successful mobilization as organizations face the difficulties of transitioning to a more persistent 
state. 
 Edwards and McCarthy transparently describe exactly how they measure each of their 
variables. For social capital they created five indicators found to facilitate the emergence and 
mobilization of social movements. The first unstated assumption made by their aggregation of 
these five variables into a social capital measure is that social capital is limited to individual 
actors within organizations, thus contracting their field. They measure the ties of individuals 
within the groups then ascribe the results to the groups. 
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 Their first indicator is the existence of strong pre-existing ties among the group’s leaders. 
They find it to be significant and well supported in the literature as substantially linked to the 
theoretical concept of social capital (Bourdieu 1977). Their second, more debatable indicator 
(Granovetter 1973), addresses weak ties outside the group to civic leadership. Unfortunately, 
those ties are found to be detrimental, despite a strong empirical foundation for the theoretical 
stance (Lin 2001). In their third indicator, they predict that MADD chapters that emerge from 
another social organization are more successful because groups that emerge from other groups 
have strong ties to outside organizational leadership. However, it is also true that in these 
scenarios, groups draw on membership with diverging loyalties, and so groups that emerged 
from other groups are more likely to disband. With their fourth indicator they made the statement 
that groups with a higher proportion of members who were victims, or family members of 
victims, of drunk driving, have access to more weak social ties in the community (as opposed to 
indicator 2, weak ties among community leadership). The use of the concept of weak community 
ties is theoretically consistent. This bears out with their findings that high victim membership is 
only slightly more significant than low victim membership, with medium accounting for the 
bulk. Their fifth, and most significant, indicator is the presence of patronage funding at founding. 
The presence of funding is fiscal capital, the presence of patronage could be said to be an 
outcome in itself; that organizations with money last longer. If they are not relational, Edwards 
and McCarthy’s measures are at least defended in the literature and internally consistent. They 
constructed their object and built measures from solid theoretical foundations. 
 Rosalind Edwards (2002) also typifies the third approach. She uses the concept of social 
capital as short hand for a collection of other concepts, but more qualitatively than in the 
previous examples. She examines the effect of social capital in the family field. This is perhaps 
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the more defensible approach as it avoids the need for a statistical model incorporating 
relationships among actors and the relationships of actors to the fields they inhabit, opting 
instead for an understanding of the concept and the trained eye of a sociologist to identify it. In 
Edward’s case, social capital is tied to trust as well as to community engagement and family 
cohesions, as Coleman and Putnam argue. But, by limiting its scope to the family field, she 
satisfied many of the needs Bourdieu finds unfulfilled in other approaches. It is ultimately the 
keen application of an academic understanding while engaged in the real world that Bourdieu 
argues for and that Edwards demonstrates. 
 
Variations on Social Capital 
Structural to Cognitive Social Capital 
 Structural social capital is the actual network structures or relationships, while cognitive 
social capital is the tags or labels people apply to the network relationships. This is a symbiotic 
dualism, rather than a continuum. This dualism gives way directly to an empirical methodology 
of observing social capital. By measuring the relationships that are present among a group of 
actors as well as the labels the actors apply to those relationships or by observing a set of 
cognitive concepts that give way to labels, and asking actors to identify the relationships that 
typify the quality in question, it is simple to get a useful measure of social capital. 
 Conceptually a networks perspective on social relationships places each person in a 
collection of people as potentially in contact with each other person. The network structure is the 
pattern of actual connections along with relevant descriptions of the relationships. 
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Horizontal to Vertical Social Capital 
 Horizontality, meaning flat, is an expression of the relative quantities of a resource held 
at two social structural locations, generally two actors. Actors existing on the same level have the 
implication of horizontality. Verticality exists if one of the actors in a relationship has more of a 
resource than another. The resources in question are typically trust, social capital, or fiscal 
capital. Cultural capital may also enter into measures of verticality and horizontality. Such 
measures result in a hierarchy of capital and/or influence. It is necessarily advantageous to have 
more of a desired resource, and so often that is a power difference. 
 Horizontality and verticality become hierarchical measures of access to a given resource. 
It is impossible to have an up or down without a hierarchy. There is some confusion in this 
concept. To consider vertical ties as links outside of the ego-group assumes that the out-group 
has superior access to the resource in question. This is often the case, because there is a tendency 
for the actors in a group to have the same access to the same resources and if there is a link out of 
the group it is likely to be in search of greater access to a resource (Lin 2001; Granovetter 1974), 
but to go outside the group is not necessarily to go to greater resources. To go to greater 
resources is not necessarily to go outside the group. It is simply that this is the tendency. A 
horizontal link then is likely to be in the group as the in-group is likely to have equal access to 
the resource in question. 
 People activate relations to access resources, but those relationships don’t exist only for 
the purpose of whatever resource forms the hierarchy. Actor network theory, as described by 
Coleman, Granovetter, Burt and Lin addresses the complexities observed in empirical studies. A 
relationship has two nodal actors with imperfect knowledge of one another’s access to resources. 
When an actor seeks a resource and accesses their alter (the other actor in the relationship), they 
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do so with imperfect knowledge of whether the link is vertical or horizontal. Cultural capital 
allows for higher accuracy predicting relationships. 
 Relationships where actor’s possess better knowledge are likely to be relationships with a 
greater time investment. Those strong-tie relationships (Granovetter 1973; 1983) are likely to 
bring few new resources to the group because they are more likely to be horizontal ties. Ties 
reaching outside the group are more likely to find new resources and are often weak ties. Ties 
connecting unequal resource holders are less likely to be casual and familial, but are more 
essential, in the sense they are simple relationships governed by expectation that they are 
accessed with a nod to custom as the resource’s availability is quickly checked. Granovetter’s 
famous study of job seekers (1974) showed conclusively that job seekers accessing weak ties 
were more successful in finding gainful employment. It is a practical matter. An actor contacts 
others with whom they had not had recent contact to seek work, perhaps involving a meal or 
meeting, but with no expectation of extended or intense contact. This is the weak tie. 
 
Bonding to Bridging Social Capital 
 Bonding relationships are connections that hold together groups internally. Bridging 
relationships connect those groups to other groups. Groups held together by bonding 
relationships have similar resources within the group (Lin 2001) and the people who provide 
bridges allow groups to access the resources of other groups (Burt 1992). Relationships with 
other groups tend to be less frequent and less intense, but more valuable (Granovetter 1973). 
 The degree to which bridging social capital is present in a community indicates how 
willing and able that community is to reach outside itself, outside of the identity it has 
constructed for itself, seeking resources. A prescient example is the relationship between 
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Evangelical Protestantism and racial segregation. In communities that are significantly 
Evangelical Protestant communities, there is more racial segregation due to a mindset that 
discourages bridging social capital (Blanchard 2007). 
 
Strong to Weak Social Capital 
 The strength of a relationship can be ambiguous. Every child on a school playground is 
familiar with debates and consternations of who is a best friend with whom. From this early age 
children learn the strength of a relationship matters. In one sense, it is the question “what is 
sufficient to end this relationship?” The relationship that is nearly impossible to end, short of 
death, the relationship of a parent to a child, or a spousal relationship, is then a strong 
relationship. Another sense of the word strong may be the actor’s extent of knowledge of the 
other, or frequency of contact with the other. For a relationship to be strong, it is likely that at 
some point there was prolonged interaction, though the causality of strength and frequency is not 
direct. 
 Burt (1992; 1997) seems to use the term to mean frequent relationships, where weak ties 
are infrequent relationships. The term weak may encompass the ideas of distance and low 
frequency, with intimacy and knowledge sufficient to anticipate the other’s resources and levels 
of capital to access them. 
 Gemeinschafitan relationships are stronger (Brint 2001). Reliance on social structural 
supports like civil contracts weakens relationships, regardless of frequency of contact. Strength is 
in some sense related to trust. 
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Open to Closed Social Capital 
 A community holds a lacework of ties. Closed and isolated communities can be sewn 
tight with dense affiliations, but when a need arises that cannot be fulfilled using the resources 
present in the group it is necessary to look outward and vertically. In complex systems this 
emerges as a series of densely connected n-cliques (Sharp 2001), cliques that are partially closed, 
within a system. The ‘n’ in n-clique is an expression of the degree of closure. N-cliques count of 
how many of the potential ties are present. 
 A closed community has a high ‘density’ of ties and a lack of ties to members outside of 
the group. That is, many bonding and few bridging ties. An open community is not necessarily 
less dense in its bonding but has a superior ratio of bridging to bonding network relationships. 
 
My Conceptual Understanding of Social Capital 
 My concept for social capital draws on resources from many theoretical sources where 
research has advanced understanding. I feel strongly that the difference between lines of research 
that seem to contradict each other is a parallax view. The same object seen from a different 
perspective appears different. I feel that the methodologies and analytic techniques I use provide 
a valuable subjectivity that more closely approaches objectivity. The sociological literature 
frequently overlooks such issues, though philosophy literature has much to say on it (Badiou 
2005; Žižek 2006). 
 My understanding of social capital draws its definition from Putnam (1995; 2000), its 
conception from Bourdieu (1986) and gratefully acknowledges the observations of Granovetter 
(1973; 1983), Lin (1999; 2001), Portes (1998; 2000) and Coleman (1990). Each observed things 
about the function of social capital that appear to be true. A good theory of social capital either 
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has to explain away those truths or incorporate them. I do so by placing outcomes of social 
capital on a continuum, for instance the continuum from bridging to bonding that pertains to how 
the trust of social capital is used. 
 
Rationality in Social Capital 
 The issue of rationality addresses actors’ motivation for action. Placed on a continuum 
action is motivated by self interest embedded position in the social structure. In cases where what 
is in the best interest of the actor is at odds with what is best for the groups of which the actor is 
a part, the actor must decide.  
 Rational actor theorists (Burt 1992; Coleman 1990) try to explain action that benefits 
group at the actor’s expense as being rational due to imperfect information or norms. They do 
this to explain free riders, actors who take from the group and offer nothing in return. Rational 
actors are thought to succumb to mores and norms only when necessary to gain access to group 
resources. I dismiss out of hand any psychologically convoluted explanations resembling “action 
that seems irrational is really rational because of (insert excuse)” because such convolutions 
destroy the reliability of scientific efforts. Variable individual capacities explain variations 
observed in society. Disadvantages can only be addressed by improving individual’s skills. 
 Social economists employ social capital as hybrid of traditional rational choice 
economists and Weberian sociology (Granovetter 1973). Their empiricism describes social 
groups as affecting the social resources of individuals collectively. In the rational choice systems 
approach resources return to individuals for their own rational goals (Coleman 1990). 
 Using Coleman’s model of the self interested actor, Lin (2001) provided empirical 
examples of job seekers and class relations, formalizing theories of hierarchy describing 
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pyramids where lower-status actors have difficulty reaching up in the hierarchy. Lower status 
actors receive less value from social capital than higher status actors, showing verticality, while 
higher-status actors profit in exchanges with lower level actors. Higher status actors exact a 
portion of the resources of the lower level actor in exchange for recognition of the lower actors 
claim over the remainder. These models are often criticized as under-socializing actors 
(Granovetter 1985), by removing them from the consequences of their social contexts. 
 Theorists who see actors as embedded in the social structure, whom they sometimes 
called over-socialized (Granovetter 1985) must also explain action typified by actors making 
decisions in their own interest at the expense of the community. Free riders are a problem for 
society. In this perspective society is displays large unequally segmented groups. Networks of 
groups have different cultural significance and access to resources. Individuals are expressions of 
a particular collection of group affiliations. Complexities in the segmentation form a tapestry of 
interrelations among groups, a web of affiliations through groups and through individuals 
(Simmel 1955; Bourdieu 1990a; Putnam 2000). 
 
“How an action serves an individual is irrelevant. What matters is how the action serves 
relations with others.” (Durkheim 1968:50) 
  
Embeddedness proponents employ an empirical approach derived from post-structuralist 
phenomenology. Actors are not seen as particularly rational. Society is seen as a complex set of 
interactions in a multi-layered social system of interloping meso-level fields and the occasional 
larger commonality, creating a regional or national level field of power. I refer to this approach 
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as embedded, referencing the view that action is embedded fully in a social context (Bourdieu 
1993). It can also be called over-socialized (Granovetter 1985) or subjective or holistic. 
 There is a complexity that can only be captured in a continuum. Embeddedness 
empiricism describes strong social ties as constituting most of an actor’s interactions. They tend 
to be informal (Granovetter 1983), familial, more Gemeinschafitan (Tonnies 1887). These 
relationships are more reliable but less likely to allow access to unique resources for the actor 
and group. Weak ties with access to unique resources carry more social capital (Burt 1992) but 
are less likely to motivate normative behavior (Coleman 1990). The relationship between trust 
and resources is the relationship between rationality and embeddedness. Custom and norms 
confer social capital as trust in actor’s capacity to manage collective resources (Simmel 1955). 
 Voluntary group affiliation (Putnam 1995; 2000) as social capital does not assume the 
actor is rational. Decisions motivated by affiliations and obligations to the social order instill 
trust because decisions made in the interest of the community serve the interests of actor’s family 
and friends (Tocqueville 1945). This is rationality motivated by embeddedness. Social capital is 
a community resource that serves all the actors in the community. One group’s gain may be 
another group’s loss, and so strong ties within a community build infrastructure, and weak ties 
acquire resources in unequal exchange and by allowing one segment of the community to repress 
another segment that has better access to resources (Portes 2000). 
 A balanced perspective, where behaviors are typified by one perspective or the other 
using a continuum characterizes groups by their position on a scale. Both perspectives are 
observed, and so an empirically useful approach sees them both as real though opposed 
(Warriner 1956).  
 51  
 
 
 Solutions must emphasize a continuum. Social situations calling for rational action, like 
politics and business, are dominated by the rational end of the continuum. Behavior that is 
acceptable in business negotiations is unacceptable in Gemeinschafitan environments. Bluffing is 
re-termed as lying. What may have received respect now ends in social exile. Employing the 
wrong behavior for the circumstance shows low cultural capital, and where it hurts trust in the 
community it hurts social capital. As such, public policy that treats all people as rational actors is 
doing harm to the nation’s social capital. The model that dominates policy has implications for 
real people. Rational choice has dominated public policy for two generations and defends cuts in 
social spending. From Reagan’s assertion that homeless people choose to be homeless to Clinton 
Era welfare reform and Bush Era tax cuts for the rich, the death of the Union and the raise of 
trickledown economics, the assumption that society does not fundamentally exist has been 
detrimental to the health and welfare of real people. 
 The continuum of rationality captures the shared understanding of social rules by of 
exchange and a common outlook pertaining to the life chances of group members, habitus or 
doxa where it pertains to social artifacts (Bourdieu 1977). The continuum of rationality makes 
sense of the measurement of actors (Coleman 1990), their relationships (Emirbayer 1997) and 
their reflexive understanding of those relationships (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992) There is a strongly dichotomous continuum between rational and embedded 
understandings of social actors, and, thus, social capital, where in some situations people 
endeavor to seek profit by acting rationally, and in others they do not. 
 The terminology surrounding rationality is difficult because of the positive semiotic 
assumption of rationality. Irrational or non-rational action in favor of an embedded position in 
the community assumes the negative connotations of not being rational. Instead I favor the use of 
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the term relational rationality (Schipper 1996), an aspect of relational sociology which assumes 
rational action is relative to normative relationships and follows a logic related to contextual 
meaning. For example, it is rational to buy locally to prevent economic leakage at the community 
level. 
 
Relational Sociology 
 Relational sociology is incongruous with the rational actor. A relational understanding 
necessitates an actor who is integrated, through the social reality that is the combination of the 
individual and their relationships, in a way that precludes uninhibited self interest. It is better 
from the outset to have an understanding of people that incorporates their social nature. 
Observations show that over time people tend to resemble the groups they belong to 
(Simmel 1955). Academics call this process of group cohesion homoscadacity (Lin 2001), where 
actors join a group and tend to entropically become more similar to other group members over 
time. Research on ego networks, networks centered on an individual, found striking cohesiveness 
of age and marital status across the network (Kalmijn and Vermunt 2007). Similarity between 
ego-actor and the rest of the network exceeded what they expected. Broad groups exhibit what 
they call clustered-selection where entire networks create boundaries that cannot be explained by 
looking only at the individuals in the network. Homoscadastic entropy, an observable quality of 
the social universe, does not just happen. It is the byproduct of multilevel processes of 
reflexivity. This subtlety is only available when measuring relationships as equal in importance 
to individual measures. 
 The concepts of habitus, doxa and the field are attempts to get critical social distance, to 
approach limited objectivity and lend empirical epistemology to a subject that resists it 
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(Bourdieu 2003). The subjective nature of symbolic systems resists objectivity. Using fields 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and a relational approach to sociology (Emirbayer 1997) 
focusing on the relationships among actors, strengthens the epistemology’s objectivity. 
 Bourdieu (2005) directly addresses the economic field in its ascendancy. The economic 
field is corrupted by the academic field. Bourdieu posits homo academicus, the academic actor 
who is dispossessed of reality and motivated by publication. Homo academicus manufactured the 
rational actor, homo oeconomicus. Homo oeconomicus is a vision of man as entirely self 
interested and constantly calculating the social universe so that all of his decisions made in it in 
terms of what is most beneficial to him individually (Bourdieu 2005). This imaginary being is 
constantly being mis-inserted into the actions of ordinary agents, according to Bourdieu, and as 
such creates a conflicted reality (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005). Bourdieu (2005) explains this 
conflict in terms of the suburban Parisian housing market of the mid 1980s. It closely parallels 
the housing crisis of 2006-2009 in the United States. An aspirant segment of society was 
compelled to purchase homes they couldn’t afford. The non-economic portion of their lives 
became a ritual sacrifice to the economic portion. Pursuing a vision of suburban life, replete with 
relaxation, people bought houses in the suburbs and drove many hours to work, leaving no actual 
time for relaxation. All of this expressed as the interplay of fields and habitus. 
 Bourdieu (2005) makes the case that the rational actor is the result of the collective 
practice reflected and reproduced in the historical experiences of the individual. The relation of 
the individual to the dominant social field, in practice creates a second dominant field, the 
economic field. In the economic field, the behaviors I have described as the rational actor are 
dominant. In practice, real people confuse the two habitual modes of action. Because of the 
confusion the economic field ascends over and represses the social field. But the break between 
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the fields is an academic illusion. The economic field is homo economicus’ academic fiction. It is 
only real in its effect, where it imposes unrealistic motives on the average person. According to 
Bourdieu (2005) government is the ultimate arbiter of the economic field, and so government 
policy affects the average person. Policy causes interplay between the economy and real people, 
because academics have power over policy and are motivated by pursuits that do not translate 
into the lives of ordinary people. This is a complexity only open to the holism of relational 
sociology employing a continuum of rationality. 
Elster modeled a rational choice conflict theory including the axiom “Many properties of 
individuals, such as “powerful,” are irreducibly relational, so that accurate description of one 
individual may require reference to other individuals.” Meaning there is a lack of a useful 
relational epistemology. Individual properties require externalities to explain, but in the rational 
choice paradigm irrational individuals’ action are explained by reference to other agents. When a 
group acts against the interests of its members reference needs to be made to externalities. 
Collective action is rational to the individual, whether it is action against actor’s short-term 
interests or their economic interests, in favor of the generalized interests of the group. As an 
example he Elster cites the decisions of the 19th century French bourgeoisie to forfeit political 
power in exchange for maintaining social power (1982:458). He posits class action as functional 
and re-brands conflict as function using rational choice. Elster (1982) seems to be seeking the 
solution Emirbayer offers with relational sociology (1997). 
Elster’s materialism favors the fully embodied actor. Changes in biological understanding 
of humanity inform sociology. Biology acknowledges human organisms as multiple multiples, 
the composition of multiple independent viral, bacterial and organic elements to constitute 
systems. Darwinism (Wilson 1979) has shown that there are ontological realities to species. 
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Sentience is reserved for the individual and denied to all other levels of existence and all non-
human entities, but that egocentric understanding of the world is not scientific. The human body 
and beneficial bacteria would not exist independently, as society cannot exist without people and 
people cannot exist outside of society. It transcends symbiosis, originating in the womb. It seems 
silly to attribute bacteria or society with thoughts aside from the thoughts of individual people, 
yet there are decisions made by bacteria and societies that cannot be accounted for by reference 
the minds of the relevant individuals. 
Conflict theory traditionally acknowledges the material independence of large social 
orders. A materialist economic perspective grants ontological reality to class and at other levels 
to the workforces of industries, manifest through unions. There is danger of engaging in 
groupism (Warriner 1956), assuming reality exists by merit of an observer’s ascription of 
categories to observed characteristics, but this is not groupism. Analytic categories are neither 
objectified nor anthropomorphized (Bourdieu 1984:4 from Vandenberghe 2007). Not all 
categories are real, neither are all realities recognized and categorized, but there is a degree of 
correspondence. 
Raymond Boudon (2003) uses Weber to develop a rational choice microsociology. He 
analyzes large-scale action with explanations involving the rational action of social agents 
(Boudon 2003). As an example Boudon points to the enclosure movement, explaining that it was 
a rational choice for the landowners to enclose their lands and then a rational choice for people to 
move to the cities seeking work. But, this perspective misses many key points that are better 
captured with other perspectives. It ignores changes in culture during the industrial revolution 
that altered the logic of communal grazing lands. It ignores the subjectivities. Changes in 
technology made displacing large populations less dangerous. Ignoring how agents of change are 
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embedded in a social structure misses how the protests against enclosure would likely have 
escalated to revolution in an earlier time. Highly stratified social structures facilitated enclose 
because the subjective perspectives that saw it as irrational were not accessible to the decision 
makers. An element of embeddedness and interrelatedness was lost during the industrial 
revolution, then reacquired later with labor movements. For a time technological change dis-
embedded the ruling class and let them make decisions that would have been untenable at an 
earlier time. On a continuum, those segments of society were more rational. 
During times of high stratification people can make irrational decisions due to an 
embedded relational position in society. The 2004 presidential elections provide an illustration. 
Many voters acted against their rational socioeconomic interests in favor of a sense of moral 
continuity with an embedded religions community. Conversely, people make decisions according 
to a relational rationality where it makes sense to pay more for the same thing if it can be bought 
locally from a business that will put money and life back into a local community. 
Relational sociology, the acknowledgement of relationships and groups as analytically 
relevant on a level similar to individuals, allows access to reflexive subjectivity and localized 
realities that identify those collectives with ontological reality. It allows for the use of the 
relational network structure, an external reality, to be combined with the collected realities as 
experienced by individuals in such a way as to avoid the over emphasis on the internal factors 
employed by rational choice sociologists. It allows us to understand, for instance, why ethnic 
inequalities persist in ways that don’t benefit any involved individuals, without referring to the 
rational action of the oppressed minority individuals (Malešević 2002). 
Network theory has not been as broadly successful in sociology as it has been in other 
disciplines due to a failure to identify ontological realities for epistemological purposes. 
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Relational sociology provides that ontological foundation, and allows traditional epistemology in 
combination with network modeling, that is quite useful empirically. 
The ontological reality of a group is symbolic and subjective. Two otherwise identical 
groups may be quite different because of how they relate to others and how their constituent 
members view them. If one group is made of actors who consider it to be real and affective, then 
that group is in fact real. Potentially the researcher may add further qualifications for reality. If 
the same actors decide that a group is not real, then subjectively it lacks reality. Ontological 
reality is situationally determined by observed network conditions with known consequences. 
This symbolic interactionism grants the symbolic discourse the power to determine reality. What 
is perceived to be real is in fact real, but not only in its consequences. It is real in its being, 
situationally, contextually and temporally located in the relational reality of the social network; 
in a process. This process is reflexivity. 
Merton argues (1995) that causal power is sufficient to bestow reality. This comes from 
the related idea anything real in its effect is real, the Thomas Theorem (Merton 1995). It tends to 
hold true that; if there is an observable effect the reality of the causal element is presumed, but it 
is not a truism. Agency is not instilled simply from perceived agency. Analytic categories do not 
ascribe reality, like Hawthorne effects flowing from all action. That fallacy is called Groupism. 
Relational sociology captures something far more substantial, and elusive by employing the logic 
of networks and the complimentary logic of set mathematics (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). 
 
Selectorate 
 The idea of selectorate lends itself to a hierarchical understanding of power in 
community, and is closely tied to rational action, which is an aspect of social capital theory. The 
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selectorate is a political science concept that says in any political body there is a group able to 
confer authority. The cost of maintaining authority is the cost of satisfying those people’s 
demands. In a state like the United States, the voting population is the selectorate and so the cost 
of maintaining authority is the cost of satisfying their demands. The idea of the selectorate 
implies the regime is uniquely capable of conferring power within the community, of selecting 
leaders and demanding of those leaders. De Mesquita (1985) shows in some regimes like third 
world dictatorships, the selectorate demands money in exchange for the conference of power. In 
a rural American community the regime is more likely to demand control over the selection of 
community development projects, zoning and regulation, or the awarding of contracts. It is the 
active political body of the community. 
 This is an idea that relates in many ways to the sociological concept of a regime theory. 
Regime theory states that interests in the community will informally relate their resources in 
order to acquire power (Agnitsch 2003). It could even be seen as the defining quality of the 
regime. A regime is a body within the community that makes decisions for the community. The 
regime-selectorate are those community members who participate in the social life of the 
community, groups and organizations, as well as those who volunteer time, join groups, and 
attend meetings. They do this is by not letting anything stand in the way of their participation, 
actively seeking power, and an aggregate measure of what prevents people from participating is 
employed, reverse coded, to help identify the selectorate. Active participants and active 
socializers are also measured in aggregate. 
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Satisfaction 
 In communities, satisfaction with the delivery of government and public services is a 
measurement of the community’s function. I include this concept because I believe a functional 
community should have high social capital. In communities that have greater satisfaction with 
the delivery of services people tend to be more connected to the community and see the 
probability of overcoming adversity and inequality as more realistic (Moller and Dickow 2002). 
 The sociology of community social capital literature allow the application of set theory in 
a valid and reliable way for the purpose of constructing concept lattices representing network 
concepts in pursuit of a sociological understanding of the social capital patterns found in the 
communities examined. By constructing lattices illustrating the concepts it is possible to 
understand the social structure of these communities, their social capital and social capital in 
general in a way it has never been seen before. Lattices in turn reveal concepts that are 
significant contributions to key sociological concepts used in the hypothesis, and allow for 
comparisons among concepts and communities. 
 I expect correlations between the communities with high measures of the three forms of 
social capital I employ, and some of these concepts. I am not making statements of causality, but 
at its present level of development, using lattices as an analytical tool should reveal correlations 
that are directional and significant between the dependent variables and the three forms of social 
capital. 
 
Networks 
 The concept of the network aids in capturing the complexity of social relationships in a 
concise way for analysis. It is a metaphor, drawn from nets, simple regular interlaced structures, 
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and extended to capture the complexity of real life social relations. At its simplest, the researcher 
places a number of points on a grid to represent social entities, generally people, and draws lines 
connecting the ones that know one another. 
 Difficulty arises from attributing value to those relationships. If a network represents all 
the people in a town who ever interact with one another will generally not be very informative. 
In small towns the network is all inclusive, and in larger towns it is dominated by throwaway 
contacts. People in a city interact many times a day for trivial purposes. Depth and purpose 
define relationships that answer sociological questions. Those networks are difficult to represent. 
 Efforts have been made to address this. Generally, network relationships are purposive. 
Only relationships for a given purpose are represented in a given network map. One network 
map expresses the contacts people have for community development. A separate network map 
expresses the contacts people in the community have for financial gain. Each map must express 
the complete and full community so the relationships have context. An incomplete sample of 
community relationships diminishes common network measures like closure, centrality and 
betweennenss, most of which assume a complete network map in their theoretical construction, 
even if good sampling techniques were employed. 
Instead, researchers often ask respondents to identify the groups with which they affiliate 
or how often they participate in a given activity. While quite valid, this approach loses some of 
the benefits of network structures in traditional epistemologies. Epistemology involving set math 
derived concept lattices allows associational data to gain the benefits of social network theory 
but allows for sampling. It employs the multiple subjectivities of networks in order to model a 
group structure, which is greater than the sum of its parts (Newman, Barabási and Watts 2006). 
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Network Concepts 
 Relational sociology and a network perspective allow important analytical social capital 
concepts to be employed for use in lattices. 
 The presence of an “us-versus-them” outlook in a group is sociologically important, 
related to social capital, and visible in network structures. It captures suspicion and 
combativeness. A group’s cohesiveness is part of its view of the world as hostile to their 
interests. This perspective can be useful for community organization (Alinsky 1971) but 
considering community social capital, it tends to segment and polarize the community-at-large 
(Putnam 2007). 
 The idea of homogeneity is closely related. Homogeneity captures the idea that the 
community feels they share important aspects of their identity. As such, its specific 
representation varies from one group to another, depending on what matters in a group and those 
aspects that are important. It also varies over time. Richard Sennett observed (2006) that a 
generation ago, children knew the religious affiliations of all their classmates because it 
determined who was available for dating. Today that is significantly less important. Similarly, 
ethnic distinction is less important than it used to be among second generation immigrants from 
Europe (Sennett 2006). Income and cultural class indicators foster homogeneity. According to 
Sennett (2006), religion and ethnicity still matter, but are diminished. Other things, political 
affiliation for instance, have increased in significance. 
 
Trust 
 Trust is the vital a concept of social capital. Both sides of the embeddedness-rationalism 
debate agree that trust, expressed either through norm compliance (Coleman 1990), or collective 
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participation (Putnam 1995; 2000), is fundamental and central to any measure of social capital. 
Even advocates of a rational choice perspective tend to agree that trust must be maintained for 
simple social order. Reciprocity requires trust. But there is much debate about how trust 
functions and whether it is universally good. 
 Trust is a tool for exercising power, as Foucault (1995) would explain it. With trust, the 
actor, the group and even the society is capable of acting in ways that seem irrational. Trust may 
be seen as confidence in the ability of the actor in question to complete an action for their 
personal gain. Trust is an expression of confidence that the actor will act as expected, not 
necessarily that they will act for the social good. 
Trust may be confidence in the likelihood the action will take place. It may also be 
confidence in the positivity of the action itself. 
 This becomes a point of confusion, leading to debate about the dark side of social capital. 
When they talk about the dark side of social capital, Portes and Landolt (Portes and Landolt 
2000; Portes 2000) or Schulman and Anderson (Schulman and Anderson. 1999), express an 
awareness that trusted actors may act disingenuously. Trusted actors may use social capital to 
disguise their betrayal, and make it seem that their actions are in the public interest. This analysis 
focuses on the positivity of the action and leads to the criticism that embeddedness approaches to 
social capital assume all social capital is good, because they do not look at trust as a tool for 
duplicity. 
 Embeddedness assumes positive action, but employs trust to measure the assumed 
likelihood of the action coming to fruition. 
 For Putnam (1995; 2000) trust is a quality of relationships, though it may reduce the cost 
of doing business. Bonding relationships have trust. Trust facilitates social coordination 
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(Agnitsch, Flora and Ryan 2006). It is possible to enter into long term volunteer activities. There 
is generalized reciprocity, a lack of expectation for immediate return. Community members are 
willing to enter into relationships that serve the good of the whole community. Without those 
relationships there is a general unwillingness to act on behalf of the community, because there is 
a lack of confidence that the project will see completion. A project with the scale and expense 
that a person cannot do it alone, and with no expectation of a direct return on the investment, will 
not happen in a market. Trust that others will act for the community and stay involved over time 
is necessary. This is generalized reciprocity, where benefits accrue to broad sections of society 
for the actions of the volunteer section. This is an essential quality, value, and mechanism of 
social capital. 
 Another form of negative trust is confidence that people will act against the best interests 
of those around them. The expectation of a used car dealer is that they will try to sell a car for 
more than it’s worth. The expectation is that the negotiating team from North Korea will tell the 
UN inspectors things that aren’t true. This is more of a semantic difference from genuine trust, 
expectations for a person to act positively, or a lack of trust, where there is no reasonable 
expectation as to how an actor will act. Trust exists on a continuum in social capital. It ranges 
from trusting the actor to act in the best interest of the group to a general lack of confidence to a 
confidence in dishonesty. The extreme negative form is generally restricted to international 
politics or business, gesellschaft, where guarantees are necessary (Deleuze 1994; Derrida 1978; 
Eco 1976). 
Confidence that an actor will act against the interests of those around them is also trust, 
quite distinct from abusive or covert betrayal of trust. This is a sort of abuse that is tied to 
imperfect knowledge. Luhmann (1990), when he conceptualizes trust, speaks of the need of 
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confirmation, what he calls second order observation. Trust, in this conception, comes when 
multiple people confirm a thing to be true. It is best if the people have different structural 
positions. This solution is hard to carry out in its ideal form. Commonly thought of as vetting or 
vouching, when someone with a level of trust affirms the trustworthiness of a less trusted actor, it 
amounts to a realistic form of second order observation (Luhmann 1993). 
 In another form Fukuyama (1995) provides a rational choice explanation of trust in social 
capital. As a key Reagan White House advisor, Fukuyama imagined trust in a purely 
individualistic fashion. Trust is seen as a tool to lower transaction costs. This is consistent with 
Coleman’s social theory of norms. Trust is a norm, functioning to lower the social cost of 
business. Actors who have trust, or trustworthiness, are less expensive to do business with and as 
such will elicit more profit. Social capital allows an actor to reap the benefits of a lowered cost of 
doing business. 
 
Dualisms and Continuums 
 Many concepts exist on continuums with strong concepts at either end: trust to 
uncertainty, mechanic and organic solidarity, rational versus holistic-embedded action. Some of 
the important continuums in social capital must be addressed here, along with a dualism. 
 
Difficulties of Network Analysis. 
The communities I examine in this dissertation are small, from 500 to 10,000 people. In a 
community the number of potential relationships in a network is t(n) = ((n-1)(n))/2. A 
community of 500 people can contain 124,750 relationships while a community of 10,000 people 
can contain 49,995,000 relationships. Relational sociology and network theory both insist that 
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the relationship is a central unit of analysis. Measuring nearly 50 million relationships is 
impractically complicated. However, the very nature of a network map makes sampling difficult. 
Network theory suggests that networks reveal important patterns of association. Sampling 
introduces random holes in the map that undermine the theory. Holes in a network map are 
intrinsically important (Burt 1992). Network measures like closure and centrality become 
inaccurate when holes are randomly introduced. Social network and actor ego networks are 
useful inside small organizations and groups, where those groups can be generalized to other 
groups of a similar nature. In analyzing a community of even a few hundred people, the 
practicality of making comprehensive networks is low. With a small and coherent purposively 
selected group, like a leadership regime (Agnitsch 2003), it can be practical and useful to map 
the members’ relationships. To analyze a community as a whole the using social fields as sets in 
concept lattices is much more practical, useful and theoretically sound. 
 
Relational Networks 
 Mustafa Emirbayer made the case that sociology, if is to remain relevant, must refocus on 
relationships, as that is where epistemology began because relationships constitute the social 
world. I have always agreed with him, and felt his theoretical arguments were sound, but 
sometimes an idea crystallizes when it is triangulated. When multiple sources all see the same 
thing from their own perspectives, it becomes more valid. 
 Network theory has difficulty mapping the social universe sufficiently to acquire a 
sociological perspective, finding itself instead mired in the perspective of psychology, 
occasionally rising to social psychology. This is due to the ego-centric focus of network analysis, 
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though powerful in instances where the data makes it theoretically feasible, is generally not 
advantageous to the sociologist. 
 But, computer networks may be accurately and nearly completely mapped, or at the very 
least large sections of them may be completely and unambiguously mapped, lessening the 
confusion about what qualities of relationships are sufficient and necessary. WebPages use 
hyperlinks. A map of those hyperlinks and the terms associated with them may be automatically 
and unambiguously gathered. 
 Similarities between social and computer networks are evident. Duncan Watts and Steven 
Strogatz (Watts 1999) updated the Stanley Milgram experiment looking for social paths using 
email instead of post cards, as was done in the original experiment. They asked people to contact 
strangers in as few emails as possible by forwarding an email to someone more likely to know 
the target. They were able to create network models illustrating the small world phenomena 
(Buchanan 2002). Their further research into social phenomena seemed to indicate that in a 
constellating of social phenomena, be it individuals or groups, all nodes have an equal 
probability of being influential due largely to the strength of weak ties. This confirms a network 
phenomena first observed by Marc Granovetter (1973) who noted that while a person’s closest 
relationships are strong ties, it is the distant occasional relationships, termed weak ties, that are 
the most likely to find resources unavailable in the person’s immediate social surrounding. These 
weak-tie holders are important, but not as important as elsewhere indicated. Malcolm Gladwell 
(2000), and theorists of his persuasion (Uzzi and Spiro 2005) feel that the people, or network 
nodes, that maintain large numbers of active but weak ties are powerful opinion leaders. 
 Watts used computer models in an experiment using musical preference to test this 
hypothesis (Watts 2004). He found that generally, once an idea was established, even a little, in a 
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network environment it quickly grew to dominance. This is often called first-to-market 
advantage. The musical preference experiment asked a number of people to listen to and rate 
songs. In some samples previous ratings were visible and in others they were not. In experiments 
where they were not, no one song fared significantly better than any other. In network 
environments once a song had a few good reviews, it quickly gathered more and became 
dominant. In successive instances of the experiment, no song was more or less likely to be the 
successful song, but once established any song could be the successful one. This pattern gives 
credence to the idea that certain social actors will step up and take charge, as leaders, becoming 
the element that establishes trends, but no node is more or less likely to do so. Simply, there is a 
distinct advantage to being first in a social environment. This works well with the idea of social 
sets. If people rate each of six songs as either good or bad, then a series of sets can be created 
containing people that voted good each song, and there are points of overlap where people agree 
on some songs but disagree on others. This way of observing a social trend can be applied to any 
circumstance. Belonging to community development organizations or socializing at places in a 
community is also easily categorized into sets. Sets that are larger early on are likely to attract 
more members quickly (Watts 2003). This is especially true if they have an active promoter in 
the form of an opinion leader who can step up and promote one set of affiliations over another 
(Gladwell 2000). 
 Each collection of one or more affiliations (sets) that is distinct from each other collection 
of affiliations (sets) is called a concept. A concept is not necessarily the same as a class of sets. A 
class of sets contains sets that are conceptually similar. A concept is the term employed to 
describe a collection of one or more sets. All classes are concepts, though not all concepts are 
sufficient to become classes of sets. 
 68  
 
 
Set Theory 
 Alain Badiou (2005) makes the case that mathematics, particularly set mathematics, is 
ontology. He contends that the best, and ultimately the only, way to consider the world is in 
terms of mathematical sets. Set math describes objects and their relationships; it undergirds much 
of modern math. Axioms define the rules of logic for describing sets. The predominant form of 
set theory, used by Badiou, is Zermelo-Fraenkel Axiomic set theory. To prove the superiority of 
the logic of set theory for interpreting the nature of being, Badiou examines the fundamental 
arguments of philosophers throughout history. 
Badiou asks if there is a one, a complete set of all objects. He believes the philosophical 
implications of the answer pertain to the nature of God and humanity. He is also keenly 
interested in what happens when an event takes place that is a rupture in the logic of being. This 
question poses enormous implications for the sociology of boundaries, but here I take from 
Badiou simply the idea that set theory may be seen as ontologically representative of reality, if 
not more deeply ontologically constitutive of reality. I am content with its heuristic value.  
 For Badiou being qua being (being in itself) is the logic of a specific set analogous to the 
habitus (Bourdieu 1977; 1990a) of a given field. This allows fields to be considered 
mathematical sets. Badiou’s idea of using the mathematics of set theory to examine the world 
enhances the thoroughly well reasoned logic of habitus as a concept to define the characteristics 
of those sets. 
 Linton Freeman, a leading network theory sociologist (Freeman and White 1993), makes 
the cases that lattices most accurately and intrinsically represent the observations of qualitative 
sociologists and anthropologists (Freeman 1996). Lattices are graphic constructions of set theory 
and represent the logic and reasoning Badiou uses. 
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 Together Badiou’s conception of set logic as ontological, its analogy to Bourdieu’s field 
theory, and Freeman’s observation of the value of lattices, imply that lattices are fundamentally 
representative of the deep reality of social being. 
 A fuller understanding of the sociological implications and practicalities of set 
mathematics is available in Appendix C. 
 
Cardinality 
I introduce the concept of Cardinality in the sociological use of lattices to 
analyze data. Cardinality has a long conceptual history in mathematics (Cantor 
1915) and there is use of cardinality in a similar sense, but without lattices, in 
philosophy (Badiou 2005, Zizek 2006) but in the sociological literature this is a 
new concept.  
Cardinal numbers are used to measure the size of sets, and that is precisely 
what I am doing here. Though as the mathematical term set takes on important 
sociological context so too does the term cardinal. A set is any collection of like 
objects. Like objects form subjectivity, and cardinality is the count of those 
subjectivities. For instance, when looking at a rural Iowa community's voluntary 
association, it is necessary to hold the frame of reference relative to the 
community. In this case the cardinal count of sets is the count of voluntary 
associations in the community. Cardinality allows the stabilization of a frame of 
reference, which is a fluid thing in set theory. When all sets are sets of sets that go 
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on to form larger sets in turn, subjectivity can be overwhelming. Cardinality allows 
the frame of reference to be fixed. 
I further specify sorts of cardinality. When a lattice is constructed from the 
intersections of the independent variables and the actors in the community, it 
naturally creates a hierarchy of the dependent variable. The levels of the hierarchy 
are the reference points relative to the fixed subjectivity of the community, and so 
the forms of cardinality I employ are simply understandings of that hierarchy. 
Level cardinality is the count of groups on each level. Composite cardinality is the 
count of unique actors on a level. Bijective cardinality is the count of total actors 
on a level and injective cardinality is the count of relationships the groups on that 
level have with groups from lower levels of the hierarchy. 
 
Lattices 
“We see, then, that bounded groups can be uncovered even in the presence of 
bridging ties. Thus, the Galois lattice provides a general way to use cliques to reveal 
groups. And the groups that are revealed embody a form that is consistent with traditional 
intuitive ideas about group structure. Moreover, the groups that turn up with this 
approach are virtually identical to those described by ethnographers. The clique 
formalism, it seems, produces exactly the desired result when it is used in conjunction 
with a Galois lattice.” (Freeman 1996:186) 
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 While not new, the applications of lattices in sociology has received woefully little 
attention given the enormous potential it holds for pushing the discipline forward. This is in part 
due to a lack of computer software for lattice analysis in sociology, a difficulty in part addressed 
by the development of new software in recent years. This software has the added advantage of 
falling under open source license, meaning it is free to use and distribute. 
 Deriving a lattice from data is fairly simple. Data must be structured as a series of binary 
responses. For some pretend data, assume a series of related questions about diversity and 
community asked of twenty people. The responses are in table 1. 
 
1. Do you think economic diversity improves community? 
2. Do you think racial diversity improves community? 
3. Do you think ethnic diversity improves community? 
4. Do you think diverse perspectives make community healthy? 
5. Do you feel you are a minority in any way in your community? 
 What perspectives tend to cluster and what does that clustering mean? A few people feel 
diversity of all kinds is good and a few are entirely opposed to diversity of all sorts. Rendering a 
lattice reveals patterns in the data. See lattice 1. 
 This lattice shows that questions 2, 3 and 4 are the most inclusive, but that many people 
who answered yes for question 4 did not answer yes for questions 2 and 3. The exceptions were 
Adam and Tam, who were differentiated by how they answered Questions 1 and 5. Tam 
answered yes for 5 and no for 1, Adam was the opposite. Six people at the bottom answered yes 
for everything and three at the top answered no for everything. Everyone who answered yes for 2 
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also answered yes for 3. Question 5 is particularly interesting because it is the view of the self 
identified outsider, and the outsiders, Tam, Kam and Quincy who felt that diversity and diverse 
opinions do not improve community. Of course this is all purely fictitious, but these are the 
patterns that can emerge from lattices. 
 
Table 1 – Two mode diversity and community data 
 
 
 
Respondent Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Adam  X X X X  
Berry     X  
Celia  X X X X X 
Doris     X  
Evan  X X X X X 
Fran       
Georgia X X X X X 
Hank     X  
Irene       
Jin  X X X X X 
Kam   X X  X 
Lua  X X X X X 
Mike     X  
Nancy  X   X  
Olive  X X X X X 
Pat      
Quincy  X X  X 
Ray    X  
Sam    X  
Tam  X X X X 
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Lattice 1 – Illustrative Lattice 
 
 
Hypotheses 
The correlations of within group, between group, and out-bridging social capital with 
homogeneity, us-versus-them, embeddedness, selectorate, trusting attitude, cohesiveness, 
contentment, rationality, satisfaction with public services and satisfaction with government 
 74  
 
 
services addressed by level cardinality, bijective cardinality, injective cardinality and composite 
cardinality provide the hypothesis for testing. 
 It is useful to think of within-group social capital as operating on the micro level, while 
between-group social capital operates on the meso level. Out bridging social capital is macro 
level. Cardinality is inherently structural and so operates at the network level in defiance the 
conventional micro-meso-macro paradigm. However, bijective and composite tend to be micro 
level because they address the distributions of individuals. Bijective is relational and at the 
community level. Composite is at the individual level and tends to be less relational. Injective 
and level cardinality do not address individual distributions. They look at group structures in the 
community though they are still structural and operate on the network level. Compared to the 
other forms of cardinality, injective cardinality is more meso where level cardinality is more 
macro. Injective cardinality is more relational because it captures group relations while level 
cardinality captures structural measure of the community as a whole expressed in the groups that 
occupy that level, making it a purely community level measure, much like the bijective measure. 
 
Homogeneity  
Homogeneity should be positively correlated with out-bridging social capital, especially as 
measured with level cardinality. At the macro level, homogenous communities are more likely to 
be out-bridging communities because they need diverse resources more than heterogeneous 
communities. 
 
H1: Measured as level cardinality, the presence of community out-bridging social capital 
positively correlates with the presence of homogeneity in the community. 
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Us-versus-them 
Communities that have high between group social capital will have less of an us-versus-them 
attitude. This is especially likely to be the case as measured by injective cardinality because it 
captures the inter-group relationships that diminish us-versus-them attitudes. 
 
H2: Measured as injective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital negatively correlates with the presence of us-versus-them in the community. 
 
Embeddedness 
Embeddedness is likely to be positively correlated with within and between group social capital 
and negatively correlated with out-bridging social capital. This is especially true as measured by 
bijective cardinality. The complex interrelations in the community produce a genuine concern for 
an interest in the life of the place to the exclusion of others. 
 
H3: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community within-group social capital 
positively correlates with the presence of embeddedness in the community. 
 
H4: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital positively correlates with the presence of embeddedness in the community. 
 
H5: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community out-bridging social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of embeddedness in the community. 
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Selectorate 
Communities with more extensive selectorates that comprise a large segment of the community 
are likely to correlate with communities with strong between group social capital where that 
selectorate finds its expression and coordination. An extensive selectorate is most likely to be 
found in bijective, composite and injective measures. 
 
H6: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital positively correlates with the presence of selectorate in the community. 
 
H7: Measured as level cardinality, the presence of community between-group social capital 
positively correlates with the presence of selectorate in the community. 
 
H8: Measured as composite cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital positively correlates with the presence of selectorate in the community. 
 
Trusting attitude 
It is an expression of a trusting attitude that a community is willing to reach outside its borders. 
Out-bridging social capital should be correlated with a trusting attitude as expressed in bijective 
measures. 
 
H9: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community out-bridging social capital 
positively correlates with the presence of trusting attitude in the community. 
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Cohesiveness  
Cohesive communities do not tend to reach outside themselves. At the macro measure of level 
cardinality, out-bridging social capital will negatively correlate with cohesiveness. 
 
H10: Measured as level cardinality, the presence of community out-bridging social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of cohesiveness in the community. 
 
Contentment 
Within and between group social capital should be negatively correlated with contentment. 
Content people do not engage with their communities. Level and injective measures should 
express the coordination of discontent voiced in the mobilization of a community’s social capital. 
 
H11: Measured as level cardinality, the presence of community within-group social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of contentment in the community. 
 
H12: Measured as level cardinality, the presence of community between-group social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of contentment in the community. 
 
H13: Measured as injective cardinality, the presence of community within-group social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of contentment in the community. 
 
H14: Measured as injective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital negatively correlates with the presence of contentment in the community. 
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Relational Rationality 
Rationality is at the heart of social capital. Relationally rational economic behavior is most likely 
in communities that have high between-group and within-group social capital as measured by 
bijective cardinality. Out-bridging social capital and relational rationality may be negatively 
correlated for any number of reasons, including an increased presence outside the community. 
 
H15: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community within-group social capital 
positively correlates with the presence of relational rationality in the community. 
 
H16: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital positively correlates with the presence of relational rationality in the community. 
 
H17: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community out-bridging social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of relational rationality in the community. 
 
Satisfaction with public services 
At the group-relational measure of injective cardinality, there is likely to be a correlation of 
between-group social capital and satisfaction with public services as well as within group social 
capital and satisfaction with public services. The presence of interrelation should indicate a 
greater investment by the community in its public services. 
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H18: Measured as injective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital positively correlates with the presence of satisfaction with public services in the 
community. 
 To accompany a relational perspective as applied in the formulation of these hypotheses, 
it is necessary to employ a relational methodology. The theory requires an appropriate method. 
Ontology demands epistemology. The methodology described in the next chapter is a new 
application of developments in analytical techniques, most notably the use of lattices to make 
comparisons.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
With this dissertation I seek to clarify social capital theory, promote methodological 
collectivism, advance the empirical use of lattices and model the effective use of relational 
sociology. 
The construction of lattices, using broad definitions, has high validity. Beginning with the 
idea put forth by Linton Freeman (Freeman 1996; Freeman and White 1993) that lattices are the 
most efficient way of representing quantitatively, those things that are observed by qualitative 
sociologists in the same situations. This strongly implies that the data capture important 
information that is simply not represented using traditional regression models. In a lattice, each 
hypothesis with a positive slope appears as a potential concept. Those with high relative slopes 
capture the viewer’s attention. Questions are designed to align with theoretically significant 
concepts. Concepts appear where the data suggests significance. Concepts recognized as 
significant may also be regressed using a standard model. This technique is dependent upon the 
proper selection of variables to be used in the lattice. They all need to be related or contrasted 
conceptually. As the Cronbach’s Alpha scores demonstrate, they are. 
Terry Besser, Vern Ryan and Kerry Agnitsch generously supplied data from their 2004 
survey of 99 communities in Iowa. The survey was designed to capture the social capital 
variables of the communities and the people in them. This analysis technique draws on the earlier 
work done with concept lattices and leans on network theory to gain many of its advantages, but 
address questions of sampling in networks. This method approximates the observations of 
qualitative sociologists but uses survey data that can be readily duplicated. The lattices 
constructed to analyze the data address all of those combinations of variables with a positive 
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slope. Variables were selected for their ability to address the theoretical construction of 
important concepts. The sociologist recognizes those concepts that rise to the level of 
significance within the community according the logic of sets and, therefore, become fields 
fitting the definitions of Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and Wilkinson 
(1970). 
 
Data Source/Data Collection 
The data for this dissertation was provided by Terry Besser, Vern Ryan and Kerry 
Agnitsch from their 2004 survey of residents of 99 small Iowa towns. A multi-level probability 
sampling design was used for the selection of heads of household to participation in a mail 
survey of community quality of life, social capital, and other community dimensions. The 
original instrument is available in Appendix A. 
Initially, towns with 500 to 10,000 residents in 1990 that were not contiguous to a 
metropolitan center were randomly selected from each of Iowa’s 99 counties. Then one hundred 
and fifty (with 15 replacements) households within the telephone exchange area of each town 
were randomly selected from local telephone directories1. Sampled households were contacted 
several times following a modification of Dillman’s (Dillman 1978; Besser, Recker and Agnitsch 
2008) total design method. The response rate was 67 percent, acceptable for mailed survey 
methodology (Dillman 2000; Besser, Recker and Agnitsch 2008).  
 
 
                                                 
1
 To assess the adequacy of the telephone directory as a sampling frame, comparisons of sample characteristics to 
census figures were conducted. Results of these comparisons indicated that the sample was representative of the 
population based on a 99 % confidence interval (Besser, Recker and Agnitsch 2008). 
 82  
 
 
Operationalization of Key Concepts 
A cardinal number (Cantor 1915; Badiou 2005) is the number of concepts represented 
within a higher concept. It is central to both set theory and field theory that all sets and fields are 
composed of multiples that are themselves composed of multiples and in turn go on to compose 
larger concepts (Martin 2003; Bourdieu 1977; Lewin 1997). Cardinal numbers are specific to a 
given concept containing one or more sets or fields. Cardinal numbers imply that a specific 
quantity of sets compose the concept in question. 
Each concept has a cardinal number. Each lattice organizes the concept in terms of its 
multiple components. Each lattice reveals an inherent grouping present in the concept, termed 
here as a "level". Each level has a cardinal number of its own and each level has a quality taken 
as a whole. This is where broad community concepts like social capital and selectorate are 
revealed. Lattices represent concepts where levels are obvious and distinct and the cardinal 
numbers of each level is seen to represent qualities of the concepts on that level. A series of 
variables are selected according to their theoretical fit for each lattice to represents a sociological 
concept. Each concept is examined in detail with tables showing reliability measures and factor 
loadings for the employed measures. 
 
Social Capital 
Three forms of social capital are modeled. They are community within-group social 
capital, community between-group social capital, and community out-bridging social capital. I 
carefully figured, developed and compared scores of the three forms of social capital 
representing each community. See table 2 for the scores of the selected communities in 
comparison to the other communities for each of the three scores. 
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I followed Besser's (Besser, Recker and Agnitsch 2008) model for computing within-
group social capital. This measures the community's informal network ties. 
Friendship was exhibited by social participation at local public gathering places including 
food centers, bars, city parks, bowling alleys, town square, malls, community center, country 
clubs, other locations, churches, schools, libraries, gas station, and work. Besser eliminated 
bowling alleys and malls, as they were infrequently present, but I left them in because they did 
not overly skew the results and their presence may indicate that relationships facilitated their 
presence. Each place was scored for the proportion of residents who said they "socialize or visit 
with others" at those gathering places "daily" or "weekly" from a choice of "daily", "weekly", 
"monthly or less", "never", and "no such place". This left scores for each location relative to the 
populations. Also, respondents were asked to rate how friendly their community is, on a scale of 
one to 7, 7 being unfriendly and 1 being friendly. The average score was calculated for each 
community, and those respondents from all communities rating their community more than one 
standard deviation away from the mean from all communities in the direction of friendly were 
counted as ranking the community as friendly. Then a proportional score of residents calling the 
community friendly was calculated for each community. Scores for the two principal 
components and the measures used are in table 3. 
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Table 2 – Social Capital Scores of 99 communities 
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1 0.16 0.28 0.42 Firston 34 0.13 0.25 0.36   67 0.11 0.22 0.37   
2 0.16 0.27 0.40   35 0.15 0.26 0.22   68 0.14 0.23 0.22   
3 0.16 0.27 0.42   36 0.15 0.23 0.32   69 0.12 0.26 0.22   
4 0.16 0.28 0.37   37 0.14 0.27 0.23   70 0.10 0.19 0.49   
5 0.17 0.27 0.33   38 0.16 0.20 0.33   71 0.13 0.25 0.21   
6 0.17 0.29 0.25   39 0.14 0.28 0.18   72 0.14 0.23 0.23   
7 0.16 0.26 0.35   40 0.15 0.26 0.17   73 0.10 0.18 0.50   
8 0.16 0.28 0.27   41 0.12 0.24 0.37   74 0.11 0.21 0.37   
9 0.17 0.31 0.22 Titon Between 42 0.12 0.26 0.33   75 0.12 0.23 0.31   
10 0.15 0.30 0.27   43 0.13 0.22 0.41   76 0.11 0.20 0.36   
11 0.16 0.27 0.26   44 0.14 0.26 0.23   77 0.12 0.21 0.32   
12 0.17 0.29 0.22   45 0.14 0.24 0.27   78 0.13 0.25 0.20   
13 0.15 0.29 0.26   46 0.13 0.26 0.25   79 0.09 0.15 0.66 Long Bridges 
14 0.16 0.27 0.28   47 0.14 0.28 0.20   80 0.11 0.22 0.29   
15 0.14 0.28 0.30   48 0.15 0.26 0.17   81 0.10 0.16 0.44   
16 0.16 0.28 0.24   49 0.14 0.29 0.15   82 0.11 0.19 0.37   
17 0.18 0.28 0.21 Titon Within 50 0.13 0.23 0.33   83 0.10 0.21 0.35   
18 0.16 0.27 0.25   51 0.13 0.24 0.31   84 0.10 0.14 0.43   
19 0.15 0.24 0.36   52 0.15 0.23 0.25   85 0.14 0.24 0.13   
20 0.14 0.23 0.50   53 0.12 0.21 0.47   86 0.13 0.24 0.16   
21 0.15 0.25 0.33   54 0.14 0.26 0.18   87 0.13 0.21 0.24   
22 0.14 0.29 0.26   55 0.12 0.22 0.41   88 0.12 0.23 0.25   
23 0.17 0.27 0.21   56 0.13 0.24 0.28   89 0.12 0.20 0.29   
24 0.15 0.25 0.34   57 0.11 0.21 0.42   90 0.09 0.17 0.40   
25 0.16 0.29 0.17   58 0.13 0.27 0.21   91 0.11 0.22 0.29   
26 0.15 0.24 0.34   59 0.15 0.25 0.13   92 0.09 0.16 0.40   
27 0.15 0.25 0.26   60 0.15 0.24 0.21   93 0.11 0.20 0.31   
28 0.14 0.23 0.39   61 0.10 0.22 0.42   94 0.12 0.22 0.25   
29 0.14 0.25 0.36 Avragly 62 0.14 0.26 0.18   95 0.11 0.18 0.32   
30 0.15 0.25 0.26   63 0.11 0.20 0.46   96 0.09 0.16 0.36   
31 0.13 0.26 0.34   64 0.13 0.23 0.31   97 0.12 0.20 0.25   
32 0.15 0.26 0.23   65 0.13 0.20 0.35   98 0.10 0.18 0.32   
33 0.13 0.24 0.38   66 0.15 0.22 0.24   99 0.12 0.21 0.23 Laston 
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I followed Besser’s (Besser, Recker and Agnitsch 2008) model for computing between-
group social capital. This measures the community’s formal sector ties, and represents the 
capacity of the groups in a community to come together across that community. 
The measure quantifies community participation in a number of organizations. If people 
go to church in town, participate in a service organization, a recreation club, a political or civic 
organization, a job related organization, a church group or another organization more than 
weekly, it increases the measure, again using the proportion of the community participating as 
such in each sort of organization. 
People were asked if their community is well described as "every person for themselves", 
if clubs and organizations are "interested in what’s best for all residents", and if residents are 
"receptive to new residents taking leadership positions." Answers included "strongly agree", 
"agree", "undecided", "disagree" and "strongly disagree", where responses of "agree" or 
"strongly agree" indicated higher social capital. The proportion of respondents that answered as 
such provide a score for the community.  
Using a seven point scale respondents were asked whether “trusting” or “not trusting” 
“better describes” their community. Respondents answering one standard deviation away from 
the mean toward the value of trusting were taken to indicate that the community was really 
viewed as trusting. A proportional score for each community representing the trusting-ness of the 
community went into the calculation of between-group social capital. The last question used in 
measuring whether the community had high between-group social capital asked if they worked 
in the community where they lived. A proportion was again figured for each location, 
representing the part of the community that worked in the community where they lived. An 
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average score of all these factors was taken to represent between-group social capital. Scores for 
the measures used are in table 3. 
 
Table 3 - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Social Capital 
(N=99) 
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Within Group Social Capital    .77 
1. Gathering Places  1.12 .40  .77 
2.   
Friendly/Unfriendly 
Being resident is like living with group of 
close friends 
Immediate neighborhood I live in is closely 
knit 
1.18 .03  
.35 
.88 
.89 
.60 
 
 
 
     
Between Group Social Capital    .73 
Church or other place of worship 
Trusting/Not Trusting 
Every person for themselves is how people act 
in community 
Clubs/orgs. are interested in what's best for all 
residents 
Residents receptive to new residents taking 
leadership 
Service and fraternal organizations 
Recreational groups 
Political and civic groups 
Job-related organizations 
Church or other religious groups 
All other groups and organizations 
Work where they live 
.61 
.13 
.57 
 
.59 
 
.40 
 
.02 
.08 
.01 
.01 
.24 
.04 
.17 
.18 
.06 
.10 
 
.10 
 
.09 
 
.02 
.05 
.01 
.01 
.08 
.02 
.10 
.82 
.35 
.65 
 
.76 
 
.68 
 
.54 
.53 
.48 
.41 
.61 
.53 
.72 
 
 
The community's out-bridging score represents the percentage of the sample that count as 
bridgers, meaning they are a part of the community, but they also have connections outside of the 
community. They participate in the community and the proportion of groups that they participate 
in within the community relative to the proportion of groups they participate in from outside the 
community is within one standard deviation of the mean, and as such should be well balanced 
between the group and sources of resources the group needs, as such representing a source of 
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bridging capital for the community. Then the percentage of the community that qualifies as a 
bridger is compared among the communities. These various ways of measuring social capital 
were all used to assign community scores and the 99 communities were ranked, then an average 
of the ranks was computed. Six communities were selected from the 99 to represent the various 
positions on these scales. Table 2 is the complete table of community scores. The six 
communities selected for inclusion in the analysis are shown in table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Social capital scores for sampled communities 
Alias 
Community Within-
Group Social Capital 
Score 
Community Between-
Group Social Capital 
Score 
Community Out-
Bridging Social 
Capital Score 
Titon Within 0.18 0.28 0.21 
Avragly 0.14 0.25 0.36 
Titon Between 0.17 0.31 0.22 
Laston 0.12 0.21 0.23 
Firston 0.16 0.28 0.42 
Long Bridges 0.09 0.15 0.66 
 
Firston represents the top of the average positions in the rankings though it is not in the 
top ten of any of the charts considered separately. Titon Between has the best community level 
between group social capital scores and Titon within-group has the best community level within-
group group social capital scores. Both have very low position on the ranking of out-community 
bridging. Avragly is nearest the middle of all the different rankings. Long Bridges is the 
community with the best out-community bridging scores. It also ranks very low on within-group 
community bridging and bonding. Laston represents the top of the average positions in the 
rankings.  
 88  
 
 
The apparent correlation between high within-group community scores and low out-
community bridging scores is not consistent throughout the 99 communities. Between-Group 
Social Capital considers the number of groups within-group the community that the respondents 
participate in, while the out-community bridging score also considers that value relative to the 
number of groups the respondents individually participates in outside the community. 
To further reduce any correlation, consider how the count of groups is used in either case. 
The within-group community score is determined with a count of groups in which individuals 
participate. Then, if the respondent participates in one standard deviation more groups than the 
mean for that community, they are assumed to be active participants. Subsequently, a community 
wide score is figured by considering what portion of the community in question is considered an 
active participant. For the out-community bridging score, the respondent is evaluated to see 
whether the proportion of in-community versus out-community groups is within-group one 
standard deviation above or below the mean, not of their community, but of all communities in 
Iowa. This is because the bridges between communities must be held relative to all the 
communities but the score within-group community must be considered relative to only the 
community in question. Also, in the out-community bridge score the ideal is a balance between 
groups in the home community and groups in other communities, where they are in the 
community and out of it simultaneously and thus able to provide a bridge. In the within-group 
community score the ideal is high numbers significantly above what others in that community 
are doing. As such, there should not be significant correlation between the two scores, and there 
is not. The correlation is -.71, returning a t of -2.03 (p-value = .11) which is not significant at p < 
0.05. 
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Homogeneity  
The overall homogeneity of the community is measured by income, political affiliation, 
religious affiliation, education and the divisiveness of local politics. All of the sampled 
communities were entirely or nearly entirely racially homogenous. Ethnicities were not 
significant factors in these communities homogeneity. 
High, low, and medium income groups were identified with the division lines at $30,000 
per year and $70,000 per year. People identified themselves as democrats, republicans and 
independents. They identified themselves as having a college degree, or not having a college 
degree, including a two-year degree. 
Respondents also answered the question, "When it comes to LOCAL POLITICS do the 
people of [your community] tend to agree on the issues or are there often two or more groups 
with different ideas about the issues." Responses of "People tend to agree" were taken to indicate 
homogeneity while responses of "Two or more groups are common" were taken to indicate lack 
of homogeneity. Respondents also identified party affiliation. 
 
Table 5 - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Homogeneity 
(N=9962) 
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Homogeneity 
People tend to agree on local politics 
Attained college degree 
Religious preference is catholic 
Do you consider yourself a Democrat 
Do you consider yourself a Republican 
Do you consider yourself an Independent 
Approximate household income is low 
Approximate household income is middle 
Approximate household income is high 
8.65 12.408  
.047 
.499 
.668 
.951 
.952 
.952 
.967 
.966 
.979 
.772 
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Us-Versus-Them 
To what extent the community may be characterized as having an us-versus-them mindset 
was quantified using five questions. Asking whether "Dangerous" or "Safe" best describes the 
community in question, respondents answered on a seven point scale ranging between the two 
qualities. With the assumption that a view of the community as dangerous is more indicative of 
an us-versus-them mentality, respondents who answered more than one standard deviation below 
the mean were counted as having indicated the community is dangerous to the degree necessary 
to qualify as an us-versus-them mentality. Respondents were also asked a series of questions, 
with the responses "strongly agree", "agree", "undecided", "disagree", and "strongly disagree". 
Responses of "Strongly agree" or "agree" were considered sufficient to indicate an us-versus-
them mentality. The questions asked if the community residents act in an "every person for 
themselves" way, if respondents are receptive to new residents taking leadership positions 
(reverse coded), if you have to know the right people in the community to get ahead, and if 
people in the community respect personal achievements over a willingness to help others. These 
five questions together form a lattice describing the us-versus-them mentality of the community 
in question. 
Table 6 - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Us-versus-them 
(N=9962) 
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Us-versus-them  
Dangerous 
Every person for their selves is how people act in 
community 
Residents not receptive to new residents taking 
leadership 
To get ahead in community, you have to know the 
right people 
Personally accomplishments over community 
1.97 3.93  
.99 
.63 
 
.54 
 
.67 
 
.68 
.74 
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Embeddedness 
Two related yet distinct concepts, embeddedness and selectorate, must be differentiated. 
Embeddedness draws on economic sociology and community sociology. From the work 
of Granovetter (1985) and Etzioni (1987) embeddedness implies a social universe understood in 
a contextualized way by the people who experience it, through a refusal to be isolated from the 
world where they exist. Applied to the data, the embedded community is a place where the 
people are interrelated and familiar with one another. A person who is more embedded in a 
community would likely know the names of their neighbors, would likely see their social 
wellness as related to the health of the environment where they live. A less embedded member of 
the community would be disinterested in the community so far as they can insulate themselves 
from it by ignoring those around them. A non embedded respondent would not know their 
neighbors or be curious about the community well being. Their friends and family would be 
elsewhere, if anywhere. 
To operationalize the idea of embeddedness, a series of measures were used. Respondents 
were asked what proportion of the adults living in the community in question they know by 
name. Answers included “None or few of them”, “Less than half of them”, “About half of them”, 
“Most of them”, and “All of them”. The first three answers were considered as knowing too few 
to indicate the respondent being embedded, while the last two answers were considered sufficient 
to qualify the answer as indicating embeddedness. Respondents were asked what proportion of 
their close personal adult friends live in the community. Responses of “Most of them live here” 
or “All of them live here” were taken to indicate embeddedness. Responses of “I really have no 
close personal friends”, “None of them live here”, “Less than half of them live here”, or “About 
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hone-half of them live here” were taken to indicate that the respondent is less embedded. The 
same question was asked substituting relatives for close personal friends. A series of questions 
were asked of the respondents who indicated that they had some close personal friends in the 
community. They were asked to think about those close personal friends and indicate how many 
of them are relatives or in-laws, neighbors, coworkers, or attend the same religious institution. 
Respondents who indicated most or all of them to each or any of these questions were marked as 
being more embedded than those who indicated half or less. Finally, respondents were asked if 
they were interested in knowing what was going on in the community. Respondents who were 
very or somewhat interested were indicated as being more embedded while those expressing a 
neutrality or disinterest toward the goings on of the community were seen to be less embedded. 
 
Table 7 - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Embeddedness 
(N=9962) 
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Embeddedness 
 Proportion of adults in your community you 
know by name 
 Proportion of your close adult friends live in 
your comm. 
 Are close friends relatives or in-laws? 
 Are close friends your neighbors? 
 Do close friends work with you? 
 Do close friends belong to same 
church/synagogue you do? 
 Proportion of adult relatives/in-laws live in your 
community 
 How interested are you in knowing what goes on 
in community? 
11.51 12.957  
.325 
 
.392 
 
.922 
.916 
.846 
.919 
 
.457 
 
.322 
.777 
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Selectorate 
The selectorate of a community, a term borrowed from the political science of Bruce 
Bueno DeMesquita (de Mesquita and Lalman 1988; de Mesquita 1984; 1985), operates similarly 
to regime theory (Agnitsch 2003). The selectorate is the defining quality of the regime. A regime 
is a body within the community that makes decisions for the community. The selectorate is 
section of the community that confers power to, makes demands of, leaders. Selectorate theory 
shows that in dictatorships, the selectorate is made of generals and warlords who demand money 
or weapons in exchange for conferring power. In rural American communities the regime is 
more likely to demand influence over the selection of community development projects, zoning, 
regulation, and the awarding of contracts. The regime selectorate is identified as those 
community members who participate in the social life of the community, groups and 
organizations, as well as those who are approached volunteer time, join groups, and attend 
meetings.  
A quality of the selectorate is that they do not let anything stand in the way of 
participation. An aggregate measure of what prevents people from participating, reverse coded, 
identifies the selectorate along with active participants and active socializers are also measured 
in aggregate. Respondents were asked if, in the last year, they had been approached to participate 
in a project, an organization or a community meeting. If they responded yes to any of those three 
they are more likely to be a part of the selectorate. Respondents were also asked if their friends 
were in the same organizations they were in, if they considered themselves frequent volunteers, 
and if they felt they were involved with the community. 
The people identified do not let impediments diminish their involvement in the 
community. They have "no impediment". The seven reasons people listed as impediments to 
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their involvement in community development activities were placed on a matrix, so people who 
are closer to the base said that they lacked skill, time, opportunity, interest, an invitation or they 
felt the community didn’t need involvement. There is always need for involvement. It is a failure 
of leadership to not communicate that need to the community. All members of the community 
have skills. The assets of the community are its greatest resource and a failure of leadership does 
not communicate to the community that its skills are valuable and sufficient (McKnight and 
Kretzmann 1993). 
To identify the selectorate, those persons who let nothing stand in the way of their 
involvement were considered more a part of the selectorate than those who let some impediment 
prevent participation. Respondents identifying things that prevent participation were considered 
less a part of the selectorate. Using a series of questions asking respondents to identify where 
they "socialize or visit with others", those respondents who identified places they visited daily or 
weekly were selected. Pre-identified locations were food centers (restaurants, coffee shops, snack 
bars, deli's, etc.), bars and lounges, city parks, bowling alleys, town squares, malls, community 
centers, and golf and country clubs. An open ended "other" pulled in responses of church, 
school, library, store, and work. Within a given community, the level of use a location received 
was identified by the portion of respondents selecting it. Then each respondent was assigned a 
score by calculating how many places they frequented relative to other respondents in the 
community and multiplying that by the relative importance of the locations they used. Then a 
community mean score was calculated and those respondents who fell more than one standard 
deviation above the mean were identified as "socializers" under the assumption that a socializer 
is someone who goes to the places where the community meets on a regular basis. 
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Selectorate and embeddedness are distinguished from one another because those who are 
most embedded in a community may not seek power or exercise it. Those most motivated as a 
selectorate may be transplants, and may only be well acquainted with others in positions of 
power. Embeddedness will no doubt facilitate entry into the selectorate, but in some areas 
embeddedness acts to keep people out of power (Anderson 1991). Having a family name with 
class implications may prevent entry into the selectorate. 
 
Table 8 - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Selectorate 
(N=9962) 
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Selectorate 
Close friends belong to same civic group you 
do 
Times participated in improvement project in 
your community 
Level of involvement in local community 
improvement acts. 
 
21.00 
 
 
 
 
 
28.875 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.347 
 
.825 
 
.821 
.883 
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Table 8 (Continued) - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Selectorate (N=9962) 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Approached in last year 
Approached to vol. time to work on comm. 
improvement project 
Approached to join or participate in local org. 
or group 
Approached to attend meeting having to do 
with community issue 
 No Impediments 
I do not have time to get involved 
I do not have the skills to contribute to comm. 
projects 
I don't really know how to become involved 
Tried to volunteer for community project but 
help not accepted 
I have no interest in participating as volunteer 
No one has asked me to volunteer 
There are no comm. projects that need support 
of volunteers 
 Organizational Participant 
 Service and fraternal organizations 
 Recreational groups 
 Political and civic groups 
 Job-related organizations 
 Church or other religious groups 
 All other groups and organizations 
 Socializer 
 Food centers 
 Bar/lounge 
 City park 
 Bowling alley 
 Town square or downtown area 
 Mall 
 Community center 
 Golf or country club 
 Other 
 Church 
 School 
 Library 
 Gas station/convenience store 
 Work 
1.67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.10 
3.943 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21.403 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.078 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.204 
 
.816 
 
.243 
 
.234 
 
 
.756 
.831 
 
.882 
.882 
 
.843 
.818 
.847 
 
 
.744 
.819 
.816 
.795 
.562 
.550 
 
.512 
.543 
.261 
.391 
.473 
.337 
.301 
.373 
.518 
.489 
.447 
.624 
.702 
.768 
.907 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.967 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.914 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.449 
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Trusting Attitude 
To what extent the community may be characterized as having a trusting attitude toward 
neighbors is measured with generalized trust and trust of groups in the community.  
Asking whether "prejudiced" or "tolerant" best describes the community in question, 
respondents answered on a seven point scale ranging between the two qualities. With the 
assumption that a view of the community as tolerant is more indicative of a trusting mentality, 
respondents who answered more than one standard deviation below the mean were counted as 
having indicated the community is tolerant to the degree necessary to qualify as a trusting 
mentality. Also asking whether "trusting" or "not trusting" best describes the community in 
question, respondents answered on a seven point scale ranging between the two qualities. With 
the assumption that a view of the community as trusting is more indicative of a trusting 
mentality, respondents who answered more than one standard deviation above the mean were 
counted as having indicated the community is trusting to the degree necessary to qualify as a 
trusting mentality. 
Other questions were used including questions asking if people in the community would 
report selling drugs or shoplifting. The drug question was worded assuming people would not 
report and the shoplifting question was worded assuming people would report. I made the 
assumption that a trusting community self-polices, and so respondents indicating that they 
disagree or strongly disagree with the assumption of the drug question or agree or strongly agree 
with the assumption of the shoplifting question were counted as indicating a trusting community. 
Questions were similarly scored asking if people felt people could express opinions 
publicly in the community, if people could trust elected officials in the community, and if people 
were comfortable with their doors unlocked. 
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An aggregate measure of respondent’s trust of groups was used. People were asked if 
they trusted various groups "Just about always", "most of the time", some of the time", or "hardly 
ever". The groups were "your neighbors", "people working in local stores", "local teenagers", 
"new residents", "local police", "local public officers", and "people you don't know personally". 
People who "just about always" trust a group were counted as trusting. Then averages for a 
community were figured and people who scored above the mean level of trust for the community 
were counted as trusting people. 
Table 9 - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Trusting attitude 
(N=9962) 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Trusting attitude 
Trust 
 Tolerant 
 Trusting 
Most would report a suspected neighbor of 
selling drugs 
Community issues arise, most willing to express 
opinions 
Expected to report any shoplifting incident you 
witness 
People in community trust their elected officials 
People are comfortable leaving their doors 
unlocked 
Trust Groups 
 Trust your neighbors 
 Trust people working in local stores 
 Trust local teenagers 
 Trust new residents 
 Trust local police 
 Trust local public officials 
 Trust local people you don't know 
personally  
10.53 
3.78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.75 
10.092 
4.725 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.739 
 
 
.578 
.641 
.495 
 
.645 
 
.570 
 
.508 
.553 
 
 
.529 
.556 
.657 
.540 
.422 
.637 
.632 
.866 
.748 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.860 
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Cohesiveness  
To measure the cohesiveness of the community three aggregate measures were used 
along with three separate measures.  
An aggregate assistance measure was taken from series of questions asking about the 
community's willingness to render assistance in times of need. Needs included tornado damage, 
spring cleanup, financial help for a the only locally owned grocery store, canned food drive for 
the needy at a church, volunteers for food delivery to the home-bound elderly and a call to 
voluntarily stop watering lawns and gardens during a water shortage. In cases where respondents 
answered "most" rather than "about half" or "few" the question was seen to indicate a general 
cohesiveness. The scores that fell one standard deviation above the mean in aggregate were 
counted as a positive cohesiveness score. 
A number of questions were aggregated to arrive at a measure of whether the 
communities were inclusive. Respondents were given a list of qualities and asked whether those 
qualities divided people in the community for informal socializing. The choices were "don't 
know", "a lot", "some" or "not at all". Responses of "Not at all" were considered positive 
indicators of cohesiveness. The qualities in question included amount of education , ethnic 
background, age, sex, length in residence, social standing, wealth, religion, group membership, 
and family name. This score also included a series of questions on a scale of "strongly agree", 
"agree", "undecided", "disagree" and "strongly disagree", where responses of "agree" or 
"strongly agree" are taken to indicate a general cohesiveness. Those four questions were whether 
youth involvement in community projects is encouraged, whether disadvantaged and low income 
get involved (reverse coded), whether people in the community tend to look out for family and 
friends but are not concerned with the welfare of others (reverse coded) and whether people who 
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do not attend a church or synagogue tend to have difficulty fitting in (reverse coded). All of these 
qualities were taken in aggregate and scores that fell one standard deviation above the mean or 
more were taken to indicate cohesiveness. 
An aggregate measure of the community's support for others was taken. A seven point 
scale rating the community from supportive to indifferent was used. Responses one standard 
deviation below the mean was counted as indicative of a respondent who feels the community is 
supportive. That score was aggregated with the responses to two questions on a scale of 
"strongly agree", "agree", "undecided", "disagree" and "strongly disagree", where responses of 
"agree" or "strongly agree" are taken to indicate a general supportiveness that serves to indicate 
the community's cohesiveness. The questions asked whether the community gets behind 
something when it needs done and if clubs and organizations in the community are interested in 
what's best for all residents. The aggregate of these three questions were then combined such that 
those with score more than one standard deviation above the mean score were taken to be 
indicating a supportive community. 
In addition to those aggregate scores, three other questions were used for the final 
cohesiveness score. A question asking if the immediate neighborhood the respondent lives in is 
closely knit on a scale of "strongly agree", "agree", "undecided", "disagree" and "strongly 
disagree", where responses of "agree" or "strongly agree" are taken to indicate cohesiveness. A 
question on a seven point scale asking if the community is friendly or unfriendly where 
respondents with responses more than one standard deviation below the mean are taken to 
indicate cohesiveness. The last included question asked respondents to rate the spirit of 
community participation in their community as "very good", "good", "fair", or "poor". Responses 
of "very good" were taken to indicate a cohesive community. 
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Table 10 - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Cohesiveness  
(N=9962)  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Cohesiveness 
Friendly/Unfriendly 
Overall, how would you rate spirit of comm. 
Participation 
Immediate neighborhood I live in is close knit  
Supportive 
Supportive/Indifferent 
When something needs done, whole 
community gets behind it 
Clubs/orgs. are interested in what's best for all 
residents 
Assistance 
Volunteer if tornado causes serious damage to 
homes/business 
Volunteers are requested to help on 
community wide spring cleanup 
Vol. if donations requested to keep locally 
owned grocery 
Vol. if local churches/synagogues ask for 
donations 
Volunteers needed to deliver meals to the 
elderly 
Voluntarily stop watering lawns/gardens if 
water shortage 
Inclusive 
Disadvantaged groups rarely get involved in 
community projects 
Involvement of youth in community projects is 
encouraged 
People look out mainly for what's best for their 
friends 
If don't attend church/synagogue, have hard 
time fitting in 
Differences in their amount of education 
Differences in ethnic background 
Age differences 
Differences in sex 
Differences in length of residence 
Differences in social standing 
Differences in wealth 
Religious differences 
Differences in group memberships 
Differences in family name 
13.6 
 
 
 
 
1.51 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.44 
 
18.925 
 
 
 
 
1.983 
 
 
 
 
 
6.074 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.527 
 
.024 
.711 
 
.653 
 
.277 
.860 
 
.853 
 
 
.785 
 
.847 
 
.699 
 
.812 
 
.801 
 
.801 
 
 
.669 
 
.646 
 
.706 
 
.663 
 
.690 
.695 
.712 
.714 
.711 
.771 
.776 
.737 
.783 
.801 
.933 
 
 
 
 
.527 
 
 
 
 
 
.868 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.951 
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Contentment 
The ability to freely leave and return to a community is a defining characteristic of a 
healthy community (Gittell and Vidal 1998), but it is a sign of the contentment of people in that 
community that they would be sad to leave it. Using the question "Suppose that for some reason 
you had to move away from [your community]. How sorry or pleased would you be to leave?” 
Responses of "very sorry to leave" were taken to indicate contentment with the community. 
"Somewhat sorry to leave", "It wouldn't make any difference one way or the other", "somewhat 
pleased to leave" and "very pleased to leave" were taken to not indicate contentment with the 
community. 
Respondents were asked whether their community is best described as well kept or run 
down. Answers were given on a seven point scale. People who responded with a value less than 
the mean were taken to indicate an impression that the community is well kept, contributing to 
an overall contentment with the community. 
Respondents were also asked if being a resident of their community is "like living with a 
group of close friends". Respondents were given choices including "strongly agree", "agree", 
"undecided", "disagree" and "strongly disagree", where responses of "agree" or "strongly agree" 
are taken to indicate contentment. Using the same set of options and choices to qualify as 
indicating contentment, respondents were asked if their community "has more things going for it 
than other communities of a similar size" 
The final question indicating contentment asked if the respondent feels "at home" in their 
community. Respondents indicating that they "yes, definitely" feel at home were taken to 
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indicate contentment while respondents answering "yes, somewhat", "no, not much" or "no, 
definitely not" were not taken to indicate contentment. 
 
Table 11 - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Contentment 
(N=9962) 
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Contentment 
Well-kept/Run down 
Being resident is like living with group of close 
friends 
Overall, community has more things going for it 
than others 
In general, would you say you feel "at home" in 
your community? 
How sorry or pleased would you be to leave your 
community? 
2.88 2.511  
.210 
.719 
 
.720 
 
.711 
 
.689 
.565 
 
Relational Rationality 
Rationality is a problematic term. The colloquial opposite of rational is irrational, but 
there is a strong argument to be made that the operational opposite of rational as commonly used, 
that is a logical rationality, is relational rationality. For the concept of rationality, a rational actor 
is one who makes buying decisions regardless of the interest of the community. Using a set of 
measures of in-shopping patterns, rational actors are those who in-shop one standard deviation 
less regularly than the mean of the community in question. In-shopping is the act of shopping in 
the home community. There is an assumption that the same products are less expensive in larger 
population centers. Actors who in-shop and use local services one standard deviation more than 
the mean do so against their individual economic interest. They are termed relational rational. 
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Table 12 - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Relational 
Rationality (N=9962) 
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Relational Rationality  
 Primary health care 
 Specialized health care 
 Shopping for daily needs 
 Shopping for "big ticket" items 
 Recreation/entertainment 
 Church or other place of worship 
2.87 5.539  
.753 
.758 
.738 
.738 
.721 
.598 
.805 
 
Satisfaction with Public Services 
To arrive at a score representing satisfaction with the availability of services and facilities 
in a community, respondents were provided a list of nine services or facilities categories. They 
were asked to rate each service’s availability on a scale of "very good", "good", "fair" and "poor" 
with options of "not available" and "don't know". "Good" and "very good" were taken as 
sufficient to indicate an overall satisfaction with the availability of local services and facilities. 
The categories were "Jobs", "Medical", "Schools", "Shopping", "Housing", "Entertainment", 
"Child care", "Senior citizen programs", "Youth programs" and a final rating of "Overall 
quality". 
 
Table 13 - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Satisfaction with 
public services (N=9962) 
  
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Satisfaction with public services (I) 
 Jobs 
 Medical services 
 Public schools 
 Shopping facilities 
 Adequate housing 
 Recreation/entertainment 
 Child care services 
5.42 9.62  
.605 
.689 
.705 
.649 
.761 
.720 
.728 
.885 
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 Senior citizen programs 
 Programs for youth 
 Overall quality of local services/facilities 
.728 
.751 
.747 
 
Satisfaction with Government Service 
To arrive at a score representing satisfaction with the availability of government services 
in a community, respondents were provided a list of seven government service categories. They 
were asked to rate the service’s availability on a scale of "very good", "good", "fair" and "poor" 
with options of "do not receive service" and "don't know" available. "Good" and "very good" 
were taken as sufficient to indicate an overall satisfaction with the availability of local 
government services. The categories were "police", "street condition", "parks condition", 
"water", "fire", "garbage collection", "emergency response" and a final rating of "overall 
quality". 
 
Table 14 - Descriptive, Factor Scale, and Network Statistics for Measures of Satisfaction with 
government (N=9962) 
 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Factor 
Scale 
Cronbach’s  
alpha  
Satisfaction with government service 
 Police protection 
 Condition of streets 
 Condition of parks 
 Water 
 Fire protection 
 Garbage collection 
 Emergency response service 
 Overall quality of government services 
6.16 5.578  
.686 
.768 
.781 
.763 
.834 
.777 
.815 
.700 
.891 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
 For analytical purposes I employed lattices as an aggregating mechanism. Instead of 
using a mean score to arrive at a representation of the presence of some quality in a community, 
a complete lattice is in essence the community score of that quality. Then, using a skew score to 
represent the overall shape of the lattice, it is possible to make comparisons necessary to answer 
the hypotheses. Lattices employ a network perspective and so there are special considerations 
relative to level of analysis. Specific details and illustrations of the processes of lattice analysis 
are in Appendix D. 
 Additionally, the concept of cardinality is employed. Significant details about cardinality 
are in Appendix D, but in summary there are four lattices available for each concept; level, 
bijective, injective and composite. Bijective is the most robust measure and so it is generally the 
one I employ, though the others have specific theoretical applications and so are employed 
occasionally. 
 
Analysis 
For the town of Long Bridges, the specific measures taken of each of these qualities 
appear in Lattice 7 and Table 17. Figures 6-9 show the distribution of each quality of cardinality. 
These are used to make comparisons between the communities in hypothesis testing. The 
distribution of a fully realized lattice is normal. 
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Table 15 – Values for complete lattices that contain five concepts 
L
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L
ev
el
 C
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P
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ssible
 (C
P)
 
C
o
m
posite
 
C
ardin
ality (M
)
C
o
m
posite
 
C
ardin
ality P
o
ssible
 
(M
P)
Bijectiv
e
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ardin
ality 
(B)
Bijectiv
e
 A
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rs
 
P
o
ssible
 (B
P)
Injectiv
e
 C
ardin
ality 
(J)
Injectiv
e
 C
ardin
ality 
P
o
ssible
 (JP)
5 1 1 70 n 4 5 7 70 
4 4 5 169 5600 11 20 10 70 
3 6 10 186 5600 14 30 10 70 
2 6 10 136 2800 12 20 13 70 
1 4 5 63 700 4 5 19 70 
0 1 1 11 70 0 0 11 70 
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Lattice 2 – Lattice of Long Bridges Happiness with Cardinalities 
 
Level  5 Possible 
Cardinal 1 1  
Bijective 70 (N)  
Injective 4 5  
Composite 7 70 (N)  
Level  4 Possible   
Cardinal 4 5  
Bijective 169 5600 
Injective 11 20  
Composite 10 70  
Level  2 Possible  
Cardinal 6 10  
Bijective 136 2800 
Injective 12 20  
Composite 13 70  
Level  1 Possible  
Cardinal 4 5  
Bijective 63 700 
Injective 4 5  
Composite 19 70  
Level  0 Possible  
Cardinal 1 1  
Bijective 11 70 
Injective 0 0  
Composite 11 70  
Level  3 Possible   
Cardinal 6 10  
Bijective 186 5600 
Injective 14 30  
Composite 10 70  
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Figure 6 – Level Cardinality (C) 
  
 
Figure 7 - Bijective Cardinality (B) 
 
 
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Level 5 Level 4 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 Level 0
 110  
 
 
Figure 8 - Injective Cardinality (J) 
 
 
Figure 9 - Composite Cardinality (M) 
 
 
Comparing Skews 
 To make comparisons between communities or between measures within a community it 
is useful to examine the lattice’s skew. Lattices with higher skews describe the population of the 
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community clustering at the top of the lattice. They are less convinced of the presence of the 
quality in question within the community. Conversely, lattices with lower skews describe the 
quality as more present in the community. In Figure 6, the Level Cardinality, the skew is -
0.327350696. In Figure 7, the Bijective Cardinality, the skew is -0.170836586. In Figure 8, the 
Injective Cardinality, the skew is -0.171244198. In Figure 9, the Composite Cardinality, the 
skew is 1.259037728. With the social capital scores and skews from multiple communities for 
multiple measures, a Student’s t-test answering whether the differences are significant and 
therefore if the hypothesis are true. 
In order to make comparisons involving skews and the levels of social capital, all of the 
skews were reversed. Because skews that are positive indicate greater tails on the right and so 
actually lean left, a higher skew indicates less of the quality in question. By reversing the skews, 
statements of positive social capital may be correlated with statements of positive presence of the 
qualities being measured in the communities, where positive qualities are indicated by higher 
reverse coded skews. 
 
Lattice Analysis 
 The complete Lattices B1-B120 are in Appendix B, representing ten concepts in six 
communities with bijective and composite lattices for each. The cardinality scores and the skews 
for the six communities of the ten concepts for use in Section 5.1, are also found in Appendix B, 
tables B1 through B10. Much of the cardinality data is illustrative, as the bijective cardinality 
was the key cardinality concept employed. 
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Each set of measures returns a skew score representing the presence of the quality in 
question in the community. The skew scores are inverted to make higher scores represent more 
of the quality in question. Tables 18 through 21 show the inverted skews of each quality in each 
of the six sample communities. 
 
Table 16 - Bijective Inverted Skews 
H
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C
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ent
R
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S
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n
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ith 
public
 services
S
atisfactio
n
 w
ith 
govern
m
ent
 services
Long Bridges -0.695 -0.461 -1.024 -1.491 -0.129 -0.554 0.171 -2.619 -1.318 -0.487 
Titon Within -1.190 -0.063 -0.587 -0.777 -0.633 -0.278 -0.132 -0.556 -0.699 -0.170 
Avragly -1.166 -0.080 -0.547 -0.747 -0.543 -0.472 -0.283 -0.747 -0.631 -0.320 
Titon Between -0.464 -0.288 -0.601 0.041 -0.553 -0.557 0.046 -0.887 -0.436 -0.488 
Laston -0.447 -0.298 -0.709 -0.711 -0.731 -0.137 0.189 -0.705 -0.053 -0.283 
Firston -0.993 -0.533 -0.748 -0.891 -0.509 -0.446 -0.124 -0.438 -0.393 -0.124 
 
Table 17 – Level Inverted Skews 
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m
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 services
Long Bridges -0.198 -0.099 -0.438 -1.242 -0.335 -0.715 0.327 -1.115 -0.989 -0.476 
Titon Within -0.691 0.000 -0.004 -0.512 -0.118 -0.191 -0.185 -0.063 -0.454 -0.225 
Avragly -0.630 0.053 0.857 -0.258 -0.799 -0.506 -0.383 -0.577 0.127 -0.299 
Titon Between -0.587 -0.334 0.149 0.160 -0.256 -0.640 0.000 0.052 -0.495 -0.458 
Laston -0.389 0.568 0.320 0.052 -0.556 -0.277 0.262 0.199 -0.343 -0.321 
Firston -0.434 -0.026 -0.293 -0.071 0.117 -0.619 -0.185 0.000 -0.449 -0.301 
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Table 18 – Injective Inverted Skews 
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Long Bridges -0.311 0.491 0.232 -0.420 -0.261 -0.611 0.171 -1.230 -1.455 -0.477 
Titon Within -0.781 -0.296 -0.404 -0.359 -0.343 -0.313 -0.318 -0.109 -0.450 -0.381 
Avragly -0.994 -0.407 0.180 -0.258 -0.447 -0.520 -0.453 -0.776 -0.243 -0.475 
Titon Between -0.516 -0.379 -0.197 -0.083 -0.337 -0.825 -0.107 -0.063 -0.643 -0.574 
Laston -0.439 0.308 -0.086 -0.021 -0.754 -0.493 0.000 -0.738 -0.486 -0.400 
Firston -0.775 0.424 -0.399 -0.324 -0.066 -0.838 -0.318 -0.072 -0.640 -0.493 
 
Table 19 – Composite Inverted Skews 
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Long Bridges -0.858 -1.040 -0.195 -1.246 0.374 -0.246 -1.259 -2.614 -1.463 -0.944 
Titon Within -1.315 0.196 -0.019 -0.156 -0.233 -0.876 -0.423 -0.651 0.621 -1.375 
Avragly -1.315 0.062 -0.509 -0.839 -0.692 -0.426 -0.957 -1.124 -0.244 -2.399 
Titon Between -1.122 -0.435 -0.537 0.647 -0.225 -0.203 -1.512 -0.304 0.359 -0.794 
Laston -2.416 0.895 -0.063 -0.330 -0.528 -1.021 1.426 -0.248 -1.528 -0.736 
Firston -1.246 -0.633 -0.247 -0.377 -0.600 -0.033 -0.901 0.454 0.342 -1.014 
 
 Correlation scores are taken between the inverted skews (tables 18 through 21) and the 
social capital scores for each community (table 4). Then I use a t test to test for significance of 
the correlation. This is an inferential application of a descriptive statistic, and so the formula is 
 
√
√	
 (Wright 1986). Tables 22-25 show correlations between the qualities and the three 
forms of social capital. The test is one tailed so the direction of the correlation is important. It 
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tells whether the relationship is positive or negative. A p value of .1 is significant and .05 is 
strongly significant. This is how I arrive at the answers to the hypothesis statements. 
 
Table 20 – Bijective Correlation 
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within-group s.c. -0.350 0.359 0.747 0.667 -0.599 0.094 -0.538 0.783 0.432 0.500 
between-group s.c. -0.201 0.309 0.804 0.825 -0.610 -0.038 -0.529 0.796 0.533 0.337 
out-bridging s.c. -0.058 -0.601 -0.855 -0.809 0.929 -0.543 0.192 -0.803 -0.760 -0.300 
 
Table 21 –Level Correlation 
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within-group s.c. -0.825 -0.327 0.106 0.579 0.488 0.342 -0.650 0.687 0.345 0.507 
between-group s.c. -0.812 -0.369 0.258 0.741 0.344 0.168 -0.663 0.702 0.460 0.346 
out-bridging s.c. 0.764 -0.216 -0.518 -0.776 0.061 -0.682 0.328 -0.850 -0.546 -0.481 
 
Table 22 – Injective Correlation 
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within-group s.c. -0.550 -0.590 -0.844 0.113 0.274 -0.055 -0.667 0.964 0.620 -0.076 
between-group s.c. -0.545 -0.648 -0.717 0.303 0.221 -0.259 -0.664 0.935 0.667 -0.314 
out-bridging s.c. 0.307 0.633 0.563 -0.668 0.473 -0.244 0.416 -0.654 -0.804 -0.179 
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Table 23 – Composite Correlation 
H
o
m
ogen
eity 
U
s
-v
ersu
s
-them
E
m
bedd
edness
S
electo
rate
T
ru
sting attitude
C
ohesiv
en
ess
 
C
o
ntentm
ent
R
elatio
n
al
 ratio
n
ality
S
atisfactio
n
 w
ith 
public
 services
S
atisfactio
n
 w
ith 
govern
m
ent
 services
within-group s.c. 0.063 0.169 -0.104 0.763 -0.443 -0.005 -0.160 0.723 0.935 -0.070 
between-group s.c. 0.046 0.148 -0.373 0.832 -0.545 0.131 -0.221 0.766 0.891 -0.095 
out-bridging s.c. 0.540 -0.743 -0.003 -0.790 0.566 0.547 -0.405 -0.678 -0.455 0.002 
 
Answering Hypotheses 
Homogeneity  
H1: Measured as level cardinality, the presence of community out-bridging social capital 
positively correlates with the presence of homogeneity in the community. 
 
Using level cardinality measures, community out-bridging social capital is strongly 
positively correlated with the presence of the concept of homogeneity in the community. The 
result of the correlation is 0.764 indicating a positive relationship. The t-value is 2.368 
(p=0.0385) which is significant at p < 0.05. This is theoretically consistent because level 
cardinality indicates homogeneity between broad swaths of the population, though there may still 
be diversity within groups, this condition encourages people to be comfortable engaging outside 
the community, and providing access to diverse resources from outside the community. 
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Us-versus-them 
H2: Measured as injective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital negatively correlates with the presence of us-versus-them in the community. 
 
Using injective cardinality measures, community between-group social capital is 
negatively correlated with the presence of the concept of us-versus-them in the community. The 
result of the correlation is -0.648 indicating a negative relationship. The t-value is -1.697 
(p=0.0822) which is significant at p < .10. This is theoretically consistent because the 
relationships between groups indicated by between group social capital, which are most evident 
using injective measures, reduces the divisive attitudes indicative of an us-versus-them 
mentality. 
 
Embeddedness 
H3: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community within-group social capital 
positively correlates with the presence of embeddedness in the community. 
 
Using bijective cardinality measures, community within-group social capital is strongly 
positively correlated with the presence of the concept of embeddedness in the community. The 
result of the correlation is 0.747 indicating a positive relationship. The t-value is 2.250 (p=0.044) 
which is significant at p < .05. This is theoretically consistent because the extensive overlap and 
interrelations of embeddedness will be found in situations where groups are tightly connected. 
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H4: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital positively correlates with the presence of embeddedness in the community. 
 
Using bijective cardinality measures, community between-group social capital is strongly 
positively correlated with the presence of the concept of embeddedness in the community. The 
result of the correlation is 0.804 indicating a positive relationship. The t-value is 2.703 (p=0.027) 
which is significant at p < .05. This is theoretically consistent because, as those groups are 
strongly connected they are likewise strongly interconnected. 
 
H5: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community out-bridging social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of embeddedness in the community. 
 
 Using bijective cardinality measures, community out-bridging social capital is strongly 
negatively correlated with the presence of the concept of embeddedness in the community. The 
result of the correlation is -0.855 indicating a negative relationship. The t-value is -3.296 
(p=0.015) which is significant at p < .05. This is theoretically consistent because while they are 
strongly connected and interconnected, they will tend to turn inward, and fail to seek solutions 
outside of the insular community. 
 
Selectorate 
H6: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital positively correlates with the presence of selectorate in the community. 
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 Using bijective cardinality measures, community between-group social capital is strongly 
positively correlated with the presence of the concept of selectorate in the community. The result 
of the correlation is 0.825 indicating a positive relationship. The t-value is 2.918 (p=0.0217) 
which is significant at p < .05. This is theoretically consistent because the way selectorates work 
in small communities, a large and robust selectorate is going to provide the interconnections that 
facilitate cooperation between groups in the community. The bijective measure shows that the 
groups contain a good deal of overlap. 
 
H7: Measured as level cardinality, the presence of community between-group social capital 
positively correlates with the presence of selectorate in the community. 
 
 Using level cardinality measures, community between-group social capital is strongly 
positively correlated with the presence of the concept of selectorate in the community. The result 
of the correlation is 0.741 indicating a positive relationship. The t-value is 2.204 (p=0.046) 
which is significant at p < .05. This is theoretically consistent because, as stated in H6, but the 
level measure broadens the scope to a more macro community level where we expect to see the 
structural presence of the selectorate as it is itself a structural concept. 
 
H8: Measured as composite cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital positively correlates with the presence of selectorate in the community. 
 
 Using composite cardinality measures, community between-group social capital is 
strongly positively correlated with the presence of the concept of selectorate in the community. 
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The result of the correlation is 0.832 indicating a positive relationship. The t-value is 3.004 
(p=0.020) which is significant at p < .05. This is theoretically consistent because as in H6 and H7 
the selectorate is present, but the composite measure shows each person in their unique position 
in the community. In communities where the selectorate is broadly present, there will be 
disproportionately many members of the community engaging in most or all of the activities 
indicating the selectorate, so even more so than less structural measures, we expect to see the 
selectorate present at all levels. 
 
Trusting attitude 
H9: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community out-bridging social capital 
positively correlates with the presence of trusting attitude in the community. 
 Using bijective cardinality measures, community out-bridging social capital is strongly 
positively correlated with the presence of the concept of trusting attitude in the community. The 
result of the correlation is 0.929 indicating a positive relationship. The t-value is 5.035 (p=0.004) 
which is significant at p < .05. This is theoretically consistent because where people are trusting 
they are able to reach outside of their community to people elsewhere with whom they are less 
familiar, in pursuit of beneficial exchange. A trusting attitude is an indication of a willingness to 
take the risk that is inherent in bridge building. 
 
Cohesiveness  
H10: Measured as level cardinality, the presence of community out-bridging social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of cohesiveness in the community. 
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 Using level cardinality measures, community out-bridging social capital is negatively 
correlated with the presence of the concept of cohesiveness in the community. The result of the 
correlation is -0.682 indicating a negative relationship. The t-value is -1.865 (p=0.068) which is 
significant at p < .10. This is theoretically consistent because communities where people devote a 
significant portion of their time and effort to making connections with other communities, 
splitting their time between the two, will be structural less cohesive. These communities will, at 
the macro level indicated by level cardinality, be less cohesive. 
 
Contentment 
H11: Measured as level cardinality, the presence of community within-group social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of contentment in the community. 
 Using level cardinality measures, community within-group social capital is negatively 
correlated with the presence of the concept of contentment in the community. The result of the 
correlation is -0.650 indicating a negative relationship. The t-value is -1.711 (p=0.081) which is 
significant at p < .10. This is theoretically consistent because at the broad structural level, 
communities where people are engaged are the communities where people have identified needs. 
H12: Measured as level cardinality, the presence of community between-group social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of contentment in the community. 
 Using level cardinality measures, community between-group social capital is negatively 
correlated with the presence of the concept of contentment in the community. The result of the 
correlation is -0.662753527 indicating a negative relationship. The t-value is -1.770 (p=0.078) 
which is significant at p < .10. This is theoretically consistent because, like the bounded groups, 
the interrelated groups are engaged in the community because they are aware of issues in the 
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community, or vice-versa they have become engaged and been made aware of issues in the 
community.  
H13: Measured as injective cardinality, the presence of community within-group social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of contentment in the community. 
 Using injective cardinality measures, community within-group social capital is negatively 
correlated with the presence of the concept of contentment in the community. The result of the 
correlation is -0.667 indicating a negative relationship. The t-value is -1.792 (p=0.074) which is 
significant at p < .10. This is theoretically consistent because just as was discussed in the 
previous two hypotheses, this indicates that there are relationships in the community facilitating 
group cohesiveness. These relationships are conduits for discontent. 
H14: Measured as injective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital negatively correlates with the presence of contentment in the community. 
 Using injective cardinality measures, community between-group social capital is 
negatively correlated with the presence of the concept of contentment in the community. The 
result of the correlation is -0.664 indicating a negative relationship. The t-value is -1.777 
(p=0.075) which is significant at p < .10. This is theoretically consistent because just as was 
discussed in the previous three hypotheses, this indicates that there are relationships in the 
community facilitating group interaction and the exchange of resources. These relationships in 
the community are conduits for discontent, which leads to projects in pursuit of solutions. 
 
Relational rationality 
H15: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community within-group social capital 
positively correlates with the presence of relational rationality in the community. 
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 Using bijective cardinality measures, community within-group social capital is strongly 
positively correlated with the presence of the concept of relational rationality in the community. 
The result of the correlation is 0.783 indicating a positive relationship. The t-value is 2.520 
(p=0.033) which is significant at p < .05. This is theoretically consistent because at the heart of 
the idea of rationality is a notion of the preeminence of self service. Communities where groups 
are bound will be communities where people are willing to act in the interest of the community. 
 
H16: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital positively correlates with the presence of relational rationality in the community. 
 
 Using bijective cardinality measures, community between-group social capital is strongly 
positively correlated with the presence of the concept of relational rationality in the community. 
The result of the correlation is 0.796 indicating a positive relationship. The t-value is 2.628 
(p=0.029) which is significant at p < .05. This is theoretically consistent because communities 
where people in groups are in relationships with people in other groups, will be communities 
where people are able to recognize the benefit to themselves derived from actions that benefit 
others in the community. 
 
H17: Measured as bijective cardinality, the presence of community out-bridging social capital 
negatively correlates with the presence of relational rationality in the community. 
 
 Using bijective cardinality measures, community out-bridging social capital is strongly 
negatively correlated with the presence of the concept of relational rationality in the community. 
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The result of the correlation is -0.803 indicating a negative relationship. The t-value is -2.697 
(p=0.027) which is significant at p < .05. This is theoretically consistent because in communities 
where people are frequently interacting with groups outside of their community, though they are 
bringing in resources they are also providing resources for those other communities. There will 
be a willingness to engage in those other communities commercially and socially along with an 
expectation that those other communities will reciprocate. 
  
Satisfaction with public services 
H18: Measured as injective cardinality, the presence of community between-group social 
capital positively correlates with the presence of satisfaction with public services in the 
community. 
 
Using injective cardinality measures, community between-group social capital is 
positively correlated with the presence of the concept of satisfaction with public services in the 
community. The result of the correlation is 0.667 indicating a positive relationship. The t-value is 
1.789 (p=0.074) which is significant at p < .10. This is theoretically consistent because where 
there are connections among groups in the community, especially when much of the community 
is engaged in a sense of responsibility for those services or relationships with people who are 
responsible for those services, there will be a tendency to feel satisfaction resulting from the 
empowerment that comes with engagement. 
 These complex relational hypotheses require understanding the theoretical and 
methodological groundwork laid in this dissertation.  As the core of the hypotheses testing 
portion of this dissertation, I have restricted myself to the relationships between these 
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specifically defined qualities, for which lattices were constructed, and social capital. However, 
there is also a wealth of possibility in examining the relationships among the qualities 
themselves. Though, when doing so, they do not in all cases relate directly to the complexities of 
social capital there is always an askew theoretical relationship present. It is peripheral to the core 
of the dissertation, but not so peripheral as to warrant being offset to the appendix. 
 
Relationships Among the Qualities 
There are some interesting correlations between certain of the qualities, aside from social 
capital scores, which are not incorporated in the hypotheses. Some of them shed light on the 
hypotheses. Others are interesting in their own right. 
There has been much discussion about rationality. The measures of relational rationality 
are not as robust as I would like, but in-shopping should be indicative of many of the other 
concepts that are a part of rationality.  
Bijectively, relational rationality correlates with embeddedness positively and with 
trusting attitude negatively. Embeddedness and relational rationality correlate significantly 
(p=.019), but trusting attitude and relational rationality correlate significantly (p=.008), meaning 
that people who in-shop more do not have trusting attitudes. This is perplexing. Trusting attitude 
and embeddedness correlate negatively (p=.027). Also, non-rational in-shoppers are correlated 
with satisfaction with government services (p=.060), not huge but still significant and interesting. 
Embeddedness is interesting as well. People who are embedded are interested in and 
connected to their community. Embeddedness correlates positively with selectorate (p=.040) and 
negatively with trusting attitude (p=.030). Selectorate and trusting attitude correlate negatively at 
(p=.086). The communities where people are most interested in and connected to their 
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community are communities where people are engaged in the power structure but this does not 
necessarily confer or rely on trusting attitudes. Embeddedness and an us-versus-them attitude 
correlate (p=.040). Trusting attitude correlates negatively with cohesiveness (p=.050). Is it 
possible that contentious and competitive social environments where people none the less care 
deeply about one another can be the most constructive environments? This would be an 
interesting avenue for future research. 
 Injective measures, where we are looking at the relationships among the groups in the 
community, show some interesting correlations. Homogeneity and contentment correlate at 
(p=.0001). This implies that in communities where people find relationships with similarity also 
find contentment. Embeddedness and relational rationality also correlate negatively (p=.006) at 
the injective level. Meaning that where relationships among groups indicate strong interest in and 
connectivity to the community, people are less likely to in-shop. This is perplexing as it is 
oppositional to the bijective measures, meaning that at this point bijectivity is oppositional to 
injectivity. In the relationship between embeddedness and non -rationality, group relationships 
are oppositional to group cohesiveness. This is best understood by looking back to the social 
capital scores. See table 26. Embeddedness and relational rationality are both correlated to within 
and between group social capital at significant levels bijectively but injectively the correlation 
between within-group and between-group social capital is opposite between embeddedness 
(negative) and relational rationality (positive) indicating the significant of looking at 
relationships between groups, injective cardinality, in contrast to bijectivity. The complete 
picture takes both into account, theoretically concurrent with relational sociology. 
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Table 24 – Embeddedness and Selectorate Bijective and Injective alpha scores and direction
Bijective Embeddedness Relational Rationality 
within-group s.c. positive positive 
between-group s.c. positive Positive 
   
Injective Embeddedness Relational Rationality 
within-group s.c. negative positive 
between-group s.c. negative positive 
Bijective Embeddedness Relational Rationality 
within-group s.c. p=0.044 p=0.033 
between-group s.c. p=0.027 p=0.029 
   
Injective Embeddedness Relational Rationality 
within-group s.c. p=0.017 p=0.001 
between-group s.c. p=0.054 p=0.003 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
Discussion of Implications 
 The implications of this dissertation support the theoretical perspective of Putnam, that 
social capital is an embedded quality, but encourage the pursuit of analytical techniques which 
are aware of the relational nature of social subjects. They greatly complicate the idea that 
diversity of identity in a community diminishes social capital, by acknowledging the complexity 
of the idea of diversity. 
The idea that diversity is healthy or not healthy for a community must ultimately be 
addressed in communities with greater diversity than is found in rural Iowa. Social capital is a 
powerful concept that fits well with relational sociology, for better than it does with traditional 
perspectives employing variables ascribed simply to individuals. The incorporation of techniques 
that bring out the relational nature of social data is powerful for advancing sociology. 
There is still a lot to be learned about social capital from small towns in Iowa. Thought 
they lack racial and ethnic diversity they have a great deal of relative social inequality, which 
manifests itself in the politics, community service and development life of the communities, its 
informal social organization and economic behaviors. The way these qualities, the ten qualities 
measured, interplay with the three forms of social capital addressed as well as with each other, 
informs sociologists about the social and economic lives of small towns in Iowa.  
 These methodologies and findings also have implications for effective community 
organizing in communities of all sizes. Properly understanding the relational nature of an issue 
makes strategic sense where the goal is positivistic in nature. If the work of sociologists is to 
make the world a better place through the application of science, then refining the instruments so 
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employed will lead to more profound and powerful outcomes for the efforts invested. Moving 
forward, a relational understanding of society is one of the most profoundly powerful tools 
sociology has. 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
This dissertation makes significant theoretical contributions by making the strong 
connection between relational sociology and social capital. Social capital theory, especially 
social capital theory at the community level, is inherently relational and given to a network 
perspective. The theoretical developments in this dissertation make an overt and explicit 
statement of that relationship, and they take it to a new level by encasing it in a new ontological 
theory, derived from cutting edge philosophy, to move into a new methodological approach for 
examining the world consistently with all these theoretical advancements. 
The most unique contribution to theory from this dissertation is the robust development 
of theory that pertains to why and how set mathematics provides theoretical underpinnings for a 
relational comparative sociological perspective. That theoretical underpinning in realized in 
methodological advancements, but without the theoretical support, all the methodological leaps 
lack substance. 
 
 
Methodological Contributions 
Drawing on the exhaustive and meticulous theoretical work, a new methodology was 
developed for representing network relationships at various levels of abstraction using Galois 
lattices. Where lattices have been used before, the contribution of the theoretical work done in 
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this dissertation allowed the development of analytical techniques involving a newly developed 
system of cardinalities. Cardinalities were brought in from mathematics, and fleshed out through 
theory to become a useful analytical methodology. Lattice cardinalities, the theory behind them 
and the use of skews to compare lattices constitute the most significant contribution this 
dissertation hopes to make. 
This dissertation exposed some weaknesses in network methods, but saw their amazing 
potential and found a way to maintain the most important contributions of network theory 
without being subject to the weakness of the method, namely validity loss resulting from 
standard sampling techniques. 
 
Limitations and recommendations for future research 
 The greatest limitation faced was the time involved in quantifying the various cardinality 
measures. This could be addressed with a small software project and may be worth pursuing 
grants to fund. This would make much larger N’s practical. In this dissertation there were six 
communities and so an N of 6 but the raw data offered the possibility of an N of 99, which would 
have allowed for much more profound findings. The decision to sample 6 communities was 
made reluctantly. The 6 communities purposively selected represented the range of social capital 
present in the population, but the analysis of an additional 93 communities would have added 
years to the project. It is the deliberate hope of this researcher that a software solution can be 
found and that the other 93 communities may be incorporated into the findings in the future. 
This dissertation respects the ontological independence of groups. It does so in a way that 
is theoretically consistent with the literature of social capital but offers analytical techniques that 
may be broadly applied to any community quality that is inherently hierarchical in a way similar 
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to the manifestations of the ten qualities addressed in this dissertation. The application of set 
mathematics and lattices to these sociological concerns offers a direction for future research that 
could shed a new light on subjects broad of base. It could offer insights into the independent 
reality of groups, frequently observed by sociologists but glossed over for lack of empirical 
support. Sociologists rarely see the sudden advances enjoyed by material sciences, when some 
new m measurement device allows a perspective previously unavailable. That is the sort of 
potential relational sociology has, and I hope it moves the discipline forward. 
 
Implications for Community Development 
The uses of lattices to analyze a community have enormous potential for the efforts of 
groups who wish to accentuate the strengths of a community field. It is possible, using readily 
available data about a community, to come to a robust understanding of how the hierarchical 
arrangements of power are arrayed and what, then, is the best route to social change.  
Imagine, for instance, a community where decision makers must be swayed to see an 
issue in a particular way. Knowing the key factors involved in the decision for each decision 
maker, the powers or voting blocks to which they are beholden, a strategy may be formed. 
Arrayed on a lattice, those factors will immediately reveal clusters in the community. The 
identities of the people who need to be persuaded and what external environmental factors that 
are changeable are influencing those decision makers are clear. If the people making the lattice 
are particularly thoughtful in designing the lattice, and knowledgeable in the factors involved, 
they may see potential alliances or points of fissure in the community that are not visible to 
community leaders.  
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Structure is powerful because it is real. These new methodologies have enormous 
potential to make substantive change throughout the sociological field.  
 
Unanswered Questions and Future Research 
 For all the advancements present in this dissertation, it is but a scratch in the surface of 
the iceberg of potential from research designed to take advantage of this methodology. 
 I would hope to find research funding for the design and implementation of data 
gathering specifically for this purpose. The use of relational variables, where the respect and 
priority afforded relationships is at least on par with that given individuals would be an 
enormous start. The construction of questions that take a comparative perspective, constructing 
data sets that naturally divide communities were fissures are likely to occur will be particularly 
useful. 
 It is also a viable route to go back and re-analyze classic data sets using this 
methodology.  
 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation made significant contributions. It was a joy to write and a pleasure to 
research. It is also a habit of mine to take on a project score beyond what is reasonable, and it is 
always good council to reduce the scope of such projects. But, it was my intention to do 
something grand here, and I feel that I have accomplished that goal.
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APPENDIX 
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
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LATTICES AND CARDINALITY SCORES 
Lattice B 1 - Long Bridges Bijective Homogeneity 
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Lattice B 2 - Long Bridges Composite Homogeneity 
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Lattice B 3 - Titon Within Bijective Homogeneity 
  
 155  
 
 
Lattice B 4 - Titon Within Composite Homogeneity 
 
  
 156  
 
 
Lattice B 5 - Avragly Bijective Homogeneity 
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Lattice B 6 - Avragly Composite Homogeneity 
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Lattice B 7 - Titon Between Bijective Homogeneity 
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Lattice B 8 - Titon Between Composite Homogeneity 
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Lattice B 9 - Laston Bijective Homogeneity 
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Lattice B 10 - Laston Composite Homogeneity 
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Lattice B 11 - Firston Bijective Homogeneity 
5
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Lattice B 12 - Firston Composite Homogeneity 
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Lattice B 13 – Long Bridges Bijective Us-versus-them 
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Lattice B 14 - Long Bridges Composite Us-versus-them 
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Lattice B 15 – Titon Within Bijective Us-versus-them 
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Lattice B 16 - Titon Within Composite Us-versus-them 
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Lattice B 17 - Avragly Bijective Us-versus-them 
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Lattice B 18 - Avragly Composite Us-versus-them 
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Lattice B 19 - Titon Between Bijective Us-versus-them 
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Lattice B 20 - Titon Between Composite Us-versus-them 
  
  
 172  
 
 
Lattice B 21 - Laston Bijective Us-versus-them 
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Lattice B 22 – Laston Composite Us-versus-them 
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Lattice B 23 – Firston Bijective Us-versus-them 
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Lattice B 24 - Firston Composite Us-versus-them 
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Lattice B 25 – Long Bridges Bijective Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 26 - Long Bridges Composite Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 27 - Titon Within Bijective Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 28 - Titon Within Composite Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 29 - Avragly Bijective Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 30 - Avragly Composite Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 31 - Titon Between Bijective Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 32 - Titon Between Composite Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 33 - Laston Bijective Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 34 - Laston Composite Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 35 – Firston Bijective Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 36 - Firston Composite Embeddedness 
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Lattice B 37 – Long Bridges Bijective Selectorate 
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Lattice B 38 – Long Bridges Composite Selectorate 
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Lattice B 39 – Titon Within Bijective Selectorate 
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Lattice B 40 - Titon Within Composite Selectorate 
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Lattice B 41 - Avragly Bijective Selectorate 
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Lattice B 42 - Avragly Composite Selectorate 
 
 194  
 
 
Lattice B 43 - Titon Between Bijective Selectorate 
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Lattice B 44 - Titon Between Composite Selectorate 
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Lattice B 45 - Laston Bijective Selectorate 
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Lattice B 46 - Laston Composite Selectorate 
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Lattice B 47 – Firston Bijective Selectorate 
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Lattice B 48 – Firston Composite Selectorate 
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Lattice B 49 – Long Bridges Bijective Trusting Attitude 
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Lattice B 50 – Long Bridges Composite Trusting Attitude 
.
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Lattice B 51 - Titon Within Bijective Trusting Attitude 
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Lattice B 52 - Titon Within Composite Trusting Attitude 
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Lattice B 53 – Avragly Bijective Trusting Attitude 
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Lattice B 54 – Avragly Composite Trusting Attitude 
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Lattice B 55 - Titon Between Bijective Trusting Attitude 
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Lattice B 56 - Titon Between Composite Trusting Attitude 
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Lattice B 57 - Laston Bijective Trusting Attitude 
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Lattice B 58 - Laston Composite Trusting Attitude 
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Lattice B 59 - Firston Bijective Trusting Attitude 
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Lattice B 60 - Firston Composite Trusting Attitude 
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Lattice B 61 - Long Bridges Bijective Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 62 - Long Bridges Composite Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 63 - Titon Within Bijective Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 64 - Titon Within Composite Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 65 - Avragly Bijective Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 66 - Avragly Composite Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 67 - Titon Between Bijective Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 68 - Titon Between Composite Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 69 - Laston Bijective Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 70 - Laston Composite Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 71 - Firston Bijective Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 72 - Firston Composite Cohesiveness 
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Lattice B 73 - Long Bridges Bijective Contentment 
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Lattice B 74 - Long Bridges Composite Contentment 
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Lattice B 75 - Titon Within Bijective Contentment 
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Lattice B 76 - Titon Within Composite Contentment 
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Lattice B 77 - Avragly Bijective Contentment 
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Lattice B 78 - Avragly Composite Contentment 
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Lattice B 79 - Titon Between Bijective Contentment 
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Lattice B 80 - Titon Between Composite Contentment 
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Lattice B 81 - Laston Bijective Contentment 
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Lattice B 83 - Firston Bijective Contentment 
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Lattice B 84 - Firston Composite Contentment 
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Lattice B 85 - Long Bridges Bijective Relational Rationality 
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Lattice B 86 - Long Bridges Composite Relational Rationality 
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Lattice B 88 - Titon Within Composite Relational Rationality 
 
  
 240  
 
 
Lattice B 89 - Avragly Bijective Relational Rationality 
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Lattice B 91 - Titon Between Bijective Relational Rationality 
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Lattice B 93 - Laston Bijective Relational Rationality 
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Lattice B 95 - Firston Bijective Relational Rationality 
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Lattice B 97 - Long Bridges Satisfaction Bijective with public services 
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Lattice B 101 - Avragly Bijective Satisfaction with public services 
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Lattice B 103 - Titon Between Bijective Satisfaction with public services 
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Lattice B 104 - Titon Between Composite Satisfaction with public services 
  
 256  
 
 
Lattice B 105 - Laston Bijective Satisfaction with public services 
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Lattice B 107 - Firston Bijective Satisfaction with public services 
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Lattice B 108 - Firston Composite Satisfaction with public services 
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Lattice B 109 - Long Bridges Bijective Satisfaction with government services 
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Lattice B 110 - Long Bridges Composite Satisfaction with government services 
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Lattice B 111 - Titon Within Bijective Satisfaction with government services 
  
 263  
 
 
Lattice B 112 - Titon Within Composite Satisfaction with government services 
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Lattice B 113 - Avragly Bijective Satisfaction with government services 
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Lattice B 115 - Titon Between Bijective Satisfaction with government services 
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Lattice B 116 - Titon Between Composite Satisfaction with government services 
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Lattice B 117 - Laston Bijective Satisfaction with government services 
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Lattice B 118 - Laston Composite Satisfaction with government services 
Lattice B 119 - Firston Bijective Satisfaction with government services 
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Lattice B 120 - Firston Composite Satisfaction with government services 
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Table B 1 – Homogeneity Cardinalities and Skews 
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Long Bridges 8 1 70 8 0 Titon Between 8 1 100 8 1 
7 5 166 19 1 7 5 146 26 8 
6 9 154 30 14 6 11 207 39 39 
5 11 98 22 26 5 16 172 43 34 
4 12 46 20 17 4 18 66 25 19 
3 8 12 8 12 3 9 11 9 0 
2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Skew 0.20 0.69 0.31 0.86 Skew 0.59 0.46 0.52 1.12 
Titon Within 8 1 112 8 1 Laston 8 1 99 8 1 
7 8 275 36 11 7 5 169 24 3 
6 16 204 40 48 6 9 157 32 9 
5 17 80 28 33 5 13 109 25 38 
4 11 19 11 19 4 12 50 16 11 
3 0 0 0 0 3 7 13 7 0 
2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Skew 0.69 1.19 0.78 1.31 Skew 0.39 0.45 0.44 2.42 
Avragly 8 1 101 8 1 Firston 8 1 113 8 3 
7 8 248 41 11 7 7 278 30 5 
6 17 188 46 48 6 14 242 47 41 
5 15 75 24 33 5 17 116 36 39 
4 12 19 12 19 4 13 37 17 16 
3 0 0 0 0 3 7 9 7 9 
2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Skew 0.63 1.17 0.99 1.31 Skew 0.43 0.99 0.78 1.25 
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Table B 2 - Us-versus-them Cardinalities and Skews 
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Long Bridges 5 1 70 5 30 Titon Between 5 1 100 5 37 
4 1 58 13 19 4 5 113 18 31 
3 5 32 11 9 3 9 65 20 18 
2 6 18 11 7 2 6 21 10 9 
1 5 5 5 5 1 4 5 4 5 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0.10 0.46 -0.49 1.04 0.33 0.29 0.38 0.43 
Titon Within 5 1 112 5 35 Laston 5 1 99 5 24 
4 5 156 14 30 4 5 156 12 27 
3 7 110 18 24 3 6 101 14 22 
2 7 47 10 14 2 6 40 12 19 
1 3 9 3 9 1 4 7 4 7 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0.00 0.06 0.30 -0.20 -0.57 0.30 -0.31 -0.89 
Avragly 5 1 101 5 33 Firston 5 1 113 5 40 
4 4 101 13 25 4 5 128 8 41 
3 6 70 12 25 3 4 55 8 16 
2 5 28 5 12 2 4 28 5 10 
1 3 8 3 5 1 2 7 2 5 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
-0.05 0.08 0.41 -0.06 0.03 0.53 -0.42 0.63 
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Table B 3 - Embeddedness Cardinalities and Skews 
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Long Bridges 7 1 70 5 21 Titon Between 7 1 100 6 17 
6 3 56 9 16 6 5 175 20 24 
5 4 30 7 16 5 9 141 24 29 
4 4 15 6 9 4 9 73 17 12 
3 6 8 6 8 3 7 32 14 6 
2 0 0 0 0 2 6 15 6 9 
1 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 3 3 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0.44 1.02 -0.23 0.19 -0.15 0.60 0.20 0.54 
Titon Within 7 1 112 5 17 Laston 7 1 99 6 23 
6 5 204 16 27 6 5 153 11 25 
5 9 166 25 29 5 6 102 14 22 
4 11 89 29 20 4 7 53 14 18 
3 10 34 16 10 3 5 19 7 4 
2 6 9 6 9 2 4 9 5 4 
1 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 3 3 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0.00 0.59 0.40 0.02 -0.32 0.71 0.09 0.06 
Avragly 7 1 101 5 18 Firston 7 1 113 5 17 
6 4 143 14 23 6 5 191 18 33 
5 6 100 15 30 5 10 143 22 31 
4 6 55 13 6 4 9 56 23 17 
3 5 30 8 15 3 9 15 9 15 
2 5 12 8 5 2 0 0 0 0 
1 4 4 4 4 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
-0.86 0.55 -0.18 0.51 0.29 0.75 0.40 0.25 
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Table B 4 - Selectorate Cardinalities and Skews 
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Long Bridges 8 1 70 6 23 Titon Between 8 1 100 8 19 
7 4 58 9 29 7 5 115 25 12 
6 4 18 7 11 6 10 138 36 15 
5 7 7 7 7 5 12 117 36 20 
4 0 0 0 0 4 14 74 32 13 
3 0 0 0 0 3 11 28 16 12 
2 0 0 0 0 2 8 9 8 9 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1.24 1.49 0.42 1.25 -0.16 -0.04 0.08 -0.65 
Titon Within 8 1 112 8 13 Laston 8 1 99 7 27 
7 6 223 34 30 7 4 101 14 21 
6 13 213 38 23 6 7 71 14 22 
5 16 109 38 19 5 6 38 8 12 
4 15 45 24 21 4 5 21 10 6 
3 6 6 6 6 3 6 11 6 11 
2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0.51 0.78 0.36 0.16 -0.05 0.71 0.02 0.33 
Avragly 8 1 101 8 33 Firston 8 1 113 8 22 
7 6 138 24 25 7 5 162 29 30 
6 9 90 23 14 6 10 81 26 26 
5 12 56 20 16 5 11 67 22 14 
4 9 21 14 7 4 11 36 15 10 
3 6 6 6 6 3 9 19 10 9 
2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0.26 0.75 0.26 0.84 0.07 0.89 0.32 0.38 
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Table B 5 - Trusting Attitude Cardinalities and Skews 
 Le
v
el
 
Le
v
el
 
C.
 
B
ije
ct
iv
e 
C.
 
In
jec
tiv
e 
C.
 
Co
m
po
sit
e 
C.
 
  Le
v
el
 
Le
v
el
 
C.
 
B
ije
ct
iv
e 
C.
 
In
jec
tiv
e 
C.
 
Co
m
po
sit
e 
C.
 
Long Bridges 8 1 70 6 3 Titon Between 8 1 100 8 3 
7 5 171 32 13 7 8 368 46 12 
6 13 219 55 9 6 20 576 76 10 
5 21 208 64 11 5 28 544 84 18 
4 22 148 47 13 4 24 316 58 23 
3 18 85 33 8 3 18 150 36 15 
2 8 26 9 9 2 10 52 16 10 
1 3 6 3 3 1 4 12 4 8 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
0.34 0.13 0.26 -0.37 0.26 0.55 0.34 0.22 
Titon Within 8 1 112 7 6 Laston 8 1 99 8 7 
7 7 352 41 11 7 7 278 44 15 
6 17 491 73 19 6 21 387 99 19 
5 23 383 65 26 5 34 330 118 14 
4 22 204 50 15 4 31 117 73 25 
3 17 87 30 21 3 18 64 33 8 
2 10 29 14 8 2 11 25 17 5 
1 4 6 4 6 1 5 6 5 6 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0.12 0.63 0.34 0.23 0.56 0.73 0.75 0.53 
Avragly 8 1 101 8 4 Firston 8 1 113 8 6 
7 8 330 39 16 7 6 374 36 6 
6 17 414 64 11 6 15 560 68 10 
5 29 377 69 25 5 19 445 57 29 
4 20 189 44 23 4 21 284 58 20 
3 12 69 26 9 3 21 164 41 12 
2 8 31 12 7 2 14 75 17 18 
1 4 9 4 5 1 4 12 4 12 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0.80 0.54 0.45 0.69 -0.12 0.51 0.07 0.60 
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Table B 6 - Cohesiveness Cardinalities and Skews 
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Long Bridges 6 1 70 5 19 Titon Between 6 1 100 4 27 
5 5 96 16 22 5 4 133 12 32 
4 8 62 14 18 4 6 83 12 26 
3 5 20 8 7 3 4 27 4 11 
2 3 6 3 3 2 1 4 1 4 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0.71 0.55 0.61 0.25 0.64 0.56 0.83 0.20 
Titon Within 6 1 112 6 42 Laston 6 1 99 6 36 
5 5 118 19 32 5 5 125 17 29 
4 9 80 27 19 4 8 97 20 12 
3 11 46 22 8 3 8 56 12 11 
2 7 16 9 7 2 4 19 4 5 
1 4 4 4 4 1 3 10 3 4 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 
0.19 0.28 0.31 0.88 0.28 0.14 0.49 1.02 
Avragly 6 1 101 5 30 Firston 6 1 113 5 30 
5 5 132 20 34 5 5 167 20 33 
4 9 88 19 18 4 9 125 20 25 
3 7 32 12 14 3 6 45 8 16 
2 4 8 4 4 2 4 15 4 7 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0.51 0.47 0.52 0.43 0.62 0.45 0.84 0.03 
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Table B 7 - Contentment Cardinalities and Skews 
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Long Bridges 5 1 70 4 7 Titon Between 5 1 100 4 6 
4 4 169 11 10 4 4 294 13 10 
3 6 186 14 10 3 7 417 18 15 
2 6 136 12 13 2 7 352 13 10 
1 4 63 4 19 1 4 173 4 21 
0 1 11 0 11 0 1 38 0 38 
-0.3 -0.2 -0.2 1.26 0 -0 0.11 1.51 
Titon Within 5 1 112 5 9 Laston 5 1 99 5 14 
4 5 347 20 10 4 5 252 14 19 
3 10 490 30 16 3 7 258 18 20 
2 10 362 20 24 2 7 198 13 9 
1 5 137 5 32 1 4 91 4 19 
0 1 21 0 21 0 1 18 0 18 
0.18 0.13 0.32 0.42 -0.3 -0.2 0 -1.4 
Avragly 5 1 101 5 12 Firston 5 1 113 5 8 
4 5 279 18 11 4 5 381 20 11 
3 9 347 21 15 3 10 595 30 13 
2 7 202 10 27 2 10 492 20 16 
1 3 62 3 23 1 5 209 5 29 
0 1 13 0 13 0 1 36 0 36 
0.38 0.28 0.45 0.96 0.18 0.12 0.32 0.9 
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Table B 8 – Relational Rationality Cardinalities and Skews 
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Long Bridges 6 1 70 2 65 Titon Between 6 1 100 4 9 
5 2 5 2 5 5 4 183 8 30 
4 0 0 0 0 4 4 102 7 32 
3 0 0 0 0 3 4 38 5 24 
2 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 2 5 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1.11 2.62 1.23 2.61 -0.05 0.89 0.06 0.30 
Titon Within 6 1 112 5 8 Laston 6 1 99 6 24 
5 5 316 18 10 5 5 128 18 32 
4 9 367 21 20 4 7 67 11 27 
3 8 196 16 36 3 6 24 8 10 
2 6 65 9 26 2 5 7 5 6 
1 3 14 3 11 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0.06 0.56 0.11 0.65 -0.20 0.70 0.74 0.25 
Avragly 6 1 101 4 18 Firston 6 1 113 4 11 
5 4 140 10 44 5 4 258 13 21 
4 5 74 8 26 4 7 260 17 24 
3 3 23 3 8 3 7 137 13 29 
2 1 5 1 5 2 5 37 8 24 
1 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 3 3 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
0.58 0.75 0.78 1.12 0.00 0.44 0.07 -0.45 
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Table B 9 - Satisfaction with Public Service Cardinalities and Skews 
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Long Bridges 10 1 70 4 20 Titon Between 10 1 100 4 6 
9 4 85 12 27 9 4 253 15 10 
8 6 50 13 13 8 10 432 43 10 
7 4 18 4 6 7 19 597 72 11 
6 2 5 3 2 6 27 607 92 9 
5 2 2 2 2 5 29 445 80 11 
4 0 0 0 0 4 22 248 45 14 
3 0 0 0 0 3 13 99 20 15 
2 0 0 0 0 2 6 32 9 8 
1 0 0 0 0 1 3 10 3 4 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 
0.99 1.32 1.45 1.46 0.50 0.44 0.64 -0.36 
Titon Within 10 1 112 10 6 Laston 10 1 99 7 7 
9 10 537 82 11 9 5 220 18 27 
8 41 1357 238 13 8 8 192 43 19 
7 80 1888 248 6 7 17 244 59 9 
6 94 1643 348 9 6 19 204 39 8 
5 84 1078 271 18 5 18 156 38 12 
4 58 531 160 13 4 13 88 28 4 
3 34 204 77 14 3 9 46 16 4 
2 17 59 29 13 2 6 22 8 4 
1 6 9 0 9 1 3 7 3 4 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
0.45 0.70 0.45 -0.62 0.34 0.05 0.49 1.53 
Avragly 10 1 101 7 8 Firston 10 1 113 10 4 
9 6 303 28 15 9 10 594 68 4 
8 13 397 49 16 8 34 1414 205 11 
7 18 350 60 14 7 72 2173 297 10 
6 20 246 58 19 6 101 2343 463 17 
5 17 128 40 7 5 104 1811 396 13 
4 14 66 30 9 4 82 1437 256 16 
3 12 38 22 4 3 47 438 113 11 
2 8 16 12 4 2 20 130 35 14 
1 5 5 5 5 1 6 28 6 10 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 3 
-0.13 0.63 0.24 0.24 0.45 0.39 0.64 -0.34 
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Table B 10 - Satisfaction with Government Cardinalities and Skews 
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Long Bridges 8 1 70 8 3 Titon Between 8 1 100 8 3 
7 8 348 50 4 7 8 514 43 2 
6 25 951 113 2 6 22 1258 115 4 
5 39 1253 139 7 5 40 1807 168 6 
4 38 1080 103 8 4 45 1632 148 11 
3 24 625 62 8 3 33 956 80 13 
2 12 275 22 6 2 16 366 26 27 
1 5 100 5 15 1 5 90 5 20 
0 1 17 0 17 0 1 14 0 14 
0.48 0.49 0.48 0.94 0.46 0.49 0.57 0.79 
Titon Within 8 1 112 8 2 Laston 8 1 99 6 4 
7 8 702 35 2 7 6 406 30 1 
6 18 1384 72 5 6 16 806 72 9 
5 27 1870 103 4 5 28 1186 104 5 
4 32 1984 102 6 4 35 1170 120 8 
3 26 1452 63 11 3 30 826 80 26 
2 14 704 24 13 2 17 388 32 12 
1 5 221 5 31 1 6 114 6 18 
0 1 38 0 38 0 1 16 0 16 
0.23 0.17 0.38 1.38 0.32 0.28 0.40 0.74 
Avragly 8 1 101 8 2 Firston 8 1 113 7 3 
7 8 670 48 1 7 7 594 31 5 
6 24 1803 106 1 6 16 1177 65 3 
5 35 2435 127 3 5 26 1680 123 5 
4 35 2270 101 5 4 36 1953 141 5 
3 25 1530 52 12 3 35 1683 106 12 
2 13 752 22 10 2 21 895 42 21 
1 5 271 5 16 1 7 233 7 25 
0 1 51 0 51 0 1 34 0 34 
0.30 0.32 0.47 2.40 0.30 0.12 0.49 1.01 
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SET MATHEMATICS THEORY 
Set theory rests on the idea that all entities are composed of multiple parts and in 
turn contribute to the constitution of larger entities. It is an ontologically relativistic 
mathematic. All objects observed are described as belonging to sets, collections of similar 
objects that can be described as belonging to a definable set. A set of all even numbers, 
for instance, would be described as A = {x | x is even}. A is an infinite set, and could be 
A = {2, 4, 6, 8 ...}. A finite set may be a set of the main titles of all books written by 
Robert Putnam. B = {x | x is the main title of a book written by Robert Putnam}. That 
would be B = {The Beliefs of Politicians, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, 
Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies, Hanging Together, Making 
Democracy Work, Bowling Alone, Better Together}. This is a finite and limited set of 
seven items, leaving out articles, edited books and subtitles. Both sets A and B may be 
manipulated mathematically using the same set of rules, defined in the axioms of axiomic 
set theory. The dominant form of axiomic set theory is Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. 
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory is consistent with the set of Axioms used by Alain Badiou. 
Badiou provides theoretical and philosophical support for using set theory to describe 
ontology and society. 
From Georg Simmel to Pierre Bourdieu sociologists have seen people as both 
socially constructed and as constructers of society. Though this is cyclical, it is not a 
fallacy of any sort. People are in a dialogue with society. Simmel explained in the Web of 
Group Affiliation (1955) that the groups where an individual associates themselves 
describe how that person sees themselves, but through association they also change that 
person. As people come and go from a group, so too do they change the group, not only 
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in its constitution but in its purpose and action. If a philanthropic organization acquires a 
new member they may push the group in new directions or the group may change the 
way that person thinks. This is a constant process in group life. 
Bourdieu's concept of habitus reflects the same idea. Habitus is a structuring 
structure that alters the dispositions of people, informing them through external practice 
of what is possible, then internalized and enforced as it is in turn structured by the agents 
of social interaction. It manifests in field structures. The extent of the field is defined by a 
set. A set consists of those individuals who share common traits structuring their social 
action that may be defined as habitus, and who in turn structure the social universe 
consistent with their sense of what is possible, again habitus. Fields overlap and so do the 
sets defined by the fields. Elements are individuals, in this description. Elements may 
also be groups and organizations when analyzing a community. People who socialize at 
one location and people who socialize at another location define two sets. They meet in 
the set of people who socialize at both places. This constitutes two groups with shared 
membership. In set theory this is a collection of five sets; the people who are at one 
location (1) the people at another location (2) the meet is people at both locations (3) the 
join is all the people at either locations (4) and the null set (5) contains people who are at 
neither location, often an empty set. 
Even when analyzing groups, the individual people are still present, as when 
looking at people the groups are still present. Groups constitute the community. 
Communities are a unit in a regional analysis. Regions are a unit in state-wide analysis. 
States are a unit in national analysis. Individuals are constituted of many psychological 
elements, affiliations and manifestations of habitus. The unit of the individual receives 
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privilege socially. There is no mathematical reason to suppose the individual is any more 
or less "real" than the group or the nation or the habitus, but because people perceive 
cognitively from the level of the individual, the unit of the individual seems more real. 
This is a function of the ego that privileges itself above all other levels and perspectives. 
The web of group affiliations (Simmel 1955) serves quite well as a neural cognitive 
process for group functions much as human synaptic processes serve well for cognitive 
realities. Organizational structures have at least as much resiliency as any human life, and 
though their precise makeup changes their structures are constant. The same can be said 
of any body. The hair a person has today is not the same hair they had last year, though it 
has a similar structure. For analytical purposes the group structure of the "set" has 
ontological equivalency with the material individualistic body. The characteristics of the 
set seem more abstract. 
 
Sets 
The cardinal number of a set describes its size. John von Neumann, the 
preeminent game theoretician and inventor of the prisoner's dilemma, was particularly 
interested in the topic of set mathematics. He proposed a method of assigning cardinal 
numbers to infinite sets, to distinguish between infinities by size. The data used here is 
finite so cardinal numbers are the number of elements that sets contain. Determining the 
cardinal number depends on the level of analysis. A set may constitute only one element 
of a larger set, but itself be composed of smaller units that are in turn sets of smaller sets. 
This is a relativistic and relational way of understanding society. It questions the 
temptation to threat the individual as a default unit. Cardinal numbers are explored in 
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greater detail later, but essentially the cardinal number of a set is the quantity of units 
(people or groups generally) in the identified sample (group or locality generally). 
I refer to concepts because concept analysis is the application commonly 
associated with lattices. In computer science ideas often need to be ordered into concepts. 
The same is true of sociology. Any set is a concept. Concepts arise naturally in the 
creation of lattices. This is one of the greatest strengths of lattices. A collection of 
concepts with similar qualities is called a class. It may be used somewhat inexactly. 
Generally a set that contains other sets with a sociological context may be called a class. 
In the university, a set may be all liberal arts students. Another set may be all biology 
students. A class would be all university students. Concepts and classes where a proper 
name may be attributed are particularly important. I refer to them as groups or social 
groups. Their proportional representation as a part of the sample indicates their salience. 
There are a number of mathematical operators used in set notation with which 
sociologists may not be fully familiar. I will demonstrate each with a brief introduction of 
the pertinent concepts. 
 The operator 
 indicates there exists, or posited on the existence of.  is the 
operator meaning for all. 
The operator    represents that an object (x) is a member of a set (A). The 
operator    represents that an object (x) is not a member of a set (A). Membership 
indicates an element of a set. The elements of a set determine the set. Membership in a 
set is predicated on some condition, and a set is elements that meet that condition. 
Elements may be actors, relationships among actors, or relationships with objects. 
Relationships with objects, rather than objects, are included because actors relate to non-
  
 
sentient things. Subjectivity in defining sets can lead
relationships and objects that belong to a set. The sociologist must exercise professional 
judgment as to how finely to parse a concept. 
The operator  represents the concept of union. The union of two sets is a set 
containing all the elements of both sets. If A = {1,2,3} and B = {3,4,5} then 
. The operator 
sets is a set containing the elements common to both sets. If A = {1,2,3} and B =
then . See figure 1 for an illustration of these concepts.
 
Figure 1 – Set unions 
A subset is a set contained within another set. A proper subset contains some but 
not all of the elements of the set where
subset and superset. The 
= {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9} and B = {1,2,3,4,5} so B is a subset of A expressed as
 meaning that A is a superset of B. 
concepts. If C = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9} then C contains all the elements of A. The operator 
 is employed.
A
[1,2]
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 to disagreements identifying actors, 
 
 represents the concept of intersection. The intersection of two 
 
 
 it is a member. The  symbols denote 
 symbols denote proper subset and proper superset. A 
See figure 2 for an illustration of these 
  
B
[4,5]
[3] 
 
 {3,4,5} 
  
 
 
Figure 2 – Proper subsets
Compliments are the portions of a set not contained by another set. A = 
{3,4,5,6,7,8,9} and B = {0,1,2,3,4,5} so the compliment of B in A also known as A
{6,7,8,9}. So,  A={fans of music}, and 
complement of B in A or A
figure 3 for an illustration of these concepts.
Figure 3 – Set compliments
 
Classes of sets 
A
[6,7,8,9]
A
[6,7,8,9]
[3,4,5]
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 B={everyone who likes the Beatles}, the 
\B={music fans who don’t like the Beatles i.e. [3,4,5]}. See 
 
 
 
B
[1,2,3,4,
5]
B
[0,1,2]
 
C 
 
\B = 
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Once that compete network is available, certain qualities of the network structure 
become apparent, and by metaphorical extension they are applicable to a useful 
sociological study of network qualities that remains entirely sociological (Newman, 
Barabási and Watts 2006). 
Clay Shirky (2007) tells the story of his mother who worked at the library of 
congress, and first taught him about the Dewey decimal system. The library cataloging 
system was designed for the physical housing of books, not for the organization of 
information. Each book has to be reduced to one category and is shelved in that place. A 
book that is 49% about community sociology (Dewey number 307) and 51% about 
economic cooperatives (Dewey number 334) must be assigned one number. It is placed in 
334. A cross reference may be made, but is not necessarily, and so the way of 
understanding the information is to accurately gauge the category in which a librarian 
will place a book. To browse one category will necessarily omit many quite interesting 
entries. Also, the system as a whole was not designed to describe knowledge as much as 
to manage the paper of the books, to warehouse pulp effectively, according to what books 
are available in English. Shirky points out that in the religion category (200) listings 200-
280 are all various sorts of Christianity, while all other religions are lumped into 290. 
Obviously this does not reflect the distribution of world literature, religious affiliation in 
the world or even in America. It reflects the distribution of categorized titles listed with 
the library of congress. 
Shirky goes on to note, when the world went digital, a way had to be devised to 
organize the internet. Initially Yahoo hired an army of librarians to classify and review 
websites for their index. Every page was assigned one and only one category, but could 
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be cross listed in no more than three other categories, with a link back to the page's 
primary listing. Google’s ability to accurately reflect the social fabric of the internet set it 
apart. Google identified relationships among pages using tags people assigned to links 
and the patterns users followed finding them. Directional relationships become the focus 
of attention and accumulate tags that serve to define the nodes as well as the 
relationships. 
The reality of the social universe conforms to the Google approach, not Yahoo’s. 
A group of ten people who all know one another will have 45 relationships or 90 
directional relations. Those 90 directional relations will each allow, if each person is 
asked to define all others in one word, 9 tags to each person and 2 to each relationship. 
Categories of tags quickly and naturally arise to create groups within the population 
intrinsically and naturally. This way of measuring the universe seems difficult to manage, 
where all questions are open ended and typologies must be identified a-posteriori to data 
collection. In the days when statistics were done with slide rules, or even when 
calculators were used, this was far too labor intensive to be realistic. Today computers 
and simple applications reduce vast quantities of information to a manageable quantum. 
When 150 people create a social universe of 11175 relationships and 22350 tags, per 
question asked of each person, the data points soon mount to monumental volumes. 
To find the number of relationships in a group figure t(n) = (n-1)(n)/2. In a group 
of 150 people, widely felt to be the maximum number a person can actively maintain 
(Gladwell 2000), the 11175 relationships in that network tell a lot about the ego at the 
center. Each of those relationships goes two ways. To measure reciprocity requires 
examining 22350 measures. Many are set to 0 because an ego network does not assure 
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that all members are related directly, though they still must be measured for accuracy. A 
sample of relationships in an individual’s ego network cannot be reliably scored for 
density or centrality. K networks show that the degree of completeness of a network is 
important (Sharp 2001) and so artificially introducing incompleteness is harmful to 
validity. Ultimately ego networks describe, even with all 22350 measures taken, only the 
social position of one individual ego. Reliability is questionable. To look at the network 
as a whole along certain qualities of association doesn’t require asking Dick if he knows 
Jane, but may make the assumption that there is a tendency for patterns of association to 
warrant presumptions of similar social network structures. In a small town of 2000 
people, where there are a potential of 3,998,000 measures describing 1,999,000 
relationships, people will still tend to associate strongly with no more than 150 
individuals. If the town and place are central factors in their identity there is significant 
overlap in the ego networks of any two individuals, more so as certain factors align. 
Those factors may be membership in local church, use of local business for social 
purposes, frequenting local social and fraternal organizations, and that sort of thing. 
Exactly what constitutes active depends somewhat on the identity processes or 
mechanisms present in the local place. 
Links and tags are the way of the future for relational sociology. A map of links 
and tags will far more accurately describe the social universe, but presents difficulties 
statistically. The tools that have served sociology in the past based on variables ascribed 
to individuals (Emirbayer 1997) may not be sufficient for relational sociology (Freeman 
and White 1993; Freeman 2000). The statistics appropriate to this pursuit derive from set 
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theory, mathematics initially developed to deal with multiple different forms of infinity 
using a series of axioms allowing conceptualized values to be manipulated. 
 
Fields as classes of sets 
Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) used fields to define socially 
bounded areas. Fields are analogous to socially recognized classes of sets. Bourdieu 
described fields as sites of struggle. Most fields are subordinate ultimately to the fields of 
power and class. Fields are structured by smaller fields and in turn serve to structure 
larger fields. Consistent with Badiou's (2004; 2005) use of sets, there is no field that 
encompasses all other fields, as there would be in pure mathematics. For Badiou, this has 
theological and metaphysical implications, but for Bourdieu it is a matter of constructing 
subjects. There is no field where all people are subject, though all people are subject to 
some field of power and some field of class. There are likely points of intersection 
between any two sets of power and class, and economic fields tend to overlap, but there is 
not by necessity a single unified field in the say that there is a single unified set that can 
be arrived at simply by unifying all other sets. This emphasizes the importance of social 
recognition in fields. Fields provide subjectively. Sets that constitute fields are sites of 
struggle for resources. Fields where people disagree over fundamental questions are 
where interesting sociological questions are answered. Bourdieu said that fields address 
questions of nomos, his term for essential understanding of how the world is socially 
structured. People find themselves aligned to different answers according to perspectives 
embedded in their habitus. Habitus also determines the nature and quantity of capital at 
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stake in dominance of a particular field. Dominance of a field confers the ability to 
enforce ones vision, habitus, of what value a field holds (Bourdieu, 1977). 
Badiou's contention that no set contains all other sets implies that all subjects 
must be constructed. All systems are constructed from the bottom up. Society does not 
create people. People create groups and societies. People in turn are constituted of the 
influences of group life (Simmel 1955) as they in turn influence and constitute the 
groups. 
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Subjective reflexivity, Habitus, Composed Multiples and Groups as Sets 
“If one posits the existence of a being of the Whole, it follows, from the fact that 
any being thought in its being is pure multiplicity, that the Whole is a multiple.” 
(Badiou 2004:189) 
 
There is reality in subjectivity. Sociologists since Weber questioned the 
possibility of a truly objective perspective as they juxtaposed statements of value and 
fact. Weber seemed to eventually settle for the idea that once a value objective was 
identified, the social scientist had the tools necessary to analyze the social universe 
pertinent to the value in question (Collins 1990). Questions of subjectivity are debated in 
discussion of structure (Giddens 1984). The objective structure of social relationships is 
predicated on understanding that social acquaintances have subjective value. A list of the 
people with whom an actor interacts, even using objective measures like duration or a 
count of words said, is socially vacant. Sociologists must know the value participants 
place on the relationships (Emirbayer 1997). 
It is impossible to accurately measure the universe. Systems, probabilities, and 
rules represent the universe. Relationships between social actors are at least as important 
as the properties of the actors. Actors exist at different levels of reality. While the 
observer subjectively determines an object’s value (Marx 1867), the object must be 
considered real at different levels, independent of the objects it is made of or the objects 
it makes up (Badiou 2004). Relationships make groups and communities. The social 
reality of groups and communities constitute the individual (Simmel 1955). The 
sociologist must choose the level of analysis and remain faithful to that perspective, that 
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subjectivity. This is a Weberian statement of value, to say that all analysis is done from 
the level of the relationship consistent with the values assigned those relationships by the 
participants on either end. A commitment to the value of the individual in their capacity 
to define the relationship, the fundamental social unit, is a Weberian statement of value 
(Weber 1958). 
A relational understanding of society (Emirbayer 1997) says social groups are 
composed of actors and their relationships to one another. Those relationships 
dynamically compose interactive groups of actors (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), 
meaning that the structure of relationships in which a person is engaged has an impact on 
the person they are. Child development literature (Harris 1999) says children generally 
take on characteristics of the household where they were raised (Bourdieu 1984). People 
whose social networks focus on a trade often become involved in similar trades (Lin 
2001; Granovetter 1974). People are social compositions of the interactions in which they 
engage. 
 
“Sartre’s ultra-subjectivist imagination has been outdone by the voluntarism of 
the anthropological fictions to which the ‘rational actor’ theorists have to resort 
(when they actually raise the question, which they usually avoid) in order to make 
rational decision making the sole basis of the rational conduct of the ‘rational 
actor’, and more especially of the constancy and coherence of his preference over 
time… by refusing to recognize any other way of founding it in reason than by 
giving reason as foundation, they simply introduce a being of reason, an ought-to-
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be, as a vis dormativa, in the form of an agent all of whose practices have reason 
as their principle.” (Bourdieu 1990a:46-47) 
 
With the supposition that actors are composed of their relationships interacting 
within themselves, as Simmel clearly does in the Web of Group Affiliation (1955), then it 
is the rearing process that makes the interaction of those relationships significant. During 
childhood a person acquires the skills necessary to participate in a culture (Bourdieu 
1984), cultural capital. 
The process of managing the interaction of these relationships within the 
individual psyche confers habitus upon the child (Bourdieu 1998). Habitus is similarity in 
the way people view aspects of the world, and their relationship to the social universe. A 
person may have as many forms of habitus as they have aspects of their life. Each aspect 
comprises a field (Bourdieu 1977). The number of fields, and the variety of habiti within 
a person is unbounded, but in practice it is limited by the finite capacity of the psyche 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Individuals have within themselves another habitus for 
managing the interaction of the fields where they belong, and so the actor becomes a 
separate field, recognized socially. 
Reflexivity is the quality that makes an actor capable of dynamically creating 
complex social systems. Reflexivity is best considered as analogous to Niklas Luhmann’s 
(Luhmann 1990; 1995) concept of self-reference. Social systems are autopoietic, meaning 
they are self-organizing and self-sustaining rather than organized and sustained 
intentionally by some force. Reflexive actors can be separated from non-self-referential 
objects by their ability to distinguish themselves from the system that makes up their 
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environment and their place in the system. Luhmann describes progressive degrees of 
self-reference. First, self-reference is where the actor can distinguish between objects and 
relations in the system. Second, this becomes a process, (part of a communication or a 
reasoning exercise) in which the actor engages over time rather than a simple attribute of 
the actor. In the third degree, the actor has the ability to reference the system and 
distinguish it from its environment. 
Reflexive actors can communicate, and having communicated they can consider 
the value of that communication and how it may have changed their position in the larger 
system, or the positions of other objects. They also can reflect on their own internal 
processes of consideration, and refine those processes based on the accuracy of the 
assumptions they hold relative to observed reality. It becomes dynamic as constant 
considerations of objects, relations, communications, action and past considerations are 
reflected upon (Bourdieu 1990a). 
The reflexive actor is an alternative to the rational actor as the atomistic property 
of the social system. The rational actor uses rational logic. Rational logic is entirely self-
serving. Rational logic emphasizes information and skill to manipulate the social 
environment, its norms and mores, to the actor’s service. The reflexive actor uses 
relational logic, a logic expressed mathematically by set theory. The reflexive actor is 
free to pursue emotionally driven goals if they judge that course of action preferable for 
reasons consistent with their relational understanding of their social environment, their 
habitus.  
The reflexive actor sees society as constructed of groups of actors that exist as 
real objects in relation to other real groups. Actors are reflexive both intuitively and 
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ontologically. They are not isolated but a multiple within a multiple (Badiou 2004; 2005). 
They are interred in the system and cannot ponder an existence outside of it. Social 
groups, fields, are posited to exist by extension of the concept of habitus. They are 
composed of reflexive actors, who in turn are composed of intersecting groups, fields. 
The axiom of collection, one of the axioms of set theory as described later, says 
that sets are subject to the conditions of the sets they are themselves members of. This 
means that while social organization is formed bottom up, by the collection of 
relationships, the ascription of meaning to those relationships originates with larger sets 
and is ascribed, in a top down fashion, to the smaller sets. This is consistent with the 
function of fields and habitus, as the mechanism for collecting, processing and ascribing 
meaning to the members of the fields. 
The reflexive actor as the agent capable of ascribing value to a relationship. In a 
sociological analysis of a community’s social capital the people who live in that 
community are reliable sources for the value they hold in relation to the people, objects 
and groups in the community. If asked about where they socialize or their organizational 
affiliations and why they are so affiliated, respondents are capable of gauging the value 
of their relationship to the group or place in question. Sets of actors in the community 
who all ascribe similar values to the question “where do you socialize” or “what sorts of 
organizations do you participate in once a month or more” naturally define set-concepts. 
Labels such as “active in community development” or “political” may be applied to those 
set-concepts. A lattice is constructed naturally by arraying the questions and actors 
identifying the concepts where those labels are applied. The sociologist identifies the 
questions that reliably construct each concept. 
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In examining group structures, relationships between the elements of the sets have 
primacy (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005). The relationships people or groups hold with 
one another and the values they assign to those relationships tell volumes about the 
community, groups and people who occupy them. Just as in a cognitive process options 
are weighed, so too a social process weighs the values of relationships. A number of 
values may be assigned to a relationship. Emirbayer and Williams (2005) analyze a 
homeless shelter and distinguish two distinct forms of relationships, those sanctioned by 
staff and those sanctioned by residents. The values assigned to relationships according to 
either schema may be conflicting, and so they analyze the social location to distinguish 
the concepts that are dominant in that situation. Social capital distinguishes generalized 
trust from individuated trust. Generalized trust operates well as a signifier at the 
community level. Emirbayer and Williams observed cultural capital. They focused on 
power relations, and contextualized power along two fields; the staff and resident fields. 
Power is exercised differently in the two fields. Neither necessarily relies on trust, as trust 
and power are quite distinct. In any social location there may be any number of fields in 
operation. There will always be a social field of trust, that is characterized as social 
capital. There will also be a social field of power, that is well characterized as cultural 
capital. Both are fields, that are sets themselves, and are often complex and may be 
analytically divided into a number of sets. Sets of sets, for purposes of analysis, are 
classes. And so for sociological analysis the class of social capital and the class of 
cultural capital are universally present (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005). 
 The community field (Wilkinson 1999), or community capital, is a class identified 
according to the relationships present in an area. Community field relationships are for 
 299  
 
 
the purpose of promoting the community as a whole, almost exclusively in efforts to 
mobilize group processes. Putnam did not use this terminology, but if he had it would 
have reduced initial confusion about social capital at the community level. 
 
Axiomic set concepts 
Venn Diagrams 
Venn diagrams were developed in the 1880s around the time Cantor (1915) began 
formalizing set theory. They represent overlapping concepts, showing where elements of 
those concepts are similar and different. When Venn diagrams exceed three concepts, it is 
necessary to convolute shapes to illustrate the possible intersections. With more than six 
or seven concepts Venn Diagrams cease to be useful or intuitive. 
This is related to network theory. Imagine a group wants to see a movie, but 
everyone must agree on the movie they choose to see. From a network view, with three 
people (1, 2, 3) it is necessary for three pairs (1-2, 2-3, 1-3) to agree on a movie. With 
two more people (4, 5) it gets complicated. Ten agreements are needed (1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-
5, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 3-4, 3-5, 4-5). This follows the formula t(n) = ((n-1)(n))/2. A group of 
just 10 people needs 45 agreements. It’s hard to get large groups to agree on anything. 
Venn diagrams have the same problem. Adam, Berry, and Cecil (A, B & C) want 
to go to a movie. Venn diagrams, to capture the range of social concepts, must capture 
the points where all intersections take place. They cannot exclude any possible 
combination of concepts, even if nothing occupies those concepts. The Venn diagram in 
figure 4 easily shows “A”, “B” and “C”.  
  
 
 
Figure 4 – Three concept Venn diagram
If Derek and Ethan decide to come along a Venn diagram no longer captures all 
the concepts easily. Simply adding a circle is insufficient. It would fail to capture the 
overlaps of people on opposite sides of the diagram where those people do not overlap 
with one of the other two. Figure 5 illustrates Venn diagrams for four and five concepts. 
The complexity of such an illustration explains the failure of Venn diagrams as 
widespread sociological tools. But, the basic function of Venn diagrams, representing the 
logic of sets, is still desirable. A Venn diagram that represented the concepts employed in 
this dissertation would have to represent the potential overlaps of six or
independent variables, which is impossible complex.
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Figure 5 – Four and Five concept Venn diagram 
 
 
The complexity of the concepts employed in this dissertation is captured by 
lattices structures. Lattices are graphic and intuitive, but naturally exclude empty sets. 
Even if there are no movies that “A” and “D” but not “B”, “C” or “E” want to see, the 
Venn diagram must still represent the concept. A lattice is naturally and intuitively 
capable of ignoring empty sets while representing non-empty sets. 
Set Theory was introduced by Georg Cantor, in 1874 as a way of contending with 
the philosophy of infinity. In essence it is the idea of bounding together in sets, series of 
objects, based on similarities among the items. The basic concept of set theory is the idea 
that an object or set may be an element of a set. Any two sets may be brought together 
into another set, known as their union. Overlapping sets may independently consider the 
point of overlap, known as the intersection, containing all the elements that are in both 
original sets. Compliments are a set of the members in one set that are not present in the 
other set. 
A 
C 
B 
D 
AD 
ACD 
AC 
ABCD 
ABC 
AB 
ABD 
BCD 
BD CD ? 
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Bertrand Russell asked a series of questions that exposed paradoxes in the use of 
sets (1903). Most famously Russell's Paradox asks how a set of all sets that do not 
include themselves can exist, as it would both have to include itself and exclude itself. 
Russell also was fundamental as the first to seriously apply principals of set math to 
social contexts. This led, over a number of years, to the specification of a series of 
axioms for the operation of set mathematics, collectively called the Zermelo-Fraenkel 
axioms of set theory. They consist of the axioms of extensionality, regularity, 
specification, pairing, union, collection, infinity, power set, and the well-ordering 
theorem. I provide an explanation of each in the next section with their sociological and 
mathematical contexts. 
Set theory was principal in the development of a school of mathematics known as 
game theory. John von Neumann developed the minimax theory that each actor seeks to 
maximize gain while minimizing cost, as a way to solve dilemmas presented in game 
theory. He also introduced the prisoner's dilemma. It was the first development of a 
school of thought systematically applying set theory in an effort to solve social problems, 
and also gave rise to a school of thought known as rational choice, wherein all actors in a 
social situation are entirely self interested and choose the course of action likely to give 
them the best returns, regardless of the consequences to other players. The application of 
game theory has been instrumental in some sociologists thought concerning the nature of 
social capital. With proper scrutiny of the assumptions and rules pertinent to a game 
situation there can be useful applications for game theoretic in the study of social capital, 
but there is a strong tendency for such applications to undersocialize the players, meaning 
it decontextualizes the game-playing social actors from the social context that gave rise to 
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the game in question, thus rendering the outcome of any simulated games dubious at best 
(Potter 2004). These axioms together comprise the logic of sets, and are necessary to 
avoid fallacies. 
 
Axioms 
There are a number of terms related to set theory axioms that are important for an 
understanding of the theoretical implications of lattice structures. Linton Freeman (1996) 
observed that lattices create a hierarchy and express a relational social structure that 
captures the reality observed by sociologists who employ the ethnographic method. He 
shows it mathematically, but to understand why it works theoretically, set theoretic 
axioms must be recast in sociological terms. These axioms provide philosophical and 
theoretical support for the ontological reality of groups, based on Badiou’s assertion that 
all ontology is essentially mathematical.  
Lattices replace the simple aggregation of independent variables into a dependent 
variable score for a community. They do so by making the independent variables into a 
dependent variable concept, which contains a hierarchically arranged set of scores that 
express the presence of a concept in the community. This expression is more robust than 
simple dependent variable scores because it holds on to the hierarchical structure of the 
concept in the community. 
Axiom 1 – Extensionality. The Axiom of extensionality says that two sets are 
equal if they have the same elements, and so two concepts may be considered equal is 
they are represented by the same set of elements. If two sets are equal they contain the 
same set of elements. An example of this is that the set of “all music I like” is the same as 
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the set of “all music that is good”; implying that if I don’t like it then it must not be good. 
If two sets have the same elements but different predicates (conditions of belonging) they 
are known as proper subsets of one another (Fraenkel et al. 1973). 
When a set with a proper subset tries to communicate with another set, the proper 
subset will make the meaning of any relationship imprecise. This is because of 
disagreement between the sets about the operational condition of belonging. Consider the 
case of a set defined by one culture as “freedom fighters” and defined by another set 
through its relationships as an object called “terrorists”. The two sets may contain all the 
same elements and in fact be equal concepts defined separately. 
Axiom 2 – Regularity. The axiom of regularity says that no set is an element of 
itself. This is a basic truism necessary to keep people from falling into infinite series of 
logic. If a set were an element of itself, then it was in turn an element of itself, and so on. 
The most important implication of this axiom sociologically is that all elements must be 
placed hierarchically. 
Axiom 3 – Specification. The axiom of specification says that if you can define a 
subset within any set, that subset is itself a set. Any property that may be characterized as 
a property of a set is itself a characteristic sufficient to define a set. 
A set can be divided into its classes where membership in each class is predicated 
on some condition, constituting a set in itself. This means that a field can be subdivided 
into any number of sub-fields by further specifying the predicate condition of set-
membership. Begin with a set of all people in a department. Subdivide those people into 
“students” and “faculty”. Students are divided into “graduate” and “undergraduate”. 
Graduate students are divided into those with “teaching assistantships”, “research 
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assistantships” and a third group of “non-assistantship” students. This can go on logically 
until the population is exhausted. It is also possible to say a set of all people who teach 
would include all faculties, but only those students who are teaching assistants. This point 
of overlap creates another set. 
Axiom 4 – Pairing. The axiom of pairing says that you can take the elements of 
any two sets and create another set that contains all of the elements of those two sets. Any 
two sets, whether or not there is overlap, may be combined to form a unique third set. In 
the above example of the department, there is a logical way to combine the elements. But, 
in other cases there is no logical combining element. It is possible to combine any two 
sets using “and/or” statements. A set containing all people who prefer chocolate over 
vanilla can’t logically combine with a set of people who prefer vanilla over chocolate, but 
a set can be created of all people who prefer chocolate over vanilla and all people who 
prefer vanilla over chocolate. 
Axiom 5 – Union. The axiom of unions says that any set, in fact contains a 
collection of all sets that could possibly be made of its elements. The implication is that if 
the condition qualifying one set is the same as the condition qualifying another set, then 
the elements of those sets can move between the sets. This indicates that not all sets 
require their members to be in contact. A bowling league in Detroit shares a field identity 
with a league in London. None of the members have ever met, but they both draw 
meaning from the same super-set, and an actor from one sub-field may transition to the 
other sub-field. Social elements are not fully interchangeable due to the other sets that 
intersect with those sets. However, alterations to the super-field (bowling leagues) will 
have an impact on both the London bowling league and the Detroit bowling league. Also, 
 306  
 
 
the actions of either location can affect the super-field, and so affect the other location by 
the network quality of field interaction, even if there is never direct interaction between 
the sub-fields. Further, there are certain measurable qualities where both the London 
elements and the Detroit elements are considered equivalent. 
Axiom 6 – Collection. The axiom of collection says any set that is in turn a 
member of a broader set is subject to all conditions and restrictions of the broader set. 
This is a very important axiom, though I do not delve deeply into it here. The axiom of 
collection says, sociologically, that while groups are formed of elements bottom up; 
meaning is conferred on those elements top down. 
If you take all the members of a set of sets (two or more); there is another set that 
contains all of them. Any number of sets can be united in this way. So, it is not limited to 
two sets. Any two sets can be combined. Any three sets can be combined. Weakening the 
condition of containment can combine any number of sets. The condition of the 
containing set must be weaker than the condition of the contained set. This allows bottom 
up construction of sets into broader and broader categories, but allows for logical 
paradoxes within sets. 
Axiom 7 – Infinity. The axiom of infinity states that there exists a set I, such that I 
contain all natural numbers. The sociological implication of the axiom of infinity is that 
there is a superset containing all elements of all sets everywhere, as a referential concept. 
It is possible to reference all of existence. 
Axiom 8 - Power set. The axiom of the power set says that given any set, there is a 
super set that contains all of the elements of the set as well as the set itself. The power set 
of a class is every possible subset of the class including the class itself. A power set 
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allows for the reference to significant categories that span many divergent categories. It 
allows for key ideas in the construction of social identity to be addressed in a fashion that 
is not beholden to the specifications of smaller groups. This allows for the analysis of 
broad categories like gender without the necessity that every subject agree on its 
definition. A power set of gender would include all operationalizations of the concept as 
well as the concept itself. 
Axiom 9 - Well-ordering theorem. The well ordering theorem states that it is 
possible to take the elements of any set and create a series of pairs that contain all of the 
elements of the set paired with all of the other elements of the set. Sociologically, this 
means that the elements of a set must be capable of relating to one another in a binary 
fashion. 
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LATTICE CONSTRUCTION 
In order to structure the data into lattices for analysis it is necessary to examine 
precisely what lattices are at greater depth. The lattice is a structure combining a number 
of concepts with any number of actors choosing among those concepts.  
I use data from the community of Long Bridges for the “Happiness” concept are 
used to illustrate the analysis process throughout this chapter. The data for the idea of 
“Happiness” for the community of Long Bridges is presented in Table 15. 
 
Table 25 - Long Bridges Happiness 
 
Object (O) 
 
Object (O) 
 
Object (O) 
 
Object (O) W
ell
 k
ept
 
Clo
se
 friend
s
 
M
o
re
 g
oing
 fo
r
 it
 
F
eel
 at
 h
o
m
e
 
S
ad
 to
 m
o
v
e
 aw
ay
 
 
W
ell
 k
ept
 
Clo
se
 friend
s
 
M
o
re
 g
oing
 fo
r
 it
 
F
eel
 at
 h
o
m
e
 
S
ad
 to
 m
o
v
e
 aw
ay
 
W
ell
 k
ept
 
Clo
se
 friend
s
 
M
o
re
 g
oing
 fo
r
 it
 
F
eel
 at
 h
o
m
e
 
S
ad
 to
 m
o
v
e
 aw
ay
 
W
ell
 k
ept
 
Clo
se
 friend
s
 
M
o
re
 g
oing
 fo
r
 it
 
F
eel
 at
 h
o
m
e
 
S
ad
 to
 m
o
v
e
 aw
ay
 
A
cto
r
 (A)
 
1 . X X X X 
1
9 X X . X . 
3
7 . X . X X 
5
5 . X X X X 
2 X . X . . 
2
0 . X . X X 
3
8 . X . X X 
5
6 . X X X X 
3 . X . X . 
2
1 X X . X . 
3
9 . . . X X 
5
7 X X X X . 
4 . X . X X 
2
2 . . . X X 
4
0 X . . X . 
5
8 . X X X X 
5 . X X X X 
2
3 . . . . . 
4
1 . X . X X 
5
9 . X . X . 
6 . X . X X 
2
4 . X . X X 
4
2 . . X X X 
6
0 . X X X X 
7 X . . . . 
2
5 X . . . . 
4
3 . X X X X 
6
1 . X . X . 
8 . . . X . 
2
6 X . . . . 
4
4 . . . . . 
6
2 X . . . . 
9 . X X X . 
2
7 X . . X . 
4
5 . . . X X 
6
3 X X . X . 
1
0 X X X X X 
2
8 X . . . . 
4
6 X X X X . 
6
4 X . . X . 
1
1 X . . . . 
2
9 . X X X . 
4
7 . . X . . 
6
5 . X X X X 
1
2 . X X X . 
3
0 . X X X . 
4
8 X X X X X 
6
6 . X X X X 
1
3 . X . . . 
3
1 . X X X X 
4
9 . X . X X 
6
7 . . . X X 
1
4 . . X X X 
3
2 . X X X X 
5
0 . . . . . 
6
8 . . . . . 
1
5 . X . X . 
3
3 . . . X . 
5
1 X . X X . 
6
9 . X . X X 
1
6 X X . . . 
3
4 . X . X X 
5
2 X . . . . 
7
0 X X . X . 
1
7 . X . X . 
3
5 . . X X X 
5
3 . X . X . 
1
8 X X . X . 
3
6 . . . . . 
5
4 X . X X X 
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All of the data I used had to be reduced to binary data before it could be used to 
construct lattices. Refer to lattice 2 and lattice 4. In the data set used to construct these 
lattices, the first question is "Suppose that for some reason you had to move away from 
[your community]. How sorry or pleased would you be to leave?” It is represented by the 
number “1” and when labeled, is labeled “Sad to move away”. Respondents were also 
asked if their community "has more things going for it than other communities of a 
similar size" Responses are represented by the number “3” and when labeled, is labeled 
“More going for it”. The second question indicating happiness asked if the respondent 
feels "at home" in their community. It is represented by the number “2” and when 
labeled, is labeled “Feel at home”. Respondents were also asked if being a resident of 
their community is "like living with a group of close friends". It is represented by the 
number “4” and when labeled, is labeled “Close friends”. The fifth question asks whether 
the community is best described as well kept or run down. It is represented by the number 
“5” and when labeled, is labeled “Well kept”. 
The basic procedure for constructing a lattice is to derive each concept of the 
lattice L from the context K = (O, A, I) as a couple (X,Y) composed of an object set 
   and an attribute set   . Concepts are complete couples with respect to I, 
where I is the incidence being the binary data in the table, requiring the satisfaction of the 
two conditions       |  ,  and       |  , . 
The functions f and g constitute a Galois connection between P(O) and P(A).” The exact 
formulae for the join, the top of the lattice, is the case where (X1,Y1)⋀(X2,Y2) and the 
meet, the bottom of the lattice where (X1,Y1)⋁(X2,Y2) (Jech 2003; Valtchev and 
Missaoui 2000). What all this means is that the data is arranged into pairs where the 
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actors and objects come together, ranked in a way such that the Incidence “I” is greater in 
cases where an actor has more attributes. At the top of the lattice are actors with no 
concepts, like actor #68. At the bottom are actors with all attributes like actor #10. 
Arrayed along the way are actors with various combinations of objects. 
As an ideal illustration, Lattice 2 shows all possible concepts in a lattice with 5 
questions, like the Happiness measure. This reflects the potential configuration of the 
Happiness measure, and so the Happiness lattice for the city of Long Bridges is drawn in 
order to illustrate the process. The top row, row 0, has no concepts. Row 1 has each of the 
five concepts represented alone. Row 2 has them represented in all possible pairs. Row 3 
has all concepts represented in sets of three. Row 4 has each of the concepts arranged in 
groups of four. Row 5 is the concept of all questions together. The circles all contain 
numbers representing those questions present in the concept. 
Lattice 3 is the same as Lattice 2, but rendered by the program Concept Explorer 
(Yevtushenko 2000), an open source application that can do this math quickly for lattices 
of any size, a procedure not available in standard social statistics applications. Concept 
explorer is an open source application developed under the supervision of Prof. Dr. 
Tatyana Taran at the National Technical University of Ukraine 
(http://conexp.sourceforge.net). This software is useful, but is generally not intended for 
the social sciences. Lattice analysis is at the forefront of advanced software design and 
artificial intelligence, and as such most software is designed for computer scientists. I 
used the applications to quickly structure the lattices then manually analyzed them. At the 
top of the lattice are the letters A-E representing each of the five questions used to 
construct the lattice, then further down the lattice are the combinations of those questions. 
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If the lines leading out of “A” and “B” are followed down, the concepts that contain those 
ideas are the ones that are connected to them. Concept Explorer shows the number of 
actors present at each location. This can be represented in two different ways, either in 
isolation (composite lattice) where all actors who answered yes to the specific question 
are shown or in total (bijective lattice) where all actors who are present at that concept are 
combined with all actors present at all instances connected to it from lower down the 
lattice. In the later case, actors may be present multiple times or many multiple times at 
each location. The later is more interesting sociologically primarily because it captures 
the intensity and unity of a concept within the community. 
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Lattice 3 - Complete 5-Question Lattice (Drawn) 
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Lattice 4 - Complete 5-Question Lattice (Concept Explorer) 
 
Lattices 4, 5 and 6 show the application of the data from Table 15. They are the 
Happiness lattice for the community of Long Bridges. Lattice 4 shows the numerical 
locations present from the complete lattice 2 above, as they occur in Long Bridges. 
Lattices 5 and 6 are rendered by Concept Explorer and show the number of unique actors 
present at each concept in Lattice 5 and the total number of actors present at the concept 
including all those from the concepts connected to it from below in Lattice 6. These 
lattices are employed as points of reference for the remainder of this chapter. 
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Lattice 4 shows all the concepts realized in the Happiness lattice in Long Bridges, 
and Lattice 5 shows how many unique actors are represented in each of those concepts. It 
is also possible, as shown in Figure 6, to have the program tell how many people in total 
are represented in each concept. Both numbers are important. The concept employed to 
know what they mean and how to use them is cardinality. The cardinal number of a 
concept is the uniqueness of data relative to the set containing it. It is the value of the 
concept. This requires mindfulness of the unit of analysis. This dissertation measures 
qualities at the community level. There are a number of relevant ways to measure 
cardinality. Section 4.3 explores what each means.  
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Lattice 5 - Happiness Long Bridges (Drawn) 
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Lattice 6 - Long Bridges Composite Happiness (Unique Actors) 
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Lattice 7 - Long Bridges Bijective Happiness (Total Actors) 
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Levels of Analysis  
Traditionally level of analysis is seen in terms of micro, meso or macro level. 
With the insights of set theory level of analysis is a level of abstraction. All of reality is 
composed multiples that in turn compose, structuring as Bourdieu (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992) termed it. In relational terms (Emirbayer 1997) whether beginning with 
the individual actor or the group-as-actor, the focus must be on relationships. Lattice 
structures aid in this goal, so long the questions have a relational focus. Considering the 
subjectivity of the perspective this data takes (Bourdieu 2003), the actor in a lattice is the 
individual. The lattice constructs “concepts” from the interrelation of individuals and 
their notions expressed in the questions asked. The naturally occurring clusters of 
individuals emergent from the lattice’s structure are the thirty-two potential “concepts”. 
A further abstraction of the collective set used to draw the sample of actors, along with 
the idea represented by collecting these specific questions, is termed the idea. In this case 
the idea is the intersection of the community of Long Bridges with Happiness. The 
concept results from the individual and the five questions as some part of the 32 potential 
positions on the lattice. Level of analysis is the intersection of the notion being examined 
and the entity ascribed with the ability to act. The resulting concepts contain the 
relational structure of the entity relative to the notion. 
The actor, the concept and the idea are the terms that must be defined to 
understand out level of analysis. Notion and entity are generic terms without specific 
levels of abstraction ascribed. The actor is the individual and the idea is happiness. 
Through the concepts constructed the structure of happiness in the community is 
revealed. Analysis moves one level of abstraction out from the actor. The lattice reveals 
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the structure of happiness in Long Bridges through concepts. The lattice has the 
possibility of revealing particularly salient ideas within the community, if a 
disproportionate section of the community falls into one concept. But this dissertation 
compares communities and so does not examine that. If a single community were the 
level of analysis a great deal about that community could be revealed by looking at the 
specific distribution of actors into concepts. Instead this dissertation looks at the 
community as a whole and compares communities. As such this dissertation examines the 
distribution of concepts across the community as opposed to actors across the concepts. 
 
Cardinality 
Cardinality is a set mathematics concept that counts the parts in a set. The axioms 
of set mathematics, as discussed in chapter 2, indicate all sets are composed of sets and in 
turn go on to compose larger sets. Cardinality selects a set to examine. The set examined 
is the “idea”. In the example here, the idea is happiness. As all sets are measures of the 
sets composing them, the generally recognized term for those sets is “concept”. The 
measures of those concepts are attributes, in this case actors or human beings. It is just as 
correct to turn the table on its side and make concepts attributes of the actors, but as the 
measure is “happiness”, the questions asked in the survey are the “concepts” present in 
happiness. Subdividing the community into distinct pre-identifiable groups and looking 
for connections between them recognized in the questions would turn it sideways, but 
instead the assertion is that the idea of happiness can be subdivided into these five 
questions and as such, reveals the structure of happiness in the community through the 
lattice. 
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Lattices are naturally divided into a number of possible levels (L) depending on 
how many concepts are being explored. Whether it is five or five hundred, the cardinality 
of each level is measured as the number of concepts represented of the total possible. 
From a concept or from a level, the number of ties going down from the total possible is 
its injective cardinality. The number of actors present uniquely in a concept or level is its 
cardinality, that must be held relative to the total possible. It is possible to get a measure 
of how many levels are present in a community out of the number possible, where lower 
quantities of groups are assumed to represent a homogeneity of the concept in question, 
and skewing toward the bottom of the lattice, or if the lattice turns 90-degrees 
counterclockwise, skewing to the right, it indicates a greater intensity of the idea at hand. 
This allows standard statistical comparisons between communities once the lattices 
structure the data in a way that is naturally responsive to the hierarchical social capital 
concepts in question. 
As sets are composed of multiple concepts, being sub-sets, the ideas of bijectivity, 
surjectivity and injectivity are used in set theory to represent cardinality. Bijectivity is the 
process of making a set of all possible ordered pairs, as represented in the lattice formula. 
All lattices are therefore bijective. Surjectivity and injectivity are the construction of sets 
from above or below either by combination or division. Injectivity is useful for analysis 
here, but surjectivity is not. Injective Cardinality is the construction of concepts from the 
sets that are contained in them. Surjective cardinality would be the opposite, if the 
concept were constructed from the concepts above it. If there were such a need and it was 
not easier to invert the data, then the notion of surjective cardinality would have a useful 
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role. As lattices have been rendered, to arrive at scores representing the forms of 
cardinality, these ideas are used to understand their constituent concepts. 
 
Level Cardinality (C) 
Level cardinality is the count of cardinal groups on each of the levels. Refer to 
Lattice 5 and observe that there is a natural series of observable levels. They are 
numbered from 0 counting from the bottom up, because lattices are constructed from the 
bottom up with the concepts on the top and the actors on the bottom, intersecting at the 
concepts along the way. Simply count across the level, how many concepts are present on 
that level. In Lattice 5 moving down the lattice the level cardinalities are: Level 5 -1, 
Level 4 -4, Level 3 -6, Level 2 -5, Level 1 -3, Level 0 -1. The level cardinality of the 
meet and join, the top and bottom, are always 1 even if they are empty. 
To calculate the maximum possible value for each level it is necessary to know 
two things. How many concepts are possible given the number of questions contributing 
to the overarching concept (called the Idea, in order to maintain the level of analysis as 
constant at the group level). That is figured by calculating the number of combinations of 
the given level there are of a quantity of questions for the whole idea. In a lattice where 
there are five questions, like the one used here, there are six levels, including the level 
where no one answered any questions in the affirmative. That level is the “meet” (Ø). Its 
level number is 5 in this instance. Then there is the level where one question was 
answered in the affirmative. That is the level 4, and has five concepts, one for each 
question, with four represented in this set of data, and so on. The number of possible 
concept per level are as follows; Level 5 is 1, level 4 is 5, level 3 is 10, level 2 is 10, level 
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1 is 5 and level 0 is 1. Level 0 is also called the “join”. This will always naturally follow 
a normal distribution. 
The formula to determine the possible level cardinality is nCk=n!/k!(n-k)!. That is 
the possible concepts of a given level k where there are a total of n levels. Ideas where 
there are 5,6,7,8 or 10 questions used and the lattices have a potential for the number of 
concepts per level as expressed in Table 16. 
So, for the data here, Happiness, the potential level cardinalities (Cp) are: Level 5 
-1, Level 4 -5, Level 3 -10, Level 2 -10, Level 1 -5, Level 0 -1. The level potential 
cardinality of the meet and join, the top and bottom, as with the realized levels, are 
always 1. The potential level cardinalities (Cp) of each idea are shown in table 16. 
 
Table 26 – Potential level cardinalities 
Lattice Level 
C
o
n
cept
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Homogenous 1 10 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 1 
Us-versus-them  1 5 10 10 5 1     
Selectorate 1 7 21 35 35 21 7 1 
Embedded 1 8 28 56 70 56 28 8 1 
Trusting attitude 1 8 28 56 70 56 28 8 1 
Cohesiveness 1 6 15 20 15 6 1 
Contentment 1 5 10 10 5 1   
Rationality 1 6 15 20 15 6 1 
Satisfaction w/Services 1 10 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 1 
Satisfaction w/Government 1 8 28 56 70 56 28 8 1 
 
Bijective Cardinality (B) 
Bijective cardinality relates to the rule that any two sets may be combined to 
create a third set containing all possible combinations of the original two. This is axiom 
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4, the axiom of pairing. The number of actors present in a concept, allowing that actors 
may be present in multiple concepts, is its bijective cardinality.  
Bijective cardinality captures the extent of a concept within the community, an 
extensive measure in mathematics. Bijective cardinality is the most important measure of 
cardinality for this analysis because it addresses the extent of a concept in the 
community, and thereby reveals the extent of the idea being measured in the community. 
If the community feels more strongly about an idea, in this case happiness, there is a 
clustering near the bottom of the lattice. The fully realized lattice, rotated ninety degrees, 
shows a normal distribution. 
The possible bijective actor cardinality (Bp), the total number of actors that could 
be bijectively present on a level, is 2 to the power of the level in question, quantity, times 
the number of cardinal groups possible, quantity, times n. Bp = ((2L)Cp)n. 
 
Injective Cardinality (J) 
The idea of injective cardinality relates to the rule that any set may be divided into 
the sets that it could be made of. This is axiom 5, the axiom of unions. This is in effect 
the number of available paths for relationships to take. The software available does not 
figure this value yet, and so it must be done manually. It is a simple enough process of 
examining each concept on a level and summing the lines reaching down from the 
concepts. Surjective cardinality is the inversion of this procedure, numerating the ties 
reaching up the lattice. 
The Possible Injective Cardinality (Jp) is simple to figure. Multiply the level times 
the cardinal groups possible (L*Cp).  
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Composite Cardinality (M) 
Composite cardinality is the sum of actors on the level who appear in the unique 
lattice, lattice 5. The computer application does not provide this information, and so it is 
necessary to sum the actors in the level manually. This is a simple process. Each actor is 
in the concept that uniquely describes their responses to the survey, and so across the 
whole lattice the sum of composite cardinality will always be n. The composite 
cardinality possible for each concept is equal to n, as it is possible that everyone could 
agree completely about that concept, and if that were the case then the composite 
cardinality would be equal to n in that concept and 0 in all others. The potential 
composite cardinality is n for all levels of analysis because the total for the matrix will 
never exceed n. Also, n is found at the top level of the bijective cardinality matrix. 
The number of actors present in a concept or level, and only in that concept or level, is its 
cardinality. This is the most complete measure of the concepts where an actor belongs 
and accurately describes the structure of concepts in an idea, but does not describe the 
group as a whole. This is useful in a case study where the universe is the community and 
the unit of analysis is the individual. This level of analysis is useful in describing the 
contours of the community if the actors are in isolation from one another. But to capture 
the relationships of the notions contained in the questions, as they reveal the interrelations 
of the members of the community through the idea being broadly measured, it is 
necessary to stack these values moving up the lattice. That stacked value is the bijective 
cardinality. 
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